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Abstract
Advances in ubiquitous mobile computing has given rise to the pervasive deploy-
ment of physical devices embedded with sensors, software, and wireless commu-
nications that collect and exchange data. These devices are adept for deployment
in environments with minimal existing infrastructure, as the devices themselves
become the components of a functioning network. With the addition of mobil-
ity, these devices operate where disruption between entities is high, resulting in
dynamic, fragmented, and ephemeral networks. Such networks are considered
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). The pervasiveness of DTN nodes, and their
varied deployment environments leads to two important motivations for securing
DTNs. First, the data collected, stored, and transferred between nodes can be
of high value due to commercial, safety, or national security reasons. Second,
persistent threats from adversaries are common. Consequently, the development
of techniques to secure communications from persistent threats from within a
DTN is an important area of research.
One particular challenge that is foundational for securing DTN is public key
management, in particular the provision of public key authentication. This is the
ability for a node to verify the identity-public key binding of another node. The
lack of public key authentication provides an adversary the capability of modify-
ing the identity-public key bindings. This allows them to eavesdrop and modify
contents of communications, as well as assume identities of others in the network
for authentication purposes. As a result, the ability to verify the identity-public
key binding is foundational to providing confidentiality, integrity, and message
authentication that ensures security in a DTN. Public key authentication is
achieved using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Centralised hierarchical PKI
implementations rely on pre-established trust in a Certificate Authority (CA),
while decentralised implementations such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) rely on
humans for trust establishment. These two methods of public key authentication
iii
are unsuitable in an autonomous DTN, where there is no pre-established trust,
and human involvement. Therefore, distributed, self-organised, and autonomous
approaches for providing public key authentication and key management are
needed.
The work presented in this thesis addresses the above challenges and makes
several related contributions. The first contribution of this thesis is the devel-
opment and evaluation of a proof-of-concept public key authentication scheme
for DTNs. The proposed scheme called the Leverage of Common Friends (LCF)
trust system, utilised a trust system to provide confidence in the identity-key
binding of an autonomous DTN node. The scheme was evaluated by introducing
an adversarial agent performing a key spoof attack, and was effective in mitigat-
ing the distribution of adversarial keys by 40%.
The second contribution is the evaluation of the LCF trust system in a re-
alistic large scale geographic environment with a large quantity of autonomous
nodes. The proposed scheme was subjected to mobility movement data of taxi
cabs in downtown San Francisco, along with the introduction of varying amounts
and varieties of adversarial agents. The trust system was successful in mitigating
the distribution of adversarial keys in some experiments by 70%.
The third contribution is the development and evaluation of a public key au-
thentication scheme that expanded the LCF trust system to include co-localisation
information. The proposed scheme called Location based Leverage of Com-
mon Friends (LLCF) was also evaluated to the realistic mobility movement data
and varying quantities and varieties of adversarial agents. The addition of co-
localisation data was found to improve security against stationary adversaries
by an additional 50% in comparison to the LCF trust system, at a small cost of
13% to key distribution performance.
The fourth contribution of the thesis is the development and evaluation of
an unplanned public key revocation and replacement scheme for autonomous
DTNs. The proposed scheme was developed and evaluated for an environment
with no Trusted Third Party (TTP) or human involvement, and was simulated
on a large geographic scale. The public key revocation and replacement scheme
was found to be successful in the timely removal of the old public key, and the
efficient distribution of the new public key, even whilst under internal attack
from adversaries. A typical experiment resulted in an additional 35% more new
public keys being distributed, while reducing the adversary keys by 40%.
iv
Dedication
To my Dad.
v
vi
Contents
Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
Previously Published Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Aims and Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Organisation of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 2 Background and Related Works 11
2.1 Delay Tolerant Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Background on Trust and Reputation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Trust Computation Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Background on Key Management through PKI . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Hierarchical PKI (with Hierarchical Trust) . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2 Distributed PKI (with Transitive Trust) . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Existing DTN Trust and Reputation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Existing DTN Key Management Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.1 Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2 Revocation and Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vii
2.6 Research Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chapter 3 DTN Key Distribution 59
3.1 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Key Distribution System Model and Security Properties . . . . . 62
3.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.2 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.4 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.5 Adversary Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2.6 Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) Trust System . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Trust Weighting Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.2 Adversary Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.4 Security and Performance Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . 80
3.6 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6.1 Public Key Distribution Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6.2 Black Hat Public Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6.3 Spoofed ID Public Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Chapter 4 DTN Location Based Key Distribution 93
4.1 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Location Based Key Distribution SystemModel and Security Prop-
erties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.2 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2.4 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.2.5 Adversary Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.6 Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
viii
4.3 Location based Leverage of Common Friends trust system . . . . 104
4.4 Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.1 Movement Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.2 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.3 Adversary Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.5 Security and Performance Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . 117
4.5 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5.1 White Key and Black Key Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5.2 Spoofed ID Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5.3 Key Trust Value Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.5.4 Public Key Distribution Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Chapter 5 DTN Key Revocation and Replacement 139
5.1 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.2 Key Revocation System Model and Security Properties . . . . . . 143
5.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2.2 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.2.4 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2.5 Adversary Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.6 Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.3 New Key Revocation and Replacement Process . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.3.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3.2 Remove Only (RO) Revocation Scheme (without trust trans-
ferral) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3.3 Remove and Replace (RR) Revocation Scheme (with ab-
solute trust transferral) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.3.4 Distributed Signing (DS) Revocation Scheme . . . . . . . . 154
5.4 Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.4.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4.2 Adversary Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.4.4 Security Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
ix
5.5 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.5.1 Public Key Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.5.2 Revocation Certificate Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.5.3 Comparison of Revocation Certificate and Key Distributions186
5.5.4 Revocation Certificate Trust Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5.5.5 Comparison of Revocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Chapter 6 Conclusion 197
6.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.2.1 Trust Weighting Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.2.2 Movement Model Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.2.3 Inclusion of Time and Freshness of Data . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.2.4 Incomplete Data Bundle Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.2.5 Distribution of New Public Key via Revocation Certificate
Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.2.6 LCF Trust and DS Revocation Schemes for CA Management203
6.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Chapter A LCF Key Distribution over Time Results 205
Chapter B LCF Key Distribution Results 209
Chapter C LLCF White/Black Key Results 213
Chapter D LLCF Key Trust Distribution Results 215
Chapter E LLCF Key Trust Five Number Summary Results 225
Chapter F LLCF Key Distribution over Time Results 227
Chapter G Revoked Key Results 233
Chapter H New Public Key Results 243
Chapter I Spoofed Revocation Key Results 253
x
Chapter J White Hat Certificates Results 261
Chapter K Spoofed Revocation Certificates Results 271
Bibliography 279
xi
xii
List of Figures
2.1 Public Key Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Centralised Trust and Reputation System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Decentralised Trust and Reputation System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Public Key Lifecycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Certificate Registration Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Hierarchies and Chain of Trust in a CA based PKI. . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Trust relationship model between nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8 Research Categories and Area gaps identified and addressed in
this thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Common Trust Weighting (tc) variations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Key distribution over time with varying connection time delay. . . 74
3.3 Public key exchange with no trust system (absolute trust). . . . . 75
3.4 Public key exchange with random trust assignment. . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Public key exchange with LCF trust assignment. . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Placement of nodes in simulation space and number of keys for
each node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7 Direct and Approved key distribution over time for LCF Scenario. 83
3.8 Direct and Approved key distribution over time for the different
trust systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.9 Black Hat key distribution over time for the different trust systems. 87
4.1 Boundaries of Simulation Space in relation to the City of San
Francisco (http://mapbox.com). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2 Location tracking of a single node in the City Vehicle Model. . . . 109
4.3 Number of active nodes over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4 Placement of nodes in simulation space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5 Direct key distribution over time for Random Path and City Ve-
hicle Movement Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
xiii
4.6 Key Distribution over Time for City Vehicle Movement Model. . . 113
4.7 Establishing initial trust between two nodes for LLCF Scenario. . 115
4.8 Key Trust Distribution for 10% Static Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . 127
4.9 Key Trust Distribution for 10% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes. . . . . 128
4.10 Five number summary for Black and White keys for 10% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.11 Key Distribution over Time for no Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . 133
4.12 Key Distribution over Time for 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . 134
5.1 Remove Only (RO) Revocation Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2 Remove and Replace (RR) Revocation Process. . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3 Distributed Signing (DS) Revocation Request Signing Process. . . 156
5.4 DS Revocation Request Signing Acceptance Process. . . . . . . . 157
5.5 Receiving a DS Revocation Certificate Process. . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.6 Black Hat Nodes detect key revocation process and initiate Sybil
Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.7 Black Hat Nodes performing Revocation Attack over Time at 10%
of Node Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.8 Revoked Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes. . . 168
5.9 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes
(Multiplying Attack). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.10 New Public Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes. 171
5.11 New Public Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes 173
5.12 Percentage of nodes with New Public Keys for each experiment. . 175
5.13 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 10% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5.14 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Keys for each ex-
periment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.15 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with no Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.16 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.17 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.18 Percentage of True Positives (White Hat Node with White Certs)
for Multiplying Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
xiv
5.19 Percentage of False Positives (White Hat Node with Black Certs)
for Multiplying Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
A.1 Direct and Approved key distribution over time for Control Scenario.205
A.2 Direct and Approved key distribution over time for Random Sce-
nario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.3 Direct and Approved key distribution over time for LCF Scenario. 207
D.1 Key Trust Distribution for 0% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . 216
D.2 Key Trust Distribution for 1% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes. . . . . 217
D.3 Key Trust Distribution for 1% Static Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . 218
D.4 Key Trust Distribution for 10% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes. . . . . 219
D.5 Key Trust Distribution for 10% Static Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . 220
D.6 Key Trust Distribution for 20% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes. . . . . 221
D.7 Key Trust Distribution for 20% Static Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . 222
D.8 Key Trust Distribution for 30% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes. . . . . 223
D.9 Key Trust Distribution for 30% Static Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . 224
E.1 Key Trust Five Number Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
F.1 Key Distribution over Time for no Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . 227
F.2 Key Distribution over Time for 1% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . 228
F.3 Key Distribution over Time for 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . 229
F.4 Key Distribution over Time for 20% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . 230
F.5 Key Distribution over Time for 30% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . 231
G.1 Revoked Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes. . . 233
G.2 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 1 Black Hat Node. . . . 234
G.3 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 1% Black Hat Nodes. . 235
G.4 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 5% Black Hat Nodes. . 236
G.5 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes. . 237
G.6 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 15% Black Hat Nodes. . 238
G.7 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 20% Black Hat Nodes. . 239
G.8 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 25% Black Hat Nodes. . 240
G.9 Revoked Key Distribution over time with 30% Black Hat Nodes. . 241
H.1 New Public Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes. 243
H.2 New Public Key Distribution over time with 1 Black Hat Node. . 244
xv
H.3 New Public Key Distribution over time with 1% Black Hat Nodes. 245
H.4 New Public Key Distribution over time with 5% Black Hat Nodes. 246
H.5 New Public Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes.247
H.6 New Public Key Distribution over time with 15% Black Hat Nodes.248
H.7 New Public Key Distribution over time with 20% Black Hat Nodes.249
H.8 New Public Key Distribution over time with 25% Black Hat Nodes.250
H.9 New Public Key Distribution over time with 30% Black Hat Nodes.251
I.1 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 1 Black Hat
Node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
I.2 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 1% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
I.3 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 5% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
I.4 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 10% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
I.5 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 15% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
I.6 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 20% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
I.7 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 25% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
I.8 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 30% Black
Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
J.1 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with no Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
J.2 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 1 Black Hat Node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
J.3 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 1% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
J.4 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 5% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
J.5 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
xvi
J.6 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 15% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
J.7 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 20% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
J.8 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 25% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
J.9 Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 30% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
K.1 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 1 Black Hat Node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
K.2 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 1% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
K.3 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 5% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
K.4 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
K.5 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 15% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
K.6 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 20% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
K.7 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 25% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
K.8 Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over
time with 30% Black Hat Nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
xvii
xviii
List of Tables
3.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Classification of Nodes and their Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Experimental Simulation Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Experiment 1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5 Averaged Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Classification of Nodes and their Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3 Experimental Simulation Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.4 Static Black Hat Node Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.5 Dynamic Black Hat Node Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.6 Spoofed ID Key Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.7 Percentage of Approved Keys that are Spoofed ID Keys . . . . . . 125
4.8 Average Key Trust Assigned by White Hat Nodes . . . . . . . . . 130
5.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2 Classification of Nodes and their Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.3 Experimental Simulation Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.4 Average Trust Value of Revocation Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5.5 Comparison of Revocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B.1 Experiment 1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
B.2 Experiment 2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
B.3 Experiment 3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
B.4 Experiment 4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
B.5 Experiment 5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
B.6 Experiment 6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
C.1 Static Black Hat Node Raw Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . 213
C.2 Dynamic Black Hat Node Raw Experiment Results . . . . . . . . 214
xix
xx
List of Acronyms
ADOPT Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust
CA Certificate Authority
CBD Central Business District
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSR Certificate Signing Request
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
DS Distributed Signing
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
DTN Delay Tolerant Network
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EU European Union
FRESH Fresher Encounter SearcH
GPG GNU Privacy Guard
GPS Global Positioning System
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
IBC Identity Based Cryptography
IoT Internet of Things
xxi
IP Internet Protocol
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
ITS Intelligent Transportation System
KDC Key Distribution Centre
KGC Key Generation Centre
LCF Leverage of Common Friends
LLCF Location based Leverage of Common Friends
MANET Mobile Ad-Hoc Network
MITM Man In The Middle
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
P2P Peer to Peer
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PKG Private Key Generator
PROPHET PRObabilistic Protocol using History of Encounters and
Transitivity
QoS Quality of Service
RA Registration Authority
RO Remove Only
RR Remove and Replace
RSU Road Side Unit
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTP Trusted Third Party
xxii
US United States
V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V Vehicle to Vehicle
VANET Vehicle Ad-Hoc Network
VARS Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network Reputation System
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
xxiii
xxiv
Declaration
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To
the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signed: Date: 2016.04.11
xxv
QUT Verified Signature
xxvi
Previously Published Material
The following articles have been published, and contain material based on the
content of this thesis.
• Journal Papers
 C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, and P. Corke, Establishing Initial Trust
in Autonomous Delay Tolerant Networks without Centralised PKI,
Computers & Security, vol. 39, Part B, pp. 299 - 314, 2013.
 C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, S. Camtepe, and P. Corke, A Self-Organising
Initial Trust Establishment Scheme for Autonomous VANETs, Jour-
nal of Networks and Computer Applications, (In Revision).
 C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, S. Camtepe, and P. Corke, Revocation and
Update of Trust in Autonomous Delay Tolerant Networks, Comput-
ers & Security, 2016. (Article in press).
• Conference Papers
 E. Foo, C. I. Djamaludin, and A. Rakotonirainy, Security Issues for
Future Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), in Proceedings of the
2015 Australasian Road Safety Conference, 2015.
xxvii
xxviii
Acknowledgements
Over the duration it has taken for me to complete this work, many have con-
tributed and encouraged me throughout this process. My appreciation and grat-
itude is heartfelt to the following.
First and foremost, my sincere and heartfelt thanks to Dr. Ernest Foo. Who
has been my principle supervisor, advisor, mentor, and a good friend. This work
would not have been possible without his guidance, wisdom, and technical di-
rection. For his perseverance and endless patience with me, particularly during
times when I was not. This thesis is as much his achievement as it is mine.
Dr. Seyit Camtepe, my associate supervisor and good friend, who through his
mentor-ship and friendship has provided great technical direction, as well as
encouragement at times when it was much needed. His meticulous approach to
proof-reading and generous feedback has greatly improved the quality of research
in this thesis.
Professor Peter Corke, my associate supervisor. For the wealth of experience
he brought to this research, and who guided me through the beginnings of my
research and this work.
Professor Gordon Wyeth, and Associate Professor Geoffrey Walker, who were
both instrumental in motivating me to undertake this research.
To the numerous reviewers who have provided helpful critical feedback on this
work. Their suggestions and improvements have helped focus this research. In
particular, the panel members, Professor Josef Pieprzyk and Dr. Dhammika
Jayalath for their feedback and encouragement in this work.
xxix
Past and present academics of the past Information Security Institute, now In-
formation Security Research Discipline. They include, Professor Colin Boyd,
Professor Ed Dawson, Professor Colin Fidge, Associate Professor Xavier Boyen,
Dr. Leonie Simpson, Dr. Douglas Stebila, and Dr. Desmond Schmidt. For their
encouragement and wealth of broad knowledge collectively.
My fellow colleagues and friends, Dr. Sajal Bhatia, Dr. Farzad Salim, Dr. An-
drew White, Dr. Christophe Hauser, Dr. Chai Wen Chuah, Dr. Sui Guan Teo,
Dr. Kaleb Lee, Dr. Janaka Alawatugoda, Raphael Amoah, James Akande, Ben
Dowling, Qinyi Li, Udyani Herath, David Myers, and Nishchal Kush for their
friendship and support. Special thanks to Thomas Haines who always paid for
coffee.
Nicholas Rodofile, for his friendship, generosity, and frequent outings to lunch.
Dr. Mark Branagan (Special Agent) from , who has provided
, , , and coffee.
The Queensland University of Technology, for the free lunch.
My nieces and nephew, Abigail, Benjamin, and Lilla, for providing a much wel-
comed distraction in the form of Star Wars and Lego.
My brother Daniel and his wife Rachel, and extended family Uncle Ricky, Aunty
Viviana, Mama, for encouraging me.
My Oma, who has always encouraged me, even from the very beginning.
My parents, who has always encouraged and never doubted me throughout this
whole process. They have tirelessly worked to provide an education for me, and
imparted its importance to me. My Dad, to whom this thesis is dedicated to, for
his curiosity to learn, and whom I follow. My Mum, who knows what it's like to
research.
xxx
My amazing wife Rachael, whom I am blessed to have. Who has endured so
much over the years, supported me in everything, and is instrumental in my mo-
tivation for this thesis. My heartfelt appreciation and gratitude for all that you
have endured and done, and all that you have endured and done that I didn't
know. These words are as much yours, as they are mine.
And finally, to God. For without Him, I am nothing.
xxxi
xxxii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Advances in a combination of fields ranging from semi-conductor design, power
and battery technology, and wireless communications have given rise to ubiqui-
tous mobile computing. Physical objects embedded with sensors, software, and
wireless communications that collect and exchange data. These devices are em-
bedded everywhere, and their pervasiveness has now encompassed every part of
modern society. Having now been heavily reliant on these devices for communi-
cations (mobile phones and tablets), commuting (Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems (ITSs)), manufacturing (control, monitoring and instrumentation systems),
health (health monitoring devices), and national security (battlefield networks
and autonomous drones). Typically, these devices are connected to the Internet,
to make the Internet of Things (IoT). However, due to the mobility of devices,
and deployment environments, there is an increase in network applications where
disruption between network entities is high. These networks are considered Delay
Tolerant Networks (DTNs) or Disruption Tolerant Networks.
Securing such networks has become a deliberate necessity for two reasons.
First, the data collected, stored and transferred can be of high value due to
commercial, safety, personal, or national security reasons. Second, the sheer
pervasiveness of these devices means they are varied, numerous, and potentially
deployed in hostile environments. These two reasons results in a high probability
for adversaries to operate in the network, and the motivation for compromising
the network is attractive.
In comparison to conventional networks, DTNs are highly dynamic and dis-
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tributed networks that create opportunistic ephemeral connections between nodes
that can span large geographic areas. There is no guarantee that a reliable source
to destination path can be maintained for long periods of time. This means infor-
mation transfer between mobile nodes is in the form of data bundles, as a store-
carry-and-forward scheme relayed through multiple intermediary autonomous
nodes or through multiple paths. Since multiple intermediary nodes will store,
carry, and forward a data bundle, it is important to provide some general security
properties in the network. Confidentiality is required when information in the
data bundle is intended only for the source and destination nodes. Intermediate
carrier nodes passing on data bundles may eavesdrop on information unintended
to be disclosed to them. Integrity of data is also required, as there is the po-
tential for the modification of information as it is passed between intermediate
carrier nodes. In some applications, it may be required for both the data source
and contents of the data be verifiable, thereby providing message authentication.
Typically these general security properties can be achieved using combinations
of cryptographic technologies such as cryptographic hash functions, and private
and public (asymmetric) keys. One aspect of providing security to protect and
mitigate from such attacks is Key Management and Public Key Authentication,
which is the subject of this thesis.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 provides
a brief overview of security in DTNs, public key authentication, its importance,
and application to autonomous DTNs. It also explains the research motivation of
this thesis. Section 1.2 states the overarching research objective and identifies the
related research questions associated. Section 1.3 summarises the contributions
of this thesis. Finally, Section 1.4 outlines the overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The implementation of a public key cryptographic system to achieve these secu-
rity properties in a DTN raises the important issue of Public Key Authentication:
The ability for an entity to verify the identity-public key binding of another en-
tity. Without public key authentication, any adversary would be capable of
modifying the identity-public key bindings to eavesdrop on passing communica-
tions, modify the contents of data bundles, and change the origin of the data.
Because of this, the concept of public key authentication is the foundation from
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which all other security properties are achieved. It is therefore a significant as-
pect of security. An example is in the critical application of battlefield networks.
Soldiers are often deployed in environments that are remote, isolated, and void
of any infrastructure. Their mobility and lack of infrastructure forms a DTN.
To operate safely and effectively, soldiers require many security properties such
as confidentiality, data integrity, and message authentication. Communications
between members of the group will need to be confidential, as to prevent the
adversary from eavesdropping on battle plans, movements and orders. Data in-
tegrity of the messages sent is required to prevent intentional tampering and
modification. Without data integrity, orders such as "Enemy location 27-28-
0 S, 153-2-0-E" can be modified to "Enemy location 28-27-0 S, 163-2-0-E" by
adversarial agents. In addition, message authentication, the requirement to au-
thenticate the source of a message is important. Soldiers will want to ensure
an order was sent by their group commander, not an adversary. An adversary
is capable of performing these attacks if there is no public key authentication.
Key spoof attacks can lead to Man In The Middle (MITM) and Sybil attacks,
thereby undermining the entire security architecture of the network. As a result,
public key authentication is a critical aspect of security in any network, and its
provision is still an open research problem.
The provision of public key authentication is through Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI), a set of policies dependent on the concept of trust. Conventional
networks with dependable infrastructure components such as the Internet rely
on a centralised Trusted Third Party (TTP) where trust is binary; either the
party is trustworthy or untrustworthy. While more distributed models such as
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) utilise discrete states; where human reasoning is re-
quired to determine the criteria for each state. While such PKI implementations
are suitable to conventional networks, the characteristics of DTNs make them
unsuitable for public key authentication. The problem is further compounded
with the lack of human intervention to guide trust in an autonomous DTN. The
use of a trust or reputation system in autonomous networks is already feasible to
provide assurance and security. However, its application to assist the provision
of public key authentication is still an active area for research and development.
Over the years, ubiquitous mobile computing has encompassed every part of
modern society. With autonomous DTNs now being deployed in greater numbers
and in more hostile environments, the information collected, stored and trans-
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ferred has forced the necessity to secure it. As a result, providing public key
authentication in autonomous DTNs is critical to securing communications and
data in such networks.
1.2 Research Aims and Questions
The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate, develop, and evaluate tech-
niques to provide public key authentication during all phases of public key man-
agement for a DTN comprising of autonomous nodes. From this overall aim, the
following research questions have been identified from the various phases of key
management:
Research Question 1: Can a trust or reputation system be utilised to assist
in DTN Key Distribution such that Public Key Authentication can be achieved
without a trusted third party, but by automatically including mobility parameters,
behaviour, and levels of collaboration into trust? This question explores the
utilisation of a trust or reputation system to address public key authentication.
The background and related work presented in Chapter 2 indicates that trust and
reputation systems are used to provide adversary detection or optimal message
routing. The literature also explores that public key authentication during key
distribution is traditionally achieved by a TTP such as a Certificate Authority
(CA) or signing keys through a Web of Trust. Combining these two concepts
directly addresses the issue of public key authentication between autonomous
nodes during the key distribution phase.
Research Question 2: Is it possible to apply a trust or reputation system for
DTN Key Distribution for a large scale realistic DTN application? This question
further investigates the suitability and effectiveness of a public key authentication
scheme for DTNs. Previous proposals for providing public key authentication in
DTNs evaluate the schemes in small, controlled, and closed environments. The
potential pervasive deployment of DTN nodes creates questions on how security
is designed and implemented for larger scale realistic DTNs. In particular, where
persistent adversarial agents exist in the network.
Research Question 3: Is it possible to leverage location data to assist a
trust or reputation system for DTN Key Distribution? DTN applications such
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as Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) are large scale realistic environments.
VANET nodes (cars, taxis, buses) also provide additional resources in the form
of Global Positioning System (GPS) driven location data. This additional in-
formation may assist autonomous nodes in public key authentication by feeding
location data into a trust or reputation system.
Research Question 4: Is it possible to utilise a trust or reputation system
to assist in DTN Key Revocation such that Public Key Authentication can be
achieved without a trusted third party? Key revocation is an integral phase of
the key management lifecycle. Effective key management schemes have provi-
sions for the efficient removal of public keys from operation. Traditional key
revocation schemes, are heavily reliant on a TTP or human intervention. This is
to provide the necessary public key authentication to prevent false and erroneous
key revocation by an adversarial agent. Extending public key authentication for
the key revocation phase when the entities are autonomous, with no human
intervention gives rise to this research question.
Research Question 5: Is it possible to provide trust transferral of an old
compromised public key to a newly generated public key without a trusted third
party during an unplanned key revocation event? This final research question
addresses a specific un-addressed but critical revocation event. Revocation of
public keys may be planned, due to a finite lifetime for keys, or organisational and
environmental policy. Trust transferral between the old public key, and the new
public key can be transferred through various planned and organised methods
(see Section 2.3 for details). However, the unplanned scenario where public keys
need to be revoked is usually due to private key compromise by an adversary.
In this scenario, trust transferral between the old public key and the new public
key is either non-existent, or difficult, and requires human intervention. The
motivation to provide trust transferral between the old public key and the new
public key for autonomous nodes gives rise to this final research question.
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis has provided various research contributions to DTNs, by providing
secure key management for DTNs using trust and reputation systems. More
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specifically, this research has resulted in the following contributions and out-
comes:
Contribution 1: Chapter 3 investigated, developed, and evaluated a proof-
of-concept public key authentication scheme. The proposed scheme called the
Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) trust system, extended previous research in
this field by utilising a trust system to provide public key authentication in an au-
tonomous DTN, thereby addressing Research Question 1. The proposed scheme
implemented a common and effective linear trust computation engine that was
evaluated in extensive simulations with the introduction of an adversarial agent.
The results from the evaluation, showed the system significantly mitigated the
impact an adversary would have on the network. To the best of our knowledge,
no other key distribution scheme for autonomous DTNs has utilised a trust or
reputation system to assist with key management. This research outcome led to
the following publication:
C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, and P. Corke, Establishing Initial Trust in Au-
tonomous Delay Tolerant Networks without Centralised PKI, Computers
& Security, vol. 39, Part B, pp. 299 - 314, 2013.
Contribution 2: Chapter 4 evaluated the proof-of-concept public key authen-
tication scheme proposed in Chapter 3 by deploying and simulating it in a re-
alistic large scale geographic environment with a large quantity of autonomous
nodes, over a longer duration, thereby addressing Research Question 2. The
proposed scheme was subjected to mobility movement data from taxi cabs in
downtown San Francisco, along with the introduction of varying amounts and
varieties of adversarial agents. The public key authentication scheme proposed
in Chapter 3 was evaluated and found to be successful in providing public key
authentication, as public keys of legitimate nodes were distributed, whilst miti-
gating the impact of multiple adversaries.
Chapter 4 also investigated, developed, and evaluated an extension of the
public key authentication scheme proposed in Chapter 3 with the addition of
co-localisation information to the trust system. The proposed scheme called
Location based Leverage of Common Friends (LLCF) was also evaluated to the
realistic mobility movement model and varying quantities and varieties of adver-
sarial agents. The addition of co-localisation data was found to improve security
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against stationary adversaries at a small cost to key distribution performance.
This research contribution addresses Research Question 3. Addressing Research
Questions 2 and 3 has led to the following publications:
E. Foo, C. I. Djamaludin, and A. Rakotonirainy, Security Issues for Fu-
ture Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), in Proceedings of the 2015 Aus-
tralasian Road Safety Conference, 2015.
C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, S. Camtepe, and P. Corke, A Self-Organising
Initial Trust Establishment Scheme for Autonomous VANETs, Journal of
Networks and Computer Applications, (In Revision).
Contribution 3: Chapter 5 presents an unplanned public key revocation and
replacement scheme for autonomous DTNs. The proposed scheme was developed
and evaluated for an environment with no TTP or human intervention, and was
simulated on a similar scale as the evaluation of Chapter 4. This addressed
Research Question 4. The public key revocation and replacement scheme was
found to be successful in the timely removal of the old public key, and the effi-
cient distribution of the new public key, even whilst under internal attack from
adversaries. Chapter 5 also investigates trust transferral between the old public
key and new public key during an unplanned revocation event, through the use
of the trust system employed during the key distribution phase. This addresses
Research Question 5. To the best of our knowledge, no other key revocation and
replacement scheme for autonomous DTNs has addressed public key revocation
and replacement with the provision of trust transferral. Addressing Research
Questions 4 and 5 has led to the following publication:
C. I. Djamaludin, E. Foo, S. Camtepe, and P. Corke, Revocation and
Update of Trust in Autonomous Delay Tolerant Networks, Computers &
Security, 2016. (Article in press).
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
The following five chapters of this thesis are organised as follows:
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Chapter 2 introduces the concepts of DTNs, in particular the characteristics,
routing, applications, and challenges that differentiate a DTN to traditional net-
works such as the Internet. Two concepts important to this research are also
covered. The first is trust and reputation systems. General concepts of trust
and reputation systems and how they are important for the operation of an au-
tonomous network are outlined. It also covers commonly implemented trust and
reputation system architectures and computation engines. The second concept
is PKI and Key Management. This includes an overview of the general concepts
of PKI, in particular the two traditional methodologies of providing public key
authentication, CAs and OpenPGP Web of Trust. Specific trust and reputation
system proposals for DTNs and VANETs are also discussed, in particular how
they are applied for adversary detection and optimal message routing. More
specific key management proposals for DTNs and VANETs are also discussed,
focussing on the two key management phases of interest; distribution, and revo-
cation.
Chapter 3 proposes a public key distribution scheme that integrates a trust
system to provide public key authentication. The chapter provides a proof-of-
concept implementation called LCF using a common and effective linear com-
putation engine that leverages social contacts between autonomous nodes. A
selection of trust variables and weightings are analysed. The implementation is
simulated in a controlled closed environment with an adversarial agent to evalu-
ate various security and performance metrics. The results indicated an effective
mitigation of the adversary from distributing spoofed keys by exploiting the lack
of a TTP to provide public key authentication.
Chapter 4 built on the LCF proof-of-concept public key distribution scheme
developed in Chapter 3 by deploying it in a realistic VANET environment. It
was also extended with the addition of co-localisation data to form a location
based trust system for key distribution called LLCF. Both LCF and LLCF trust
systems were evaluated using a realistic mobility movement model of taxi cabs
in downtown San Francisco. The evaluation tested the scalability of both trust
systems for deployment in a large scale geographic environment, with a large
quantity of nodes. Varying quantities and varieties of adversarial agents were also
introduced to evaluate the effectiveness of both trust systems in mitigating a key
spoof attack. Both stationary and moving adversaries were introduced to help
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determine the impact of including co-localisation data in the LLCF trust system.
The results from the experiments showed significant mitigation of spoofed public
keys in the network for both the LCF and LLCF trust systems. The addition
of co-localisation data in the LLCF trust system provided additional security
against a stationary adversary at minimal cost to performance.
Chapter 5 proposes a decentralised public key revocation and replacement
scheme that provides trust transferral between the old public key and new pub-
lic key during an unplanned revocation. The scheme was compared and evaluated
to similar LCF based revocation schemes using a simulation environment similar
to the experiments of Chapter 4. Varying quantities and varieties of adversarial
agents performing a Sybil attack were also introduced to evaluate the effective-
ness of old key removal, new key distribution, and trust transferral. The results
from the experiments showed significant mitigation of spoofed public keys in the
network from adversaries, as well as the complete prevention of an adversary
triggering a false revocation event.
Chapter 6 concludes and summarises the research outcomes and results pre-
sented in this thesis. Future work derived from this research is also discussed.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
The primary research aim of this thesis, as described in Chapter 1, is to provide
a complete decentralised key management scheme for autonomous Delay Toler-
ant Networks (DTNs). In particular, the provision of Public Key Authentication
during the various key management phases. Public key authentication is the
ability for an entity to verify the identity-public key binding of another entity.
This concept provides the foundation for security in a DTN. Figure 2.1a depicts
a traditional hierarchical Certificate Authority (CA) trust model for public key
authentication. Pre-established trust in the CA (A) by all nodes (B, C, D) pro-
vides public key authentication, and by extension entity authentication between
two nodes (C and D). In contrast, Figure 2.1b depicts a distributed Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) trust model for public key authentication. Initial trust is
established between network entities by humans, and everyone is their own CA.
Alice (A) and Bob (B) provide public key authentication to each other. Bob
(B) and Carol (C) also provide public key authentication to each other. En-
tity authentication is achieved through Bob acting as the CA between Alice and
Carol. The CA model in Figure 2.1a requires pre-established trust in a central
CA, while the PGP model in Figure 2.1b requires humans to provide the initial
trust establishment. However, there exists a case scenario for autonomous DTNs
where neither pre-established trust or humans are available. Thereby creating
the problem of public key authentication in an autonomous DTN as depicted in
Figure 2.1c.
To provide public key authentication for the various key management phases
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(a) CA - With Pre-established Trust
(b) PGP - With Human Trust Establishment
(c) DTN - With Autonomous Trust Establishment
Figure 2.1: Public Key Authentication
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in an autonomous DTN, several important concepts are covered. First, essential
background on the DTN environment, applications and routing are covered, as
this provides the motivation of securing communications in a DTN. Autonomous
DTN applications dictate how trust and reputation systems are utilised to pro-
vide adversary detection and general management of the network with no human
involvement. An outline of existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and how
they provide public key authentication through different methodologies are also
covered. Together, trust and key management are two important concepts in
providing public key authentication. Finally, more specific DTN applications of
trust and reputation systems as well as PKI schemes are reviewed to identify
existing issues and research gaps for the contribution of this thesis.
This chapter outlines the background and related works, with additional spe-
cific literature expanded in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Each of these chapters will
continue the gap analysis specific to the contributions of each chapter. This
chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the concept and charac-
teristics of DTNs and how they differ from traditional networks. Issues such as
network traffic routing, applications, and current and future challenges are also
considered. Section 2.2 provides a background on trust and reputation systems
and an overview on how they can be applied to autonomous DTNs. Different
architecture and trust computation engines are also discussed. Section 2.3 covers
background on two different types of existing PKI and how they provide public
key authentication. Related work on more specific applications of DTN trust
and reputation system and PKI schemes are discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 re-
spectively. From these schemes, Section 2.6 then presents the research challenges
associated with providing the complete decentralised key management solution
for autonomous DTNs. Finally the chapter is summarised in Section 2.7.
2.1 Delay Tolerant Networks
Securing DTNs is necessary due to their characteristics and potential applica-
tions in hostile environments. They consist of highly mobile nodes that are inter-
mittently connected, often forming opportunistic ephemeral connections [8, 132].
These networks typically have very long delay network paths and lack a complete
source-to-destination path [72]. In existing Transmission Control Protocol/In-
ternet Protocol (TCP/IP) based networks such as the Internet, a number of
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assumptions on the operation of the network are made. The first is that a per-
sistent end-to-end path exists between the source and destination. The second is
that the maximum round trip between nodes of the network is not excessive in
duration, and the third is that the probability of end-to-end packet loss is small.
One of the foundation papers in DTN research by Fall [40], categorises DTNs as
networks that violate one or more of these assumptions.
Fall [40] compares DTNs to the Internet due to its scale and influence. DTNs
have a high latency and low data rate in comparison. The data flow of the
network is also asymmetric, with one direction of data exceeding the opposite
data flow. In some instances, there may not be any return channel as evident in
submarines, battlefield, or covert communications. Fall also discusses the state of
disconnect between the nodes, in particular how end-to-end disconnection is more
common than connection. This is evident in applications where nodes are highly
mobile, and disconnection due to nodal movement can either be predictable or
opportunistic. DTN applications where nodes are mobile and have a predictable
disconnection include satellite passes with orbital movement, buses, trains and
transportation with timetable scheduling. Applications where mobile nodes are
opportunistic in their disconnection include aspects of randomness, such as nodes
on a random path movement model, or taxis in a city. Fall also outlines that
nodes can be disconnected due to low-duty-cycle operation in nodes which have
limited power resources. Since DTN nodes spend more time disconnected than
connected to other nodes, they also have long queuing times. Messages from the
source node may take several magnitudes of time to reach the destination node.
Due to this delay, it is also resource expensive to re-initiate transmission of the
message from the source.
DTN applications are varied and widespread. With the rise of the Internet
of Things (IoT), DTNs fall into a specific category of IoT devices and appli-
cations. The first are terrestrial mobile networks, where parts of the network
are partitioned either by unintentional reasons such as interference, or from in-
tentional and periodic reasons such as buses that act as data mules for remote
villages. Such a network may exhibit typical characteristics of DTNs, such as
frequent disconnection and high latency. Interplanetary space networks are a
form of DTN, in particular the long distances of deep space networks cause long
delay times, and potential interference from massive objects. Defence networks
for battlefield deployment are a common form of DTNs, where soldiers are de-
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ployed in an area with little or no infrastructure. Ad-hoc networks are created
between the soldiers to provide communications and data between each com-
batant. Such a network may also face intentional signal jamming or Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks from hostile forces. Covert operations or submarines may
operate on an asymmetric data communications link [40] where messages are
received. However, to comply with radio silence, no return message is sent. An
important application of DTNs is of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) and
Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs), where people, mobile devices, and vehicles
become nodes in the network.
The characteristics of a DTN are a contrast to the model of the Internet to-
day. A network that mainly relies on persistent wired or wireless connections to
provide a complete and continuous source to destination path. It has relatively
fast round trip times, and a small probability of packet loss. Many papers such
as Zhu et al. [136], Bhutta et al. [8], and Wood et al. [132] re-iterate the charac-
teristics of DTN systems and emphasise that they are connection opportunistic
in model. These characteristics in contrast to the Internet, result in a different
methodology for securing and routing data communications in a DTN.
2.1.1 Routing
Secure routing in a DTN is important because the data flow and transfer model is
different to a more conventional network such as the Internet. Due to this, differ-
ent security considerations are required. The characteristics of DTNs as outlined
in [40] is that a complete and reliable source to destination path between nodes
is not always present. This can be due to node mobility, limited communications
range, or physical obstructions [53]. Guo et al. [53] outlines that the common
data delivery mechanism in any DTN takes the form of a store-carry-and-forward
scheme, thereby exploiting the mobility of nodes. This method of routing is im-
portant in a DTN, as it forms the primary method of transfer for all data, ranging
from messages, to public keys and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
Routing of data in DTNs can be categorised into two approaches [13]; proac-
tive and reactive. Proactive routing protocols are when nodes store routing in-
formation to every other node in the DTN, while reactive protocols only initiate
route discovery between two nodes when communication is needed. A more re-
cent classification to DTN routing categorises them into the amount of knowledge
used for routing [120].
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Flooding based routing has little to no knowledge of the network, resulting
in all nodes becoming relay intermediaries. Vahdat and Becker [127] proposed
an early message routing scheme using an epidemic flooding model. This scheme
results in high congestion in the network, but provides a quick source to des-
tination route. Improvements to the flooding based routing were proposed by
limiting the number of message instances in the network [125], and limiting the
lifetime of message instances [62, 58].
History based routing relied on past interactions between nodes to provide ad-
ditional information on routing. A node that meets the destination node of a mes-
sage regularly and often is likely to meet again. Proposals such as PRObabilistic
Protocol using History of Encounters and Transitivity (PROPHET) [88] utilised
past encounters to determine the predictability of message delivery to each node,
while the Fresher Encounter SearcH (FRESH) algorithm [34] forwarded messages
to nodes that had encountered the destination node. Contextual information in-
cluding time delay between meeting destination nodes [52], and mobility patterns
of nodes [82] are also utilised to assist in DTN routing.
The addition of social relationships between nodes can help establish message
routing [45]. Hui et al. [69] proposed leveraging social networks to reduce the
source to destination hops for message delivery, by using the bubble algorithm.
This establishes a route between the most popular nodes of both the source and
destination social networks.
The final approach to data routing in DTNs is special devices. This approach
includes the use of dedicated messenger nodes [133]. Nodes wanting to send
a message push data to these messenger nodes, who are then responsible for
delivering the message. Messenger nodes that specifically pull data are considered
as data mules, such as trains and buses that pass access points and pull awaiting
messages. Proposals that utilise messenger nodes may share messenger nodes
between multiple DTN nodes [23, 128], or provide dedicated messenger nodes for
each DTN node [53].
The various approaches to message routing in a DTN can be utilised for
different messages. A flooding based approach would be best utilised for the
dissemination of a blacklist of malicious nodes, or a CRL. The combination of
history based routing and social relationships assists in trust and reputation,
while the deployment of special devices in the form of static infrastructure Road
Side Units (RSUs) for VANETs would assist in message routing. However, ir-
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respective of the type data that is being routed, it is passed through multiple
intermediary nodes as no persistent end-to-end connection is available, making
DTNs highly susceptible to Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks. It therefore
becomes important to secure communications and routing in DTNs.
Securing a DTN requires varying and different security considerations than
securing traditional networks. The wide variety of DTN applications results in
scalability issues. DTN schemes are required to be flexible and scalable to pro-
vide security from small unplanned and unmanaged deployments, to large scale
vehicular deployments. Common between all DTN deployments is the general
method of routing. Characteristics such as mobility and frequent disconnection
result in a store-carry-and-forward routing scheme, which rely on the nodes to
provide the network and communications infrastructure. This makes a DTN
more susceptible to MITM attacks, as data bundles are passed between inter-
mediary nodes. Key management is the common requirement for the security
mechanisms (confidentiality, integrity, and message authentication) to remedy
these attacks. Key management comes with two inherent fundamental issues:
1. Distribution, operation and revocation of public and private keys using
PKI.
2. Public key authentication - verifying the identity-public key binding of
another entity.
As a result, background on both Trust and PKI are covered in the next two
sections.
2.2 Background on Trust and Reputation Systems
There is an increasing number of DTN deployments where the nodes operate
autonomously, or with little to no human intervention. This is particularly per-
tinent in deployments with large quantities of nodes over large geographic areas,
where the autonomous nature contributes to the ease of network operation and
maintenance. In such applications, trust and reputation systems become an
important security mechanism to allow autonomous operation of DTNs, partic-
ularly in routing, adversary detection, and potentially key management. Trust
is a concept that is evident in daily human interaction. However, it is difficult
18 Chapter 2. Background and Related Works
to define and describe as reflected by the varying publications that attempt to
define the notion of trust and reputation [74].
Josang et al. [74] segregates the notion of trust, and the notion of reputation
into individual components. This thesis will use these definitions of trust and
reputation. Reliability trust as defined by Gambetta [43] is the subjective prob-
ability of individual A expecting another individual B of performing an action
which its welfare depends on. However, Falcone and Castelfranchi [39] note that
a high reliability in an individual may not lead to an action of dependence of
that individual as risks are involved. To include risk based on the stake of the
action, and the probability of failure, McKnight and Chervany [97] define trust
as the following.
Trust is the extent to which one party depends on another with relative security,
even with the possibility of a negative outcome [97].
In general, trust is the relationship that one party has of the other for certain
actions involving risk. It is established through the dealings of the two parties.
Trust systems produce a score or result that subjectively reflects the relationship
between two parties. However, the notion of reputation builds on the notion of
trust, and is defined as the following.
Reputation can be considered a public aggregation and collation of trust of a
party, from members of a community [74].
Josang et al. establishes the difference between trust and reputation. A party
may trust another party because of their good reputation. However, a party can
still trust another party despite a bad reputation. Josang et al. distinguishes that
trust is a direct, personal, and relational phenomenon and carries more weight
over reputation. They also state that in the absence of a direct relationship
between two parties, trust is formed through reputation, second hand relation-
ships, and referrals. Reputation systems produce a public score or result of a
party that is a culmination of the entire community. The decentralised nature of
DTNs makes reputation systems difficult to implement. The lack of a persistent
source to destination channel severely hinders the aggregation of trust scores
from a variety of nodes to form a reputation. This operation is also communi-
cations intensive, resulting in high communications overheads just to aggregate
trust scores, and subsequently distribute reputation scores. These reasons, make
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the application of a trust system independently managed by nodes more suitable
than an aggregated reputation system.
Rasmusson and Jansson [114] have used the terminology hard security and
soft security to distinguish the differences in types of security mechanisms. Hard
security is considered security techniques and mechanisms designed to prevent
malicious users from accessing certain resources. These typically take the form of
access controls or privacy in the form of encryption. However, in some instances,
adversarial agents may be acting deceitfully by offering false and misleading infor-
mation or resources. In these instances, social control mechanisms like trust and
reputation systems can help prevent these scenarios. These control mechanisms
are considered soft security [74].
2.2.1 Architecture
Trust and reputation systems can be categorised by architecture into centralised
and decentralised systems. Both are explored to provide justification of their
application in a DTN.
ACentralised trust and reputation system is where the performance of users
are collected by fellow users and aggregated up to a central authority. Users are
registered to the central authority, and feedback on user behaviour is submitted
to the trust and reputation authority. The central authority or reputation centre
collates the feedback and re-distributes the data publicly for other nodes to
access. Figure 2.2 depicts the architecture of a centralised trust and reputation
system with nodes undergoing transactions. In Figure 2.2a at time τ , nodes A
and B are conducting a transaction as denoted by the bi-directional solid line,
and each feedback to the central trust and reputation authority as denoted by
the uni-directional dotted line. Nodes C and D, and E and F are also performing
a transaction, and also respectively feedback to the central authority. At a
later time denoted by τ + δ in Figure 2.2b, nodes A and C wish to perform a
transaction. They each individually poll the public results of the other party
from the central authority. Node A pulls the reputation score of node C, and
node C pulls the reputation score of node A. Nodes D and E also perform a
similar process to nodes A and C. The reputation scores will then help determine
whether the nodes will undertake a transaction.
A centralised architecture for trust and reputation systems provides a conve-
nient and manageable method for enforcing rules and users. However, centralised
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(a) τ (b) τ + δ
Figure 2.2: Centralised Trust and Reputation System.
systems form a potential single point of failure for both reliability uptime and se-
curity. Scalability is another issue, and can be difficult to implement in networks
with a large number of nodes.
Unlike centralised reputation systems, which rely on a central node for com-
putation and distribution of scores, Decentralised reputation systems rely on
several nodes to measure, rate and individually aggregate scores of other nodes.
A fully distributed reputation system requires each node to maintain scores of
other nodes and make it publicly available to others on request. Each node formu-
lates feedback on another node and retains the information. Another node may
then request this feedback to formulate the reputation of another node, which
may impact a pending transaction. Figure 2.3 depicts a decentralised trust and
reputation system. At time τ in Figure 2.3a, node A performs a transaction
with nodes B and C. Node A then holds the feedback of B and C, and nodes B
and C each hold feedback on node A. Node D is also performing a transaction
with nodes E and F, with D holding feedback on E and F, while nodes E and
F holding feedback on node D. At a later time τ + δ as depicted in Figure 2.3b,
nodes A and D wish to perform a transaction. Since nodes B and C at time τ
performed a transaction with node A, they provide feedback to node D about the
reputation of node A. Nodes E and F provide the feedback reputation of node D
to node A.
A decentralised trust and reputation system provides a more resilient archi-
tecture than a centralised model, as there is no central authority to exploit.
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(a) τ (b) τ + δ
Figure 2.3: Decentralised Trust and Reputation System.
Unlike a centralised architecture, it is possible that nodes may refuse to provide
feedback on other nodes. Due to the decentralised nature of nodes collecting
and forming ratings of other nodes, it may be difficult to acquire all ratings of
past transactions from the various nodes, therefore a reputation score in decen-
tralised models is usually a subset of ratings acquired from neighbouring nodes
[74]. In a DTN environment, neighbouring nodes are determined by the routing
and mobility model of the nodes, resulting in the lack of a persistent end-to-end
communications channel. Therefore, a decentralised architecture is more suited
to a DTN deployment.
2.2.2 Trust Computation Engines
The computation engine is the algorithm or method used to derive a trust or
reputation rating from feedback [74]. Several different theoretical and commercial
computation engines that are relevant to DTN applications are reviewed in this
section.
The simplest form of trust system is a dual state discrete trust system. In
this system, either the node is trustworthy or the node is not trustworthy. Public
key authentication is a form of a dual state discrete trust system, as keys are
either trustworthy or untrustworthy. Additional discrete state models have been
proposed by Manchala [94] and Abdul-rahman and Hailes [1]. Abdul-Rahman
and Hailes [1] proposed a trust reputation model that determines the trustwor-
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thiness of entities based on four discrete trust degrees; Very Trustworthy (VT),
Trustworthy (T), Untrustworthy (U), and Very Untrustworthy (VU). Referrals
or recommendations are also used in this model. Entities can use their own per-
ception of the recommender to scale the recommendation of a third party entity.
If the entity has had experience with the recommended entity, they may use the
difference of trust to rate the recommender and adjust the trust settings accord-
ingly. This method of trust computation engine is effective in applications where
humans are involved, as the categorisation into the discrete trust states requires
reasoning.
The summation of scores or averaging of scores is a simple form of com-
putation engine employed for reputation systems. Summation can take the form
of adding all the positive scores and subtracting all the negative scores. eBay's
reputation system follows this principle. Resnick and Zeckhauser [118] provide
a detailed explanation of how the eBay reputation system operates. Registered
users with eBay can buy and sell anonymously, and prior to February 1999, buy-
ers and sellers were given the opportunity to leave feedback after transactions.
Comments and a numerical ratings of +1 positive feedback, 0 neutral feedback,
and -1 negative feedback were allowed. After February 1999, eBay modified the
system to tie any -1 negative feedback to a particular transaction, and in Febru-
ary 2000, eBay again modified the system to only allow any feedback tied to
the transaction. The final metric score of buyers and sellers is the number of
distinct users who left positive feedback, minus the distinct users who provided
negative feedback. Past history is also considered, with scores from the past 7
days, 1 month, and 6 months publicly displayed. The eBay reputation system
is a centralised system with eBay collecting and aggregating the feedback and
distributing them to users of the website. An extension to summation of scores,
is to average scores. Product review and commerce sites such as Epinions and
Amazon average scores. Both use a similar system of a rating 1 to 5 stars, which
is averaged to provide an overall score. Epinions further segregates the 1 to 5
star rating into categories such as delivery, customer service and ease of use [74].
Summation or averaging computation engines are effective implementations for
a DTN trust system (Section 2.4), as nodes can manage the trust ratings of
other nodes independently. An independent trust system provides nodes with
information on whether to proceed with a transaction with another node without
additional communications overhead that comes with a reputation system.
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Flow models are systems that compute trust through iterations or looped
through long chains [74]. Flow model systems such as PageRank [105], assign
a constant trust weight for the entire system. The system score is distributed
throughout the nodes, such that the trust and reputation score of a node can only
increase at the cost of a decrease in trust value of other nodes [74]. PageRank
works on the principle of looking at the number of incoming hyperlinks that point
to a webpage, which increase the ranking, and the number of outgoing hyperlinks
from the webpage, which decrease the ranking. The combination of PageRank
scores for all the websites total the system score. Even as new webpages are
created, the total system score remains constant with individual PageRank scores
being re-adjusted. PageRank is a centralised trust and reputation architecture,
with the central authority re-adjusting scores to maintain the constant system
score. It requires a holistic view of the entire network to derive values for trust
and reputation.
An extension of PageRank is the flow model trust and reputation system
EigenTrust by Kamvar et al. [75]. EigenTrust is a reputation system imple-
mented on decentralised Peer to Peer (P2P) networks. It assigns a unique global
trust value to each node on the P2P network, derived from the past history of
uploads. The system normalises and aggregates scores from various other nodes,
either centrally or distributed amongst nodes. The applicability of this com-
putation engine in DTNs is hindered by scalability. The scheme requires the
distribution of a collation of local trust values into a combined table, which is
distributed amongst nodes. This results in high communications overhead as the
quantity of nodes in the DTN grows.
This thesis explores a trust scheme that uses a combination of both threshold,
and summation or average computation engine to effectively form a discrete
dual state trust system for autonomous applications, where there is no human
involvement. Trust scores resulting from the summation or average computation
engine that are below the threshold would be considered untrustworthy, whilst
scores above the threshold result in a trustworthy state. Since the trust scores are
local and relevant to the individual node, this scheme provides scalability and no
additional communications overhead. As a result, this scheme is further explored
in this thesis to provide the dual state outcome of public key authentication in
a DTN with autonomous nodes, where there is no human intervention.
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2.3 Background on KeyManagement through PKI
PKI is a procedure of attesting the binding between the identity of a person or
entity and the corresponding public key. In some instances, the entities involved
may have never physically met or interacted with one another. It also provides
a method of distributing public keys to entities for confidentiality, data integrity
and message authentication operations [44], as well as revocation of public keys.
This is called a public key management lifecycle, which is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The stages of key management that are relevant to this thesis are distribution, and
revocation and replacement, which are highlighted in Figure 2.4. In this section,
two methods of public key authentication are categorised based on trust. The
first is a Hierarchical trust approach such as X.509 relying on a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) called a CA. The second is a Transitive trust approach such as
OpenPGP and Web of Trust, where trust is distributed.
Figure 2.4: Public Key Lifecycle.
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2.3.1 Hierarchical PKI (with Hierarchical Trust)
The most common form of hierarchical PKI is a centralised TTP CA model. The
CA is able to provide a binding between the public key and the identified user,
since it is a mutually trusted entity in the network. There may be either a single
entity or multiple entities providing this role. The application of a CA for the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol in the X.509 system will be described.
A public key certificate or more commonly certificate, is a digital document
that proves ownership of a public key. In a typical X.509 PKI system, the public
key contains information about the identity of the owner and is also signed by
an entity who has verified the integrity of the information provided.
Figure 2.5: Certificate Registration Process.
The certificate registration process is shown in Figure 2.5. The user generates
a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), which includes their public key, and is
signed by their private key. The CSR is sent to the CA, where it is checked. The
identity of the user is checked with the identity stated on the public key within
the CSR. If CA is satisfied with the validity of the CSR, a certificate is generated
and signed with the private key of the CA signifying their assertion of the identity
with the public key. The certificate is then sent back to the user. Certificates
provide an assertion by the CA that the identity-public key binding is authentic.
These public keys are then used to provide additional security operations such
as confidentiality, data integrity, and message authentication.
Because the public and private keys are critical to providing additional se-
curity properties, public key authentication during the process of key exchange
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and distribution is important. The use of a centralised CA provides public key
authentication during the key exchange process. The CA provides assertion that
a users public key actually belongs to the user by signing the public key with the
CA private key to generate a certificate. The identity-public key binding repre-
sented by the certificate can be verified using the CAs public key and returns a
boolean value of either trustworthy or untrustworthy.
Reliance on a single CA to provide public key authentication can lead to
a single point of failure in trust establishment. Due to this, the X.509 system
utilises multiple intermediary CAs, which are able to issue certificates whilst a
Root CA remains oine. The use of intermediate CAs is due to the fact that
if a CA is compromised, every certificate issued is also compromised. For a
single tier architecture, where there is only a single CA (the Root CA) issuing
certificates, compromise of this CA would require a complete revocation of all
valid certificates issued. By utilising intermediate CAs, only the certificates
issued by the compromised CA has to be revoked. A new intermediate CA
with the trust establishment from the Root CA can be formed to replace the
compromised CA.
Figure 2.6 depicts the hierarchies and chain of trust in a CA based PKI. At
the top of the hierarchical tree, the Root CA issues certificates for intermediate
Tier 1 CAs. The Tier 1 CAs issue certificates for additional intermediate CAs
that make up Tier 2. It is these Tier 2 CAs that issue certificates to users Alice
and Bob. Public key authentication is achieved using the Certification Path
Validation process defined in RFC 5280 [24]. If Alice does not hold the public
key of the Tier 2 CA that issued Bob's certificate, a chain of multiple certificates
may be needed up to the Root CA to provide public key authentication of Bob's
public key. Because Alice and Bob have certificates issued from different Tier 2
CAs, and also Tier 1 CAs, they would only need to have the public key of the
Root CA to be able to perform public key authentication on each others public
keys.
A CA architecture based PKI has the benefit of providing hierarchical public
key authentication. A multi-tiered PKI allows intermediate CAs to issue certifi-
cates to end users, whilst keeping the Root CA oine. This results in a single
trusted authority that can be common to all entities of the network. Conversely,
CAs present a single point of failure and the are capable of being compromised
[41], with large quantities of certificates being compromised. The specifications
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Figure 2.6: Hierarchies and Chain of Trust in a CA based PKI.
also do not specify certain scenarios such as the revocation of root certificates
[54, 47, 70].
Certificate Revocation in CA architecture based PKI is achieved using
one of two methods of blacklisting. The first is the distribution of a CRL to all
users. The CRL is a list of serial numbers of revoked certificates that have been
revoked. The size of the CRL file is a weakness of the CA based PKI. With
a large number of entities in the network, the CRL file can grow quite large,
creating difficulty in distributing the file [54]. Currently, the SANS institute uses
the Global Sign CRL list [49], which as of July 2015 contained approximately
136,000 serial numbers of revoked certificates totalling to a CRL file size of 5.0
Mb. These include certificates revoked over a 4-year period since June 2011.
Assuming the conservative estimate of a Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) CRL file size
to be 5 MB, under the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocol
[85], each car would require 1.5 to 13 seconds to receive the CRL. Therefore,
PKI implementations using CRLs for certificate revocation are communications
heavy [101]. The availability of a CRL is also an issue for the X.509 system.
The client web browser may only trust a certificate if a CRL is available. This
potentially provides an attacker with DoS capabilities. CRLs typically have a
short validity period to ensure freshness of data. When they expire, the client
or user will poll the CRL distributor for a new or fresh CRL to prevent a replay
attack using an old list. However, if a new CRL cannot be obtained before the
previous one expires, the entity will be subject to a DoS attack. The CRL in this
instance provides the only method of determining the validity or authenticity
of an unexpired certificate. As a result, operations involving that certificate,
such as verifying the authenticity of a message signed by that certificate cannot
take place. Conversely, to prevent this loss of functionality when oine, the
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client may be configured to automatically trust certificates regardless of whether
a CRL is available. An attacker controlling the communications channel may
prevent the distribution of the CRL to force a client to automatically trust a
certificate. These two scenarios highlight the failing of a certificate revocation
process dependent on CRLs, particularly when clients are oine. The frequent
disconnected state of DTN nodes makes CRL distribution infeasible.
The second method of certificate revocation is Online Certificate Status Pro-
tocol (OCSP), which is outlined in RFC 6960 [121]. OCSP requires the client to
poll a server to verify the validity of a certificate. Taking the example of Alice
and Bob, Alice suspecting the Bob's private key may be compromised, Alice polls
the CA who issued Bob's certificate with an OCSP request. The OCSP request
contains data including protocol version and the target certificate identifier in
the form of the certificate serial number. The OCSP server responder checks the
request and returns the status of the certificate with either good, revoked, or un-
known. OCSP certificate revocation has the advantage over CRLs as the OCSP
request and response contains less information then a CRL. However, OCSP
based certificate revocation requires clients to have a connection to centralised
infrastructure such as the CA to query the status information of a certificate.
Due to the requirement of an online, easily accessible and available OCSP server,
this solution becomes unsuitable for application in a DTN or MANET.
Another issue with OCSP revocation is the possibility of two forms of a MITM
attack. The first is a replay attack by an intermediate malicious party. Because
the OCSP request and respond channel is not authenticated, this implementation
is vulnerable to a replay attack by someone who replays an certificate valid OCSP
response before the expiration date, but after a certificate has been revoked. This
can be mitigated by the inclusion of a cryptographic nonce. However, with CA
OCSP responses typically having a validity period of several days, and most
OCSP infrastructure not supporting cryptographic nonces, the replay attack is
still a vulnerability in the OCSP revocation implementation. The second MITM
attack is compromising a server's private key, and the attacker taking the position
of a MITM. This position enables them to interfere with OCSP queries. DTNs
are particularly susceptible to MITM attacks, due to the store, carry, and forward
method of routing employed.
The use of a centralised PKI such as a CA provides an efficient method of
public key authentication. However, many of the efficiencies and benefits from
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having a centralised TTP are negated by characteristics of a DTN. The decen-
tralised nature of nodes in a DTN, along with the lack of a persistent end-to-end
communications channel hinders centralised public key authentication and certifi-
cate distribution. Many DTN applications such as battlefield networks rely on
no pre-existing infrastructure, thereby entirely ruling out centralised schemes.
While the role of a CA can be delegated to a specific node, the potential for
compromise is high due to the threat model of a persistent adversary. The
compromise of the centralised TTP in a DTN undermines the entire security of
all network entities. Similar issues extend to the certificate revocation phase.
The distribution of an ever-growing CRL may become prohibitive in severely
restricted bandwidth networks. The reliance on the freshness of the CRL, along
with the highly disconnected and fragmented nature of a DTN where nodes may
be oine for long periods of time, would make using a CRL for certificate revoca-
tion difficult. The alternative certificate revocation method of OCSP addresses
the size of CRLs, but is susceptible to the two forms of a MITM attack due
to DTN routing. Along with the highly disconnected and fragmented nature
of DTNs, dependence on a OCSP response for the validity of a certificate may
be problematic and unreliable. Although various proposals in Section 2.5.1.1
and 2.5.2.1 attempt to specifically address DTN key distribution and revocation
issues respectively, decentralised PKI models such as OpenPGP are better suited
for the application of DTNs.
2.3.2 Distributed PKI (with Transitive Trust)
OpenPGP and Web of Trust is the most common form of transitive trust PKI.
It is a decentralised method of providing public key authentication during key
distribution, and revocation. This makes it highly suitable for application in
a DTN environment. The OpenPGP protocol [14] or more commonly known
as PGP is an open standard for providing privacy and authentication for data
communications. It employs core technologies such as digital signatures, en-
cryption, compression and Radix-64 conversion [14]. Created in 1991 by Phil
Zimmermann, it is predominantly used to secure e-mail communications.
Similarly to the CA model, the public and private keys in PGP are critical
for providing additional security properties. Therefore public key authentication
during the process of key exchange and distribution is important. In an PGP sys-
tem, the key exchange process consists of distributing the public keys of the users
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in the network who wish to communicate. The issue in any key exchange scheme
is public key authentication. The lack of public key authentication provides an
adversary with the capability of performing a key spoof attack, particularly be-
tween users who have no a-priori knowledge of each other. An attacker Eve may
perform a key spoof attack between Alice and Bob, exploiting the lack of public
key authentication. Eve pretends to Alice that she is Bob, whilst pretending she
is Alice to Bob. Any messages passed through Eve protected with the spoofed
keys is subject to a MITM attack.
PGP provides a framework for providing confidence between users and their
corresponding public keys. A PGP identity certificate containing the public
key and owner information can be signed by other users. This endorses the
binding between the public key and owner information, creating a Web of Trust
of keys and users. For two users to exchange public keys as well as verify their
identities, the following process occurs. The two users Alice and Bob obtain each
other's public keys either directly from each other or from a public key repository.
Alice meets Bob so that Bob can verify that the public key fingerprint Alice has
matches his public key. Alice also verifies Bob's identity with a government
issued photo identification. The reciprocal steps are conducted for Bob to verify
Alice's public key.
For larger number of users, key signing parties where public keys are presented
in person, verified, and then signed by the participants can be held. Key signing
parties with a large number of participants do not scale well using the single ver-
ification method due to the multiple signing of keys from multiple parties, as well
as verifying multiple identities [122]. To provide a more efficient mechanism of
key signing, key signing parties employ the Zimmermann-Sassaman key-signing
protocol [122]. Prior to the key signing party, the key signing party co-ordinator
will collect public keys of the participants. A fingerprint (unique identifying
string) database of public keys is compiled and distributed to the participants.
At the party, the fingerprints are displayed, with the owner attesting to the cor-
rectness. After all keys have been displayed, users individually verify the identity
of each owner by using forms of government issued photo identification. After
the party, participants sign the public keys they verified during the party and
distribute these instances back to a keyserver or the user.
The Web of Trust model is built on the transitive trust principle. Public keys
of each node are exchanged directly with users forming the highest level of trust
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- Direct Trust. The public keys are easily verifiable as they were transferred by
the user owning the corresponding private key. Users may receive public keys of
other users through keyservers or indirectly through friends. This forms indirect
trust relationships between users much like the principle of: If Alice trusts Bob,
and Bob trusts Carol, then Alice can indirectly trust Carol. Figure 2.7 depicts the
trust relationship between users. Alice (A) has a direct trust relationship between
Bob (B), Carol (C), Dan (D), and Erin (E) as it has previously directly met
these users. An indirect trust relationship is formed between Alice and Xavier
(X), as Carol, Dan and Erin provide enough endorsement between Alice and
Xavier. Conversely, Alice does not form an indirect relationship with York (Y )
as there is insufficient endorsement from Bob and Carol.
Figure 2.7: Trust relationship model between nodes.
The level of trust a user has in the confidence of another PGP users key is
expressed through discrete states. There are four levels of trust in ascending
order; Do NOT Trust, Trust Marginally, Fully Trust, and Ultimate Trust. An
additional discrete state of Not Applicable is also available. These trust settings
require human intervention to define how each individual differentiates between
the categories such as Trust Marginally and Fully Trust. Rules can be set to
allow any number of marginally trusted key endorsers be required to trust a key.
PGP implementations have a provision for a vote or threshold based trust
scheme [14]. This implies the transitive trust principle. An example is when
Alice is determining whether to trust Bob's public key. Bob's public key has been
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signed by Carol, whom Alice has designated as fully trust. Since Carol is a fully
trusted endorser, and has endorsed Bob's key, Alice may through the transitive
trust principle trust Bob's public key. Partial or marginal trusted endorses can
also be used. Alice, determining whether to trust Dan's public key, sees that
it has been endorsed by Erin, Frank, and Gina, all whom Alice has assigned
as partially trusted endorsers. Having three partially trusted endorsers, Alice
may now trust Dan's public key. In this specific OpenPGP implementation, the
fully and partially trusted threshold is 1 and 3 respectively. The full and partial
thresholds are flexible and adjustable, with the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)
implementation using 1 and 3 [25], while PGP 2.6 using 2 and 4 [137].
Key revocation in PGP implementations is achieved using revocation cer-
tificates. Revocation certificates signify a message to cease use of the specified
public key in the future. However, the public key can still be used to verify the
authenticity of a message sent prior to the distribution of the revocation certifi-
cate. PGP Revocation certificates are generated whilst the user still retains sole
control of their private key, and needs to be stored in a secure place for future
use. The PGP standard provides several reasons for revocation, they include;
No reason specified, Key has been compromised, Key is superseded, and Key
is no longer used. The issue with pre-generated revocation certificates is secure
storage. This is a particular issue for DTN nodes, where the threat model makes
them susceptible to physical tampering by an adversary, resulting in the potential
for false revocation. A revocation certificate also provides no trust transferral
between the old and new keys. Unlike the centralised PKI model, where the
new key is issued by the CA and is deemed trustworthy, the entire Web of Trust
attached to the old key is lost when the revocation certificate is released. The
new key would require the Web of Trust to be manually rebuilt.
PGP implementations provide a flexible trust framework to achieve public
key authentication during key distribution and revocation. Unlike a centralised
PKI architecture, the individual users are responsible for their trust decisions
on whether to certify or trust a key. Each user effectively becomes their own
CA. The decentralised nature of this architecture also distributes the risk to the
individual users and is better suited for a DTN threat model where persistent
adversaries exist. An adversarial agent undertaking a key spoof attack would
have to compromise a significant number of users to get the spoofed key falsely
certified. Public key authentication through thresholds of fully or marginally
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trusted keys is attractive for DTNs as it provides network entities, who have
never met, the ability to establish end-to-end communication channels. This
also assists public key distribution.
However, a PGP implementation detailed in this section will not work in a
DTN environment. PGP is heavily dependent on human intervention for as-
signing initial trust to public keys. The strength of the Web of Trust results in
an issue pertinent to DTNs. DTN applications such as MANETs and VANET
are open and dynamic, allowing nodes to leave and join freely. New nodes join-
ing the DTN will have difficulty in joining an already existing Web of Trust,
as existing users using the vote or threshold based trust scheme [14], will re-
quire several fully or partially trusted endorsers before trusting a new unknown
public key. Public key authentication operations are also computationally and
communications intensive, which are restricted on DTN nodes. Similar problems
for public key authentication during key distribution are also present for key
revocation. Public key authentication during revocation is achieved by using a
decentralised method of distributing revocation certificates. These certificates
signify the cessation of public key use. Something that is particularly important
when the key has been compromised. Due to this, the revocation certificate has
to be pre-generated, whilst the user still retains sole control of the private key.
The certificate has to be stored securely. The threat model of a DTN makes
nodes susceptible to physical tampering. As a result, an attacker may obtain
the pre-generated revocation certificate of a node, and trigger a false revocation.
Although various proposals in Sections 2.5.1.2 and 2.5.2.2 attempt to specifically
address DTN key distribution and revocation issues respectively, many schemes
are computationally expensive, rely on nodes with elevated privileges to perform
special key management duties, or rely on a-priori knowledge for initial trust
establishment.
2.4 Existing DTN Trust and Reputation Systems
This thesis explores the use of a trust or reputation system to provide public
key authentication for all stages of key management. However, many previous
applications of trust and reputation systems for DTNs specifically focus on past
historical behaviour of nodes to provide adversary detection [5, 6, 135] or optimal
message routing [83, 21, 22]. In particular, many assume an adversary model
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where there is a persistent attacker in the network, with the intention of excluding
them.
Proposals such as Ayday et al. [5], and Ayday and Fekri [6] utilised an
iterative trust and reputation mechanism to detect a physically captured and
controlled legitimate node. The capabilities of the captured node include drop-
ping or modifying packets from other nodes, and injecting packets to cause a
DoS attack on the network. In the proposed scheme, nodes known as raters,
evaluate peers who perform a service (service providers) in the DTN based on
past behaviour. The trustworthiness of rater nodes are also evaluated to pre-
vent gaming of the trust and reputation system. Using an iterative process of
determining reputations of both rating nodes and service providing nodes, the
proposed scheme does not rely on a central authority. A major shortcoming of
this proposal is the sole reliance on the history of Quality of Service (QoS) of
routing. An adversary could be capable of behaving in a way to avoid detection
such as not injecting or modifying packets. However, they would remain unde-
tected during a key spoof attack, which leads to compromising the security of
the network.
To assist with QoS dynamic message routing in a DTN, Chen et al. [21, 22]
proposed the use of a trust and reputation system that combines past historical
data of both QoS and social trust to obtain a composite trust metric. The com-
posite trust metric is used to assist the DTN to facilitate dynamic trust man-
agement for routing, particularly in changing conditions at runtime [22]. The
social trust component is comprised of honesty and unselfishness, and is consid-
ered for node trustworthiness for message delivery. While the QoS component
is comprised of connectivity is considered for the node capability of delivering
the message in a timely manner. The trust relationship between two nodes is
assumed to be linear and computed using a summation of weighted averages of
connectivity (QoS component), honesty, and unselfishness (social components).
The trust score node i assigns of node j at time t is given by Equation 2.1 [21]:
Tij(t) = w1T
e−connect
i,j (t) + w2T
d−connect
i,j (t) + w3T
honesty
i,j (t) + w4T
unselfishness
i,j (t)
(2.1)
Where, w1, w2, w3, w4 are weightings assigned to each trust component. Trust
components T e−connecti,j and T
d−connect
i,j are associated with node i connectivity to
node j, and node j connectivity to destination node d respectively. T honestyi,j
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represents node i opinion of the honesty of node j, and T unselfishnessi,j is the node
i opinion of the co-operation of node j.
Two versions of the proposed trust management systems were evaluated in [21]
to the epidemic flood routing proposed by Vahdat and Becker [127]. The first was
an equally weighted QoS and social trust component trust management system.
This version provided ideal performance for the delivery ratio between nodes.
The second was entirely QoS component, with no social trust component, which
provided ideal performance for message delay. The linear trust computation
engine employed in [21], shows that it is suitable for application in a decentralised
DTN.
Various trust management systems specifically for the application of VANETs
have also been proposed. The issue of scalability is a significant issue to VANETs,
as the potential number of nodes is high, and the deployment environment is
large. As a result, many rely on infrastructure in the form of RSUs or appointed
cluster head nodes. The reliance on pre-existing deployed infrastructure and
knowledge of the network is also assumed. This may be valid in densely populated
areas, however, would not be valid in remote locations, or developing countries
where infrastructure is non-existent or unreliable.
Golle et al. [50] proposed a data based trust model to detect and correct
malicious data in VANETs. Nodes hold a model of the VANET, which is used
to provide data validation. Data is collected with the possibility that adversary
nodes are present, this is then compared to the VANET model held by each node
and a score is produced. Data is accepted as valid if the data is consistent with
the model. Although this proposal does not rely on infrastructure, it still does
not satisfy the definition of self organising, as there is a global knowledge shared
amongst nodes [129]. Raya et al. [116] also proposed a data based trust model
for data and event reporting. This proposal was focused on the trustworthiness
of data reporting rather than the trustworthiness of the entity. As a result, trust
was formed based on events and was ephemeral for the data generated by the
event, not the entity reporting it. Although this provides a trust management
system for event based data reporting, entity based trust management is also
important. Both proposals presented focus on event based reporting and the
history of service provision. However, they do not attempt to address entity
based trust management or public key authentication.
Dotzer et al. [33] proposed a self-organising trust establishment scheme for
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VANETs, which can be extended for public key authentication. They proposed
the distributed Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network Reputation System (VARS) that com-
bined both data and entity trust. They make use of opinion piggybacking for
validating received messages. Nodes in the network append their own opinion of
the trustworthiness of the forwarded data, while also deciding whether to trust
the information based on the opinions of previous forwarding nodes. Location
and distance of the node reporting the event, and the node receiving the in-
formation also contributes to the decision of the trustworthiness of the data.
Several shortcomings of VARS are outlined in [77, 68, 3]. Even though VARS
will consider the previous opinions that are appended to the data bundle be-
ing forwarded, the opinion of earlier nodes will be repeatedly and recursively
considered as it continues to be forwarded [77]. VARS does not address the
initial bootstrapping and updating of trust values. The forwarded messages are
susceptible to tampering, with no authentication of the node initially reporting
the message. The cost of communications bandwidth is high in large ephemeral
networks with numerous nodes, as nodes have to forward many opinions [68, 3].
This shortcoming affects the scalability of deploying VARS.
To address the scalability of deploying VARS, Chen et al. [20] proposed a
VANET trust modelling framework that improved network scalability by reduc-
ing communications bandwidth utilisation. They utilise a cluster based data
routing mechanism that collects and sends peer trust opinions regarding a mes-
sage sent by the originator and the message itself. Nodes are geographically
grouped into clusters, and from each cluster, a node is randomly selected to act
as the cluster leader. They assume that there is a pre-established co-operative
link between the cluster leaders to provide an intra-cluster link. The peer-to-
peer trust opinions aggregated by cluster leaders are a combination of role-based
and experience based metrics. Role-based trust are fixed by an oine central
authority and is assigned to a small number of nodes that have specific respon-
sibilities in the traffic system (police cars, traffic controllers and public services).
Experienced-based trust is for nodes without a role and is based on the behaviour
of the node as evaluated from other nodes in a range of [-1, +1]. Each node holds
a list of trust in their local repository. Experience trust is dynamic and scalable
and can increase for correct decisions, and can decrease for incorrect decisions.
The computation of experience based trust is linear with the number of times
receiving trust opinions from a node. Although this proposal improves the net-
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work scalability by using a cluster based data routing mechanism, it heavily
relies on the cluster leaders that are selected in each geographical clusters. As
VANET nodes are highly mobile, the system would need to ensure that cluster
leaders were distributed geographically to ensure sufficient dispersement of lead-
ers. Mobile cluster leaders leaving the geographical clusters may require other
nodes to be randomly selected to act as cluster leaders, thus re-establishing the
intra-cluster link proposed. This scheme is infeasible in a network deployment
without a-priori knowledge.
Patwardhan et al. [108] proposed a data intensive reputation management
scheme. It provided a bootstrapping process to build trust relationships between
nodes with self-generated persistent identities using data validation. They con-
sider data to be trustworthy either if the data source is considered trustworthy,
or if there are multiple copies from distinct multiple sources. Data received
from a primary source directly is considered trustworthy, while as the device
moves further away from the primary source of data, it becomes more unreliable.
The availability of data from multiple copies from distinct multiple sources mit-
igates the risk of corruption and fabrication [108]. They also assume the system
model of pervasive environments in urban or metropolitan areas, particularly
constrained mobility. They also assume that persistent identities are crucial for
association of reputation between nodes. Their proposal was simulated in a 700m
by 900m area around DuPont Circle in Washington DC, with nodes generating
a constrained mobility movement model to the Cartesian co-ordinates of the
simulation space. They varied the number of nodes from 50 to 200 and used
a communications range of 100m. The speeds of the nodes ranged from 15 to
25m/s, with pause times of 0 to 30 seconds and a total simulation duration of
30 mins. At 38 major intersections, anchor nodes were placed that are assumed
to be pre-authenticated and providing trustworthy data, while the other nodes
do not have any trust relationships with each other. Patwardhan et al. utilises
an important concept of multiple copies of data from distinct multiple sources
mitigates corruption and fabrication. This is a desirable concept for a decen-
tralised and distributed trust and reputation system. However, the scheme was
evaluated with a realistic vehicle simulation model on a small scale, and relied
on a few pre-authenticated anchor nodes to bootstrap the trust management
process. These results question the scalability of the proposal due to the reliance
on infrastructure-like anchor nodes.
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Trust and reputation scores in a majority of trust management systems reflect
on past experiences such as behavioural and data validation. This creates the
issue of how to bootstrap newly deployed and joining nodes into the network.
Current bootstrapping processes either set an arbitrary trust value for unknown
nodes or attempt to build a trust score around the actions of the node [3].
Abidin and Kolberg attempt to address the bootstrapping process by using social
networks to establish trust [3]. Their proposal uses the social connections and
links in social networks such as LinkedIn, Twitter and eBay between the drivers of
vehicles to provide an initial trust level when a node joins a pre-existing VANET.
Although this proposal assists in addressing the bootstrap problem when a node
joins a VANET, it assumes and requires human driver interaction and the human
social connections to provide the initial trust level, and therefore is not applicable
to an autonomous VANET.
The unique characteristics and wide variety of DTN deployments results in
a high probability that a persistent adversary will operate in a DTN. It is as-
sumed that the removal of adversarial agents is infeasible. Therefore, a method
for detecting and limiting the effect an adversary is capable is required. Trust
and reputation systems provide a methodology for securing a DTN against such
a threat. However, many proposals assume an application for established net-
works as they focus on past historical behaviour of nodes to provide adversary
detection [5, 6, 135] or optimal message routing [83, 21, 22]. Schemes that deal
with trustworthiness of data [33] are more concerned with the forwarding of
data, and are also vulnerable to message tampering as there is no authentication
mechanism provided for the forwarded messages. This leads back to the initial
bootstrapping problem, which was attempted in [108] and [20]. However they
were also dependant on pre-established links [20] or infrastructure [108]. As a
result, they are unsuitable for an environment void of any infrastructure, and
where nodes are deployed with no a-priori knowledge. Therefore, this thesis in-
vestigates the research gap of utilising a trust or reputation system for initial
trust establishment during the key deployment phase of a DTN, without any
a-priori knowledge.
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2.5 Existing DTN Key Management Schemes
Past proposals for providing security in DTNs involves a form of cryptographic
key implementation to provide confidentiality, data integrity, and message au-
thentication. Many of these proposals have evolved from Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs), and have focused on the use of symmetric keys [16]. Symmet-
ric key implementations are suitable for devices with constrained resources as
computation needs are significantly less than asymmetric key implementations
[66]. Solutions include using common shared keys [7], pair-wise probabilistic
[37, 19, 29], pair-wise deterministic [89, 15], and group keys [67]. However,
given the mobility model of DTNs, neighbouring nodes change frequently making
asymmetric key implementations more desirable. With DTN nodes in VANETs
being cars, nodes may be considered to have significantly more resources than
static WSN nodes.
Due to the differences specific in characteristics between DTNs and WSNs,
public key management implementations are better suited for DTNs. Two stages
in key management (Figure 2.4, Page 24) are important to the security of a
DTN; distribution, and revocation and replacement. Distribution is primarily
the dissemination of public keys or the issuance of certificates. Revocation and
replacement is divided into two separate steps. Revocation, is concerned with
the removal of public keys from use. This may be a planned revocation, where
public keys have a finite validity period, or may be an unplanned revocation,
where the private key has been compromised. Replacement, is concerned with
the re-distribution of a new public key directly after a revocation event. There
is an intermediary step in key management between distribution, and revocation
and replacement known as operation. This is where the public keys are used to
provide confidentiality, integrity, and message authentication for network traffic.
Although this usually constitutes a long time period in the key management life
cycle of a DTN, this thesis is primarily concerned with the key distribution, and
revocation and replacement stages. In particular, the provision of public key
authentication during these two stages.
2.5.1 Distribution
The provision of public key authentication during key distribution can be cate-
gorised into two main approaches [104]. The first is a centralised model where
40 Chapter 2. Background and Related Works
a TTP such as a CA issues certificates, keys and other materials as outlined in
Section 2.3.1. This is similar to the use of PKI as outlined in Perlman [109] and
Zhou and Haas [134]. The CA may be a single authority or multiple authori-
ties distributed in the network, and provides public key authentication for the
keys. The second is a decentralised model where nodes are self organising, and
key distribution is implemented through direct and indirect contact as well as
trust propagation similar to the OpenPGP Web of Trust model as outlined in
Section 2.3.2 [138, 2]. However, due to the nature of DTNs, some decentralised
schemes proposed attempt to provide public key authentication by distribut-
ing the CA role. These schemes are not considered fully decentralised, but are
included due to classification by various literature.
2.5.1.1 Centralised
Traditional CAs utilised for the Internet are not applicable for DTNs due to the
ephemeral and opportunistic connections between nodes. Because availability of
the CA cannot be guaranteed, centralised CA based implementations in DTNs
take the form of multiple entity CA, where multiple nodes distributed in the
network perform the role of the CA. The use of threshold cryptography [123] as
a (t, n) threshold signature scheme [48] allows the CA signing key to be divided
into n shares, and recovered from t components.
Zhou and Haas [134] proposed a coalition of designated nodes called server
nodes who carried out certification operations in a DTN. The server nodes are
configured by a trusted entity with the threshold values (t), and distributing the
shares (n). When a node registers for a certificate, at least t of n server nodes
must collaborate and combine the CA signing key with one of the server nodes.
Extending the proposal of Zhou and Haas, Kong et al. [79] and Luo and Lu [91]
proposed that all nodes of a network may act as a member of the distributed
CA. This proposal increases the availability a node has to a distributed CA.
However, it still relies on a trusted entity to configure thresholds and initial
credentials during the bootstrapping process.
The necessary threshold number of server nodes (t) required for CA opera-
tions may not be available for all parts of the DTN. Therefore availability for
CA operations may be intermittent [46]. Another security consideration is that
a (t, n) threshold signature scheme only tolerates up to the threshold number of
corruptions before CA operations are hindered, thereby causing a DoS attack.
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Although this would be mitigated in the proposal of Kong et al. [79], where all
nodes are a member of the distributed CA, a malicious node may still contribute
falsified shares. The proposal from Kong et al. [79] also means that an attacker
would only have to compromise the number of nodes equal to the threshold,
instead of targeting specific certificate server nodes. CA operations are consid-
ered more communications intensive. Each certificate request requires commu-
nications with a minimum t nodes, with some communications being completed
using multiple hops as characteristic of a DTN. This can significantly increase
communications overheads as well as cause delays with certificate issuance. The
computation required in implementing threshold cryptography schemes is also
an issue [102]. The proposed scheme by Luo and Lu [91] found that generation
of partial RSA signatures using a (t, n) threshold signature scheme is signifi-
cantly more computationally expensive than standard RSA signing [26]. The
increase in computational overhead also contributes to the delay and availability
for certificate issuance.
Although VANETs are a type of DTN, they may rely on static infrastructure
and more traditional CA schemes. Infrastructure based VANET trust estab-
lishment solutions such as [115] relied on static RSUs to allow both V2V and
Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications. This proposal utilised certifi-
cates to provide identity and credential management with the RSUs acting as a
gateway to a trusted third party CA. The use of a CA also allows for infras-
tructure based revocation of malicious nodes from the network. Kim et al. also
proposed an infrastructure based trust management scheme. It utilises govern-
ment organisations as a central server, and is reliant on trusted third parties for
generating security keys and certificates [77]. The keys are used for authenti-
cation in the case of V2V communications, with identities requiring a renewal
annually. Revocation of certificates is handled using the IEEE P1609.2 Standard
CRL. Liao et al. also proposed a VANET trust model for incident reporting
relying on V2V communications, while also taking advantage of V2I communi-
cations to static stations [86]. Although infrastructure based proposals such as
[115, 77, 86, 55, 56] provide ease of management of identity, credentials and re-
vocation process, they are heavily reliant on static infrastructure such as RSUs
and trusted third parties such as CAs.
The key management framework proposed by Hao et al. [59, 60] relies on
the distributed nature of RSUs to act as group private key generators for vehi-
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cles within coverage. The proposed scheme when compared to a centralised CA
scheme [77] provides several benefits. The first is key maintenance operations
such as public key updating is easier and more flexible [59], as well as a more
efficient revocation scheme as RSUs store certificate revocation lists. Location
privacy of vehicles is also improved as group private keys are changed as vehicles
change issuing RSUs. Due to the important role of group key generator, and
distributed deployment of RSUs, they are attractive and susceptible to compro-
mise. To enable a vehicle to determine whether it is being issued a group key
from a compromised RSU, Hao et al. [60] propose the reliance on global long
term public and private key pairs issued by a CA.
All centralised key management schemes proposed for DTNs and its applica-
tion in VANETs rely on some form of CA to provide public key authentication
for the keys distributed. The CA may be a single entity [115, 61, 130, 9], or
multiple entities distributed amongst nodes [134, 79, 91]. However, they all re-
quire some form of trusted authority to empower and configure the centralised
authority [18]. The inherent characteristics of a DTN make centralised key man-
agement schemes unsuitable. Even by distributing the CA role to multiple nodes
through threshold cryptography will not work effectively in a DTN. The neces-
sary threshold of nodes required for CA operations may not always be available.
While threshold schemes (t,n) can only tolerate up to threshold (t) corruptions
before CA operations are hindered. Both instances would result in either a tem-
porary or more permanent DoS attack. Computational overhead with processing
partial RSA signatures is also higher [26]. All these issues contribute as to why
centralised key management schemes are unsuitable for autonomous DTNs. As
a result, decentralised schemes that are not reliant on infrastructure are better
suited to DTNs. However, some decentralised schemes still rely on some form of
infrastructure, and thus cannot be considered fully decentralised.
2.5.1.2 Decentralised
Decentralised key management solutions assume nodes are self-organising, that
create, store, distribute and revoke public keys without the dependence on a
trusted authority [18]. Decentralised schemes are typically based on the OpenPGP
model for PKI. Nodes distribute their own public keys whilst signing other nodes
public keys to provide public key authentication in a Web of Trust model.
Capkun et al. [18] proposed a Web of Trust based self-organising public
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key management scheme for MANETs. Public keys are distributed and trust is
formed through physical contact between nodes. Each node generates a public
and private keypair with a limited time validity period. They sign and issue
public key certificates to other nodes that it trusts. An issuing node will hold
in their local repository certificates they have issued and certificates issued to
that node. From this process, a certificate graph is created. The next step is
certificate exchange, where nodes will periodically exchange certificates. Nodes
multicast to neighbouring nodes a subset of the certificate graph created during
the certificate issuing process. This information is stored in the non updated
certificate repository, which contains expired certificates that are not updated
[18]. The non updated certificate repository provides the node with an estimate of
the certificate graph. This is suitable for the scheme as it is reasonable to assume
most certificates will be renewed by issuers rather than be revoked. Finally,
the updated certificate repository is constructed by either communicating with
the nodes certificate graph neighbours or by the repository graph construction
algorithm [18]. Public key authentication is achieved through chains of trust
paths established from the certificate graphs. The scheme proposed by Capkun
et al. allows certificate generation, exchange and authentication to be conducted
automatically, whilst certificate issuing and revocation operations need to be
conducted consciously by a user [18].
The scheme proposed by Capkun et al. [18] presents significant disadvantages
as the scale of the DTN increases. Computation and communications efficiency is
an issue. Verification of a certificate in Capkun et al. [18] requires the verification
of multiple certificates to establish the chain of trust. On constrained devices,
each verification step is computationally intensive. The communications over-
head for certificate distribution and issuing significantly increases as the number
of nodes increase. To reduce the overhead, Li et al. [84] proposed a localised key
management scheme, which eliminates the certificate graph of Capkun et al. [18].
Although this reduces the storage requirements, Li et al. [84] still depends on
signed chains of trust between nodes, which does not reduce the computational
overhead in verifying signatures. In large scale DTN deployments, an increase in
the certificate chain length also increases the number of verification operations
required to establish the chain, thereby increasing computational overhead. The
chains of trust also present a security issue. As the chain is increased, the trust
of the public key is diminished [46, 14].
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The application of both Capkun et al. [18] and Li et al. [84] for a DTN with
fast moving dynamic nodes such as a VANET is infeasible. The certificate update
process for both proposed schemes requires time to sign and issue certificates. Li
et al. [84] mentions that node movement speed should be moderate in relation to
both certificate issuance and packet transmission latency. Fast moving dynamic
nodes in a VANET would cause frequent certificate update instances. Coupled
with the low latency between vehicles potentially travelling at high speeds, the
time required for certificate issuing would not be sufficient.
Ngai and Lyu [103] proposed a cluster based decentralised PKI scheme. Nodes
self-organise themselves into clusters, where each node in a cluster is assumed
to know each other. The cluster of nodes monitors and retains trust values of
all other nodes in the same cluster group. Continuous trust values between 0
and 1 are assigned based on node behaviour on security collaboration and data
forwarding. When two nodes from differing clusters need to communicate, the
other nodes in the cluster will reply to the node requesting the public key with
the public key and a trust value of that node. This scheme utilises a trust
and monitoring system to provide public key authentication. The disadvantages
of this scheme are that it assumes nodes have some a-priori knowledge of the
network prior to deployment to organise themselves into clusters. The mobility
model of a DTN also hinders the trust and monitoring of other nodes in the same
cluster group.
An extension of the cluster model proposed in [103] is Rachedi and Benslimane
[113]. Nodes form clusters, and monitor each other nodes behaviour and trust.
The addition of a cluster head acting as the CA for that particular cluster, enables
introductions by nodes from other cluster groups to occur more easily than the
aggregated introductions of cluster nodes in [103]. However, the elevation of
a specialised node as cluster head creates a single point of failure for adversary
attack for each cluster, and potential DoS attack. To mitigate this issue, Rachedi
and Benslimane [113] also propose a sub-ordinate class of dispensable confident
nodes called Registration Authoritys (RAs). RAs receive certificate requests on
behalf of the cluster head CA and filtering them before passing them to the CA.
This creates the necessity for both the cluster head CA and sub-ordinate RA
to be in close communications range, which is infeasible in a DTN due to the
sparse mobility model. Schemes that rely on clusters and cluster heads are still
reliant on infrastructure-class nodes, and therefore cannot be considered as fully
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distributed.
Omar et al. [104] proposed a distributed trust model for MANETs, allowing
generation, storage, and distribution of public certificates without the need for
a central authority. The key management is distributed as all nodes contribute
to administering the network. This work improves the proposal of Capkun et
al. [18] where nodes store and distribute certificates, by adding a transitive
trust threshold cryptography scheme. This prevents false public key certificates
being distributed by malicious nodes. The transitive trust relationship in PGP is
extended by adding resilience in threshold cryptography through the idea that if
Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Carol, then Alice can trust Carol if some other
(t − 1) entities also trust Carol. They propose a (t, n) threshold cryptography
scheme where n is the number of nodes and t is the threshold where t < n.
The proposal by Omar et al. [104] at initialisation has a system dealer or
service provider that is common to the member nodes. This system dealer has
pre-established trust with all the member nodes. The system dealer distributes
to each node a private share. An example of this is using the threshold scheme
by Shamir [123]. Each node then generates a partial certificate for other nodes
that it trusts in the system. Once this is complete, the system dealer is made
redundant and is no longer needed to administer the system. When a new node
wants to join the system, it requests a neighbouring node (the delegate node)
to process the join request. The joining node sends its own public key, and
trust evidence such as a password to the delegate node. The delegate node then
broadcasts the request to other neighbouring nodes. After reaching a threshold
of signings from neighbouring nodes, the delegate node authenticates the joining
node by sending back the signed certificate. The joining node then generates its
own private share to allow trust establishment of other new nodes.
Omar et al. [104] evaluates this proposal by introducing a malicious node.
The authors outline that an internal malicious node is capable of issuing different
types of false certificates. The first is where a certificate that binds the public
key of node I to identity node J is issued. The second is to issue a certificate
that binds node J to a forged public key. The third is to generate fake nodes and
bindings, and generate appropriate keys to match identities. They evaluate the
performance of their proposal in a simulation based in MATLAB. This experi-
ment used 100 nodes to form a MANET. The movement of each node was defined
by the random way-point model of Johnson and Maltz [73]. The proposed scheme
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has shortcomings in the threshold signing, which from past proposals presents
an additional computation overhead. Additional computation overhead is also
attributed to the reliance on certificate chaining for public key authentication.
The increased communications and computation associated with establishing
a certificate chain to verify a public key is still an open issue. Maity and Hans-
dah [92] proposed an on-demand certificate-less public key management scheme.
Since the public keys of nodes are generated, stored and distributed by the nodes
themselves, the authenticity of the public key cannot be ascertained. Hamouid
et al. [57] extended the certificate-less Web of Trust model from [92], whilst
also verifying the authenticity of public keys without the reliance on a CA. The
use of certificate chains, which constitute the PGP Web of Trust imposes high
overhead for key management, particularly in memory, bandwidth and power.
Because of this, Hamouid et al. proposed a self-certifying identity based cryp-
tography key scheme. They also separate Key Authenticity Trustworthy and
Node Trustworthiness as independent, and state that the trust of public keys are
absolute boolean states. Keys are either trustworthy or untrustworthy. Their
proposed scheme relies on a Trustor Node Ni trusting another node Nj. Instead
of signing or endorsing the public key of Nj, the trustor node Ni issues a Witness
(Wij) associated with the node identifier. The Witness is sent over an assumed
authentication channel to Node Nj, where Nj uses the Witness to generate its
private key SKj. This scheme means that the Witness is part of the private key
of the Nj and seen as the signature of the issuing node. This scheme binds the
Private key of Nj (SKj) to its identity. Because trust is assumed to be transi-
tive, any node that trusts the Witness Issuer (Ni), can compute the self certified
public key PKj. This public key authentication scheme removes the problematic
Private Key Generator (PKG) in traditional Identity Based Cryptography (IBC)
schemes, which can lead to key escrow and key revocation issues.
Although this proposal provides an improvement in the memory, bandwidth
and power of the nodes, the proposal still has some shortcomings. The key
generation process is still dependant on another party, although not a TTP, it is
distributed to the Witness issuer. As a result, there still has to be some level to
trust between the Trustor Node and the node requesting keys generation, and is
subject to potential malicious trustor nodes acting as bad witnesses between the
identity of the node. The bootstrap of the network still requires some form of
ring issuing root nodes to initiate the key generation process, essentially relying
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on another party for the private key. The memory, bandwidth and power savings
this scheme provides is mainly from the lack of public keys nodes store. Nodes
do not store public keys instances, but rather generate reactively the public key
of the node they wish to communicate and verify with. This is based on the
assumption they can establish a trust chain back to that node, which also results
in an issue with the reliability of key authenticity.
Decentralised key management schemes are better suited for DTNs. The
distributed and decentralised nature of nodes means that a PGP Web of Trust
PKI model is more favoured over a centralised CA model. However, the issues
of scalability are still present. Public key authentication is computationally ex-
pensive on devices with constrained resources [66]. The creation of chains of
trust requires nodes to exchange-sign-exchange certificates, thereby also increas-
ing the communications overhead. Establishing a chain also presents a security
issue, as the trust of the public key is decreased as the chain is increased [46, 14].
Other implementations to remove the overhead of the chain of trust has included
the organisation of nodes into clusters. Cluster heads are appointed in [103],
and public key authentication is achieved using a trust and monitoring scheme.
However, this scheme relies on a-priori knowledge for cluster organisation, and
results in the reliance on infrastructure-class nodes. The proposal in [57] re-
moves the chain of trust, but is dependant on trustor nodes, another form of
infrastructure-class nodes during the key generation process. Since DTNs are
likely to have a persistent adversary in the network, the scheme is susceptible to
adversarial nodes acting as malicious trustor nodes. Additional shortcomings in
the form of bootstrapping issues during initial deployment, as well as revocation
issues are discussed further in Section 2.5.2.2. Many of the schemes claim to
be distributed, but are actually hierarchic, as they depend on a TTP prior to
deployment or cluster structures. As a result of reviewing these schemes, a fully
decentralised and transitive trust key distribution scheme is required to provide
public key authentication in autonomous DTNs.
2.5.2 Revocation and Replacement
The distribution and exchange of public keys is an important stage in any DTN
key management lifecycle (Figure 2.4, Page 24). However, just as important to
distribution, is revocation and replacement of keys. In this section, the related
prior works for key revocation and replacement are presented. The key revocation
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and replacement process is an important part of the key management lifecycle of
any PKI. Once keys have been distributed, it may be necessary to revoke those
keys if they are compromised. Replacement keys are also essential to maintain
the security of the network when the current key have been compromised, or
when older keys expire. Previously proposed key revocation and replacement
schemes for DTNs can be categorised in two groups: Centralised schemes based
on traditional PKI schemes utilising a CA, and Decentralised schemes based on
monitoring and reputation such as IBC and threshold cryptography based pro-
posals. From these related works, the technical gaps are discussed and presented.
2.5.2.1 Centralised
Many DTN and VANET key revocation schemes are based on traditional cen-
tralised PKI implementations [117, 115, 116, 99]. These key revocation schemes
rely heavily on CRLs [124]. The CRL is a list that identifies a revoked certificate,
which is signed by the CA and made available to nodes of a network from public
distribution points [44].
Kong et al. [79], proposed a CA model where all nodes are a member of
the distributed CA. Utilising threshold cryptography to divide the CAs private
key for signing, Certificate revocation was also managed by a group of nodes.
Dissemination of revoked certificates was done through the distribution of a CRL
list. Raya et al. [117] proposed a CA based certificate revocation model for
vehicular networks. They assume a VANET where a trusted third party manages
the identities, credentials and cryptographic keys of the nodes. They also assume
certificates are not valid for an unlimited duration, and the revocation should
occur in a timely manner as to avoid exploitation by adversary nodes [117]. The
CA is responsible for revoking certificates and can do so through two methods.
The first is through the use of CRLs. Raya et al. [117] proposed the Revocation
using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL) scheme. To address the
problem of a large CRL as more nodes are revoked, Raya et al. [117] utilised
Bloom filters to compress the CRL. Bloom filters have the property that they can
return a configurable rate of false positives but never a false negative [117]. The
compressed CRL is then distributed to all nodes within the network. The second
method of revocation is the Revocation of Tamper Proof Device (RTPD). This is
used when an adversary node is detected and the CA wishes to remove all the keys
in the tamper proof device of the node. The CA generates a revocation message
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for the node to be revoked consisting of node metadata. As the CA administers
the keys and certificates of all node entities in the network, it encrypts the
revocation message for the specific node to be revoked. The CA then signs the
message to provide authenticity of the revocation message before distributing it
to the node to be revoked.
These two methodologies of revocation are initiated solely by the CA. Raya
et al. [117] also proposed the Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP), which
acts more as a warning system to nodes. This allows nodes to temporarily
revoke another node until the CA is capable of actually revoking the malicious
node. This is further extended by Raya et al. in [115], where they introduce a
misbehaviour detection system and the Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting
Emulators (LEAVE) protocol. The LEAVE protocol still relies on a centralised
CA to provide permanent revocation. The schemes proposed by Raya et al.
all rely on a CA to act as the sole authority in revoking a node. They also
utilise revocation in the context of the removal of an offending or malicious
node. Although these schemes may be sufficient for a VANET where a CA can
be assumed, it does not apply to networks with intermittent or no access to the
centralised CA.
Lin et al. [87] extended the proposal of vehicular certificate revocation in
Raya et al. [117] by proposing a RSU based certificate revocation mechanism.
Lin et al. [87] noted that certificate revocation events although rare, require
timely notification to the nodes. They leverage the assumed existing infrastruc-
ture of the RSUs to handle the majority of revocation tasks. The RSUs are
distributed fixed points of trustworthy infrastructure, to which the CA broad-
casts a certificate revocation notification. It is the responsibility of the RSU
to check the status of certificates of messages passing within the network with
the certificate revocation notification from the CA. Lin et al. [87] also utilise
the predicted vehicle movement to allow neighbouring RSUs to co-operate in re-
voking an adversarial node. This proposal distributes the responsibilities of the
centralised CA to the RSUs. However, the RSUs are still dependent on the CA
to provide the revocation notification.
In an attempt to move the revocation tasks from the centralised CA or RSUs,
Kumar et al. [80] proposed a secure decentralised PKI for VANETs where the
vehicles themselves maintain and perform the revocation tasks. However, they
still rely on a CA to monitor all communications and act as a Key Distribution
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Centre (KDC). Kumar et al. assume that the CAs are the most trusted party
in the network, and cannot be compromised by any type of attack. Keys are
initially distributed by the CA, whilst key revocation for misbehaving nodes in
the network is performed in a decentralised manner by the respective Learning
Automata on each node. The Learning Automata is responsible for re-keying
the vehicles with fresh keys during an update and revocation process. The as-
sumption of an uncompromisable CA is unrealistic. Kumar et al. simulated their
proposal with 550 nodes and a communications range of 100m. The simulation
space was 500x500 metres, with RSUs deployed in 500m distributions.
A major shortcoming of using a CA for key revocation is scalability, because
CRLs can grow very large in size for large domains and networks even with
compression. There is a large network overhead in downloading such a large
CRL for all clients in the network [44]. Schemes that utilise ∆CRLs, where only
the differences or discrepancies in CRLs are distributed may be more suitable
[44]. Proposals such as [80] also show that CRLs need to be constantly updated.
However, due to the high mobility of nodes in a DTN and VANET, and ephemeral
network connections, this is difficult to achieve.
Another certificate revocation scheme proposed for the Internet is OCSP.
Both OCSP and CRLs are forms of blacklisting. However, they differ in how a
certificate validity is checked. CRLs require the dissemination of a blacklist of
revoked certificates, whilst OCSP requires a connection to an OCSP Responder
or centralised infrastructure such as the CA to query the status information of a
certificate. Although OCSP provides a communications overhead advantage over
the distribution of CRLs, they do require an online, easily accessible and available
OCSP responder. As such, this solution becomes unsuitable for application in a
DTN and MANET, due to bottlenecking to the central server and reliance on a
single OCSP Responder [95].
In an attempt to provide an OCSP service to MANETs, Marias et al. [95] pro-
posed an Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust (ADOPT) scheme for certificate
validation. They attempt to distribute the deployment of OCSP by utilising
cached pre-signed OCSP responses. Three categories of nodes are required to
support the proposed scheme: Server, Caching, and Client nodes. Server nodes
are directly connected to the CAs and act as the OCSP responders. They an-
nounce revocation status for certificates and issue pre-signed OCSP responses to
Caching nodes. Caching nodes receive the pre-signed OCSP responses and act
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as OCSP responders to Client nodes. Caching nodes are distributed throughout
the DTN. When a Client node requests the status of a specific certificate to
a Caching node, the Caching node will search for a pre-issued and pre-signed
response. The benefit of this scheme is that the Caching nodes do not need
to execute expensive computational operations in signing and validating the re-
sponse, as they only cache signed responses from Server nodes. If a Caching
node does not have a response, it then re-broadcasts the request. Although this
scheme distributes the operation of the OCSP through Caching nodes, it is heav-
ily dependant on a reliable connection between Server and Caching nodes for up
to date pre-signed OCSP responses. Issues such as cache management for nodes
in a DTN as well as time thresholds affect the deployability of such a scheme in
DTNs.
Another issue is the potential for a replay attack. Because messages in a DTN
take the form of a store, carry, and forward bundle, a certificate status message
from the OCSP server would be passed through multiple nodes. Because the
channel is not authenticated, this implementation is vulnerable to a replay attack
by someone replaying a certificate valid OCSP response before the expiration
date, but after a certificate has been revoked. These issues, and the highly
disconnected and fragmented nature of DTNs makes OCSP difficult to implement
in a DTN.
Centralised TTP solutions are capable of providing efficient key revocation
schemes for traditional networks such as the Internet. However, as with key
distribution, the characteristics of a DTN mean that the deployment may not
have reliable access to the TTP for authentication and key revocation tasks.
Many schemes presented solely rely on the CA to perform authentication and
key revocation.
All centralised key revocation schemes proposed for DTNs and its application
in VANETs rely on some form of centralised authority to provide public key
authentication for the revocation of keys. The centralised authority may be a
single entity [115, 61, 130, 9], or multiple entities distributed amongst nodes [134,
79, 91]. However, they all require some form of trusted authority to empower and
configure the centralised authority [18]. The inherent characteristics of a DTN
make centralised key management schemes unsuitable. Many schemes presented
solely rely on the CA to perform authentication and key revocation. The use of
CRLs to inform nodes of revoked certificates presents issues with communications
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overhead as the scale of the network increases. The use of a ∆CRL is more
suitable. OCSP schemes are also unsuitable for DTN applications as the store-
carry-and-forward routing makes OCSP responses susceptible to replay attacks.
The issues associated with the centralised key revocation schemes presented in
this section suggests that decentralised schemes are more suitable.
2.5.2.2 Decentralised
Decentralised key revocation schemes that are not reliant on a TTP have been
proposed in [18] and [84]. However, many schemes for DTNs focus on the removal
of misbehaving or malicious nodes from a network, instead of the removal of a
key from operational use [90, 4, 100, 65]. Such schemes focus on node monitoring
to determine whether a node is misbehaving. Accusations or a weighted report
is then used to initiate the process of node revocation. Many proposals fall back
on a CA to provide authentication during the revocation process. In addition,
few investigate the key revocation and replacement process, particularly when a
node decides to self-revoke.
The self-organising public key management scheme presented by Capkun et
al. [18] outlines two scenarios where certificate revocation may occur. The
first is if a node believes that the identity-key binding is no longer valid. The
second is if a node believes their private key has been compromised. Capkun
et al. [18] provides two methods for certificate revocation. The first is using an
explicit revocation statement. A particular node will have a list of nodes that it
feeds certificate updates to. As a result, the explicit revocation statement only
has to be distributed to these nodes. The second is implicit revocation, which is
dependant on the certificate expiration date. A certificate is considered implicitly
revoked if it is not updated past the expiry date.
Li et al. [84] also provides a certificate revocation process for their decen-
tralised PKI scheme. They propose the use of a two-hop revocation mechanism
where the node initiating the revocation broadcasts the request a distance of two-
hops directly. All other nodes outside the two-hop distance are informed through
distribution of a blacklist similar to a CRL. The scheme proposed utilises cer-
tificates that signify a relationship between two nodes of one-hop distance. As
a result, only the two nodes who form the certificate are allowed to initiate the
revocation process. No other nodes may be involved. This has the disadvantage
that if either of the nodes who can initiate revocation of that certificate is an
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adversary, they may be able to trigger a false revocation of a legitimate node.
With enough adversaries performing a false revocation attack, it would be possi-
ble to achieve a DoS attack. This applies for both revocation scenarios outlined
in Capkun et al. [18] where the identity-key binding is no longer valid, or the
private key has been compromised.
Revocation schemes focusing on the removal of misbehaving nodes can mit-
igate a DoS attack on the network. Assisted with a node monitoring scheme as
well as a trust and reputation system, nodes may expel adversarial nodes be-
fore they inflict additional damage. Luo et al. [90] proposed a node neighbour
monitoring scheme. Nodes disseminate signed accusations of other nodes to a
predefined number of neighbours (m-hop). Nodes independently receive the ac-
cusation, and upon verifying the trustworthiness of the accusing node, add the
information into a ticket revocation list. Using a threshold (t, n) based certifi-
cate scheme to distribute the duties of a centralised CA, a node is revoked if
the threshold is exceeded. Trustworthiness of the accusing node is based on past
behaviour judged by the local neighbourhood monitoring scheme. Nodes are also
assumed to be pre-authenticated using the threshold based distributed CA.
Similarly, Arboit et al. [4] also presented a certificate revocation scheme
based on weighted accusations from nodes. The weighted accusations are based
on prior behaviour and reliability of the node. This system provides protection
against wrongful revocation of certificates by malicious nodes. The authors still
stipulate that prior to joining, nodes must hold a valid certificate from a recog-
nised CA as well as CA public keys [4]. These certificates are used for network
authentication and the CA is responsible in verifying the identity of the node
before certificate issuance. When a malicious node is detected, the network is
capable of 'self healing' by revoking or excluding the malicious node. Although
effective, the scheme is still dependant on the CA to provide public key authen-
tication, particularly if a legitimate node was required to update compromised
keys.
Moore et al. [100] proposed two strategies for revoking misbehaving nodes.
The first is using a re-election process, where nodes are required to secure a
majority approval from peers over regular time intervals. This is in contrast to
other proposals [90, 4], which rely on negative vote based systems to remove a
misbehaving node. Moore et al. [100] proposed that honest nodes must demon-
strate that it still has authority to remain in the network, thereby excluding
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misbehaving nodes that fail to be re-elected. The second is using a suicide at-
tack. The accusation of a misbehaving node should be done at a large cost as
to deter malicious nodes from falsely accusing legitimate nodes. As a result, the
node reporting a misbehaving node will also be expelled from the network along
with the misbehaving node. When a central authority is available, nodes will
report the accusation, however the central authority will handle authentication
and the revocation process. The suicide attack is also extended to work in the
absence of a central authority. Assuming nodes have pre-authenticated and pre-
distributed private and public key pairs, the accusation is signed by the accusing
node and then distributed to neighbouring nodes who verify the signature and
independently handle the removal of keys for both the accusing and accused
node. Although these proposals are effective and scale well, they do not address
the issue of key renewal, as nodes are simply rejected from the network.
A similar proposal to Moore et al. [100] is Hoeper and Gong [65], which not
only proposed a revocation scheme for the removal of misbehaving nodes, but
also included a provision for a node to self-revoke their private keys. Hoeper and
Gong proposed a monitoring based key revocation scheme for MANETs. They
proposed the identification of malicious nodes in the network through monitor-
ing neighbouring nodes by also considering false positive and false negative rates.
They employ pairing based IBC schemes [11, 64]. The scheme, much like other
IBC implementations rely on a Key Generation Centre (KGC), but also provide
an extension to distribute the role of the KGC by using a distributed online
KGC. Thus public key authentication is achieved by some form of KGC. The
key revocation focusses on the misbehaviour detection and removal of a node.
They present aspects steps for the key revocation scheme. The first is a local
monitoring scheme where each node monitors all other neighbours one-hop dis-
tance. Any suspicious behaviour of neighbouring nodes are reported. The second
is a Harakiri or suicide message. This is when a node realises that its private
key has been compromised and creates a message informing other nodes to cease
using the key pair. The message, either from the reporting of suspicious node
behaviour in step 1 or a Harakiri message in step 2, is propagated to neighbour-
ing nodes. Finally, each node updates their own key revocation list based on the
validity of the receiving messages.
The key distribution proposal of Hamouid et al. [57], which provides a
certificate-less Web of Trust model for public key authentication for MANETs,
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presents some issues that make key revocation and update a problem. Due to
the setup of the scheme, and their reliance on the Trustor Node and issuance of
Witness, when a node wishes to update their key, the entire subordinate chain
would need to be regenerated. The subordinate uncorrected key is needed in an
authentication invoked by one of the predecessor nodes. This is due to the fact
that the self-certified key generation scheme, generates a key from the Trustor
Nodes key. Hamouid et al. mitigate this by proposing a key correction opera-
tion, which addresses the need to regenerate all subordinate keys. However, the
key correction operation may result in extra resource consumption if the same
node frequently updates their key, thereby causing a repeated key correction
of the entire subordinate chain. Hamouid et al. further address the repeated
key correction issue by implementing a lazy key correction, which only occurs
when required. Another issue with key correction is when Trustor Node keys
are tied to other nodes. The trustor chain in a DTN application is highly likely
to be cyclical or heavily connected in a mesh. This creates an infinite loop of
key correction. Although this scheme focuses on the public key authentication
aspect of key management, there are elements of key revocation and key renewal
presented. However, due to the dependant nature that the private key of a node
is to a neighbouring node, issues such as infinite key correction still present an
issue for key revocation and replacement.
Many of the prior works demonstrate the challenge of providing public key
authentication during revocation. The CA based models rely on the TTP to
authenticate the revoking node and perform the key revocation and replacement
process. Decentralised schemes such as [18] and [84] provide a mechanism for key
revocation and replacement, however, are subject to adversarial nodes triggering
a false revocation of a legitimate node. Many proposals focus on the removal of
misbehaving nodes, which may help mitigate DoS attacks, but does not resolve
the problem of an unplanned self-revocation event. In a decentralised scheme
relying on IBC or threshold cryptography, public key authentication is difficult
as some proposals such as [4] and [93] fall back on a CA, and others such as
[65] rely on private key material in the revocation message, or the addition of
multiple key pairs or pre-distributed keys [64]. As a result, a fully decentralised
and distributed public key authentication scheme for an unplanned revocation
event is still an open problem.
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2.6 Research Challenges
The focus of this thesis is to address the challenges outlined in the previous
sections of this chapter. In particular, the issue of public key authentication
for public keys of autonomous nodes in a DTN, during all stages of the key
management lifecycle. Figure 2.8 identifies the areas and categories identified
as research gaps from this section, as well as the subsequent chapters that will
address these gaps.
Figure 2.8: Research Categories and Area gaps identified and addressed in this
thesis.
The requirements identified include a fully distributed and decentralised model,
based on a transitive trust principle. This is suitable for environments void of
any infrastructure or reliance on infrastructure-class nodes, as availability of ser-
vice cannot be guaranteed. Therefore a trust system is more advantageous than
a reputation system to reduce communications overhead. The ability to mitigate
a key spoof attack by the adversary attempting to exploit the identity-public
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key binding is an important requirement for a DTN public key authentication
scheme. Particularly as DTNs are large open networks, and nodes are pervasive.
A persistent adversary is assumed to be present. The pervasiveness of nodes and
a persistent adversary threat model results in nodes being highly susceptible to
physical tampering. Therefore, the challenges are:
1. Public Key Authentication for public keys during Key Distribu-
tion: The issue of public key authentication during key distribution is still
an open issue. Traditional methods rely in either a CA or a Web of Trust
model. The reliance on a CA is unsuitable due to the decentralised nature
of a DTN. While the signing and chain of trust in a Web of Trust model
is computationally expensive and problematic. Therefore, the question of
providing a decentralised and fully distributed public key authentication
for key distribution in autonomous applications, leads to Research Ques-
tion 1: Can a trust or reputation system be utilised to assist in DTN Key
Distribution such that Public Key Authentication can be achieved without
a trusted third party, but by automatically including mobility parameters,
behaviour, and levels of collaboration into trust? Chapter 3 describes the
design, implementation, and evaluation of a trust system to address this
research question.
2. Application of a trust and reputation system in a large scale DTN:
Autonomous DTNs may be deployed on a large scale. This includes a large
number of nodes deployed over a large geographic area. Past research has
focused on a small number of nodes (100) deployed in a small geographic
area (500m-1km). The DTN application of VANETs is an example of a
large scale deployment. Therefore, the question of providing a scalable,
fully distributed, public key authentication key distribution scheme in a
large open autonomous application leads to Research Question 2 and 3.
Research Question 2: Is it possible to apply a trust or reputation system for
DTN Key Distribution for a large scale realistic DTN application? With
the addition of Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities and location
tracking on vehicles this leads to Research Question 3: Is it possible to
leverage location data to assist a trust or reputation system for DTN Key
Distribution? Chapter 4 addresses both these research questions.
58 Chapter 2. Background and Related Works
3. Key Authentication for public keys during Key Revocation: The
issue of public key authentication during key revocation is still an open
issue. Similarly to key distribution, traditional methods rely in either a
CA or a Web of Trust model. Past research focuses on planned revocation
events such as key expiry and renewal. However, unplanned revocation
events such as when a private key has been compromised is still an open
problem. Therefore, the question of providing unplanned key revocation in
a fully distributed transitive trust based PKI for autonomous applications
leads to the following two research questions are therefore posed. Research
Question 4: Is it possible to utilise a trust or reputation system to assist in
DTN Key Revocation such that Public Key Authentication can be achieved
without a trusted third party? and Research Question 5: Is it possible
to provide trust transferral of an old compromised public key to a newly
generated public key without a trusted third party during an unplanned key
revocation event? Both research questions are addressed in Chapter 5.
2.7 Summary
This chapter covered background concepts in DTNs, trust and reputation sys-
tems, and PKI. More specific DTN applications of trust management and key
management were discussed. It examined the characteristics, routing, applica-
tions, and challenges specific to DTNs. Different Trust and Reputation systems
were also examined, outlining differing architectures and computation engines.
Two common models of PKI were reviewed in general covering how public key
authentication is achieved for public keys. Key distribution and revocation was
also covered. Finally, key management schemes specific to DTNs were covered
for the two critical stages of distribution, and revocation and replacement. Based
on this survey of previous related work, three research challenges were identified
for providing a complete decentralised key management scheme for autonomous
DTNs. These challenges are explored and the research questions posed are ad-
dressed in the following chapters.
Chapter 3
DTN Key Distribution
Securing communications and data in a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) involves
satisfying general security properties such as confidentiality, data integrity, and
message authentication. Cryptographic technologies such as cryptographic hash
functions and public key cryptography are some essential tools in providing se-
curity. However, the use of public keys to secure networks gives rise to a critical
foundational issue of public key authentication. This issue is essentially the
verification of the identity-public key binding. The lack of public key authenti-
cation exposes networks to adversarial agents who are capable of exploiting the
identity-public key bindings. This provides them the capabilities of eavesdrop-
ping on sensitive communications, modification of safety critical messages, and
identity deception by impersonating other entities. Traditional networks such as
the Internet achieve this through a Certificate Authority (CA), a centralised form
of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The decentralised and distributed nature of
DTNs make such schemes unsuitable. Compounded with the fact that DTN de-
ployments are now utilising autonomous nodes, decentralised trust establishment
without humans is an open research problem.
The research presented in this chapter specifically address Research Question
1 (Chapter 1): Can a trust or reputation system be utilised to assist in DTN
Key Distribution such that Public Key Authentication can be achieved without a
trusted third party, but by automatically including mobility parameters, behaviour,
and levels of collaboration into trust? This chapter reviews and extends prior
works in this area by proposing a combined trust system and key distribution
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mechanism to achieve public key authentication, in particular in autonomous
DTNs. This proposed scheme is called the Leverage of Common Friends (LCF)
trust system and is verified in the results of the simulation and evaluation com-
parison of prior work.
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 outlines
a similar past proposal of providing public key authentication in DTNs. Sec-
tion 3.2 provides a detailed outline of the System Model and Security Properties
of the network, along with definitions, threat model and adversary capabilities.
Section 3.3 presents the newly proposed LCF trust system to assist in the provi-
sion of public key authentication during key distribution. Trust weighting values
and the criteria are discussed and selected. Section 3.5 outlines the experimental
methodology including experimental and adversary setup, the experiments con-
ducted as well as the security and performance metrics used to evaluate the LCF
trust system. Section 3.6 presents the experimental results and evaluation of how
the proposed LCF trust system provides public key authentication. Section 3.7
discusses the implications and issues related to the proposed scheme. Finally,
Section 3.8 summarises the research and contributions presented in this chapter.
3.1 Background and Related Work
Jia et al. [72] outlined that key distribution in a DTN where PKI is unavailable
is still an open problem. The authors proposed the use of a similar key dis-
tribution scheme to PGP with varying levels of trust and utilising two channel
cryptography techniques to prevent key spoofing during transfer. Nodes generate
their own public and private key pair similar to Rivest et al. [119], and move
in close geographic proximity to each other. Each node exchanges public keys
with one another, and stores, carries and forwards public keys. The two channel
cryptography scheme provides security during the key exchange phase.
The public keys of each node are exchanged when they are in close proxim-
ity to each other similar to the Resurrecting Duckling Scheme by Stajano and
Anderson [126]. This scheme allows two nodes in close proximity, to exchange
keying material over an opportunistic link using imprinting. This keying material
can be stored and used later by nodes to establish a confidential channel. Util-
ising the Resurrecting Duckling Scheme for the key distribution of public keys
would be suitable for a DTN, particularly as there is no reliance on a centralised
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authority to manage the nodes. It is a fully distributed scheme, where there is
no pre-established trust.
The public keys of each node are exchanged by meeting other nodes, forming
the highest trust level, direct trust. Keys in the direct key list are assumed
to be trustworthy as they were received from the node that owns the public
key. As nodes are highly mobile, they receive the public keys of various other
nodes, becoming carriers. These carried keys, belonging to other nodes, are also
distributed forming indirect trust relationships between nodes. This follows the
Web of Trust principle: If Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Carol, then Alice can
indirectly trust Carol.
Because the ownership of carried keys cannot be easily verified in a distributed
system when compared to a centralised architecture, Jia et al. [72] proposed the
use of an approval system. The receiving node may approve or reject the carried
key based on the trust value of the carrier node it received the key from. For
example, Bob may have received many instances of Carol's key from various other
carriers. Bob trusts these carriers with varying degrees of trust. Bob assigns a
trust value to each carrier, and if the total trust of the combined carriers is above
the threshold, Bob approves Carol's key into the approved key list. Since human
reasoning is required to provide the initial trust value of each carrier, Jia et al.
utilised randomly generated trust values in the simulation. The key distribution
scheme was simulated using randomly generated values of initial trust in the
NetLogo [131] simulator.
Jia et al. [72] utilised the spread of carrier keys to effectively distribute keys
in large scale DTN systems upon deployment. However, the issue of public key
authentication is an open problem, particular when there is no Trusted Third
Party (TTP). The problem is further complicated for DTN applications consist-
ing of autonomous nodes, where there is no human involvement. Initial trust
establishment between autonomous nodes is difficult, as such a scheme is heavily
dependant on human intervention or a centralised management.
The unresolved issues in [72], along with the research gaps identified in Chap-
ter 2 presents an open research problem of whether a trust or reputation sys-
tem can be used for initial trust establishment in autonomous nodes. With
addition to the use of a trust or reputation system to provide public key au-
thentication during key distribution. Many of the trust and reputation schemes
presented in Chapter 2 were utilised for adversary detection or optimal message
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routing. Schemes that attempted to address the issue of initial bootstrapping
were dependent on either pre-established links or infrastructure. These schemes
are not suitable for a DTN deployment where there is no a-priori knowledge.
Past proposals for key distribution in DTNs attempt to provide a distributed
and decentralised key management scheme. However, due to the difficulty in
providing a truly fully distributed key management scheme, many fall back on
pre-established infrastructure-class nodes, or a hierarchical based trust model.
As a result, the open research problem of whether a trust or reputation system
can assist autonomous DTN key distribution such that public key authentication
can be achieved without a trusted third party and a-priori knowledge remains.
3.2 Key Distribution System Model and Security
Properties
In this section, the System Model and Security Properties of the application en-
vironment identified from relevant literature presented in Chapter 2 are outlined
and identified. In addition, the likely application and landscape of the network
is also discussed in system model. Terminology and notations such as types
of nodes and keys are defined. The system model is susceptible to attack by
adversaries that will attempt to exploit a threat model, which is defined. The
capabilities of the adversary are defined along with the extent of their attacks.
Having defined the system model of the network, threat model and adversary
capabilities, the security properties that the proposed key distribution scheme
should achieve is outlined. Throughout this chapter, the notations in Table 3.1
are used to refer to nodes, keys, trust, and black hat nodes.
3.2.1 System Model
The system is assumed to be a closed DTN, spanning a small geographic area.
The deployment environment has no other entities except nodes themselves.
There is no centralised PKI or any form of TTP, and there is no public com-
munications infrastructure. Nodes are considered fully autonomous and mobile,
requiring no human intervention. They self-initialise on deployment with no a-
priori knowledge of the network or their neighbours. There is no pre-deployment
initialisation phase by an oine authority. The key management phases of
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Table 3.1: Notations
Notation Description
Node ID Notations
i Unique Persistent Identifier i
Ni Node i
Key Notations
Ki Keypair of Ni
Si Secret (Private) Key of Ni
Pi Public Key of Ni
Di Direct Key List of Ni - List of public keys received directly
from another node
Ai Approved Key List of Ni - List of trusted public keys received
from carrier nodes
Ui Untrusted Key List of Ni - List of untrusted public keys
received from carrier nodes
Trust Notations
T ji Trust Value Ni has of Nj
tn Trust component weighting given to each contact
n Number of contacts
tc Trust component weighting given to each common contact
between two nodes
c Number of common contacts between two nodes
td Trust component weighting given to each key discrepancy
instance
d Number of key discrepancies
tneutral Initial starting value of trust
Black Hat Notations
S(m,i) Spoofed Private Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm
P(m,i) Spoofed Public Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm
Moore et al. [100] are adopted for this thesis. However, given the lack of a
pre-distribution phase, the key management phases are; initial bootstrapping
(distribution), operation, and revocation.
Nodes retain a persistent unique identity [108], and generate Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) public and private key pairs [98, 78]. These keys are used
to perform security based tasks such as providing confidentiality, data integrity,
and message authentication. It is also assumed that the key pairs have a long but
finite time period of validity, similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) where keys
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may last 1 to 2 years. In this chapter, it is assumed that nodes communicate to
each other through close wireless communications using Bluetooth [10]. Due to
their mobile nature, they create ephemeral or opportunistic bi-directional con-
nections between neighbours [65]. These communications connections are used
to exchange the public keys they own, as well as the public keys of other nodes
they have met and carry using the Resurrecting Duckling Scheme. Public key
exchange is considered to be a low-cost communications procedure as the ex-
change occurs at one-hop distances between nodes [13]. The public key exchange
is completed over a two channel or side channel scheme as outlined in [72]. It is
assumed that adversary nodes will always exist in the system, and that it might
not be feasible to expel such a node.
3.2.2 Trust Model
Using a transitive trust model outlined in Section 2.3.2 [138], the public keys of
each node are exchanged when nodes are within communications range. These
keys form the highest level of trust - Direct Trust. The public keys (Pi) are easily
verifiable as they were transferred by the node owning the corresponding private
key (Si). Due to the mobility of nodes in a DTN, nodes will also receive the
public keys of other previously met nodes, becoming carriers. These carried keys
belonging to other nodes are also distributed in the key exchange process. As
in the PGP Web of Trust model, indirect trust relationships are formed between
nodes much like the transitive trust principle.
3.2.3 Definitions
The following terminology used throughout this chapter is defined:
1. Key Distribution is the process where a node distributes their public key
(Pi) to another entity in the network for the use of providing end-to-end
secure communications.
2. Public Key Authentication - Is the verification of the identity-key binding
of a public key. In a decentralised public key distribution scheme such as
PGP and the Web of Trust, public key authentication is achieved by the
human user confirming the entity's claimed identity is associated with their
corresponding public key. It is measured as a boolean (Y or N).
3.2. Key Distribution System Model and Security Properties 65
3. Public Key Confidence is proposed in this thesis as having confidence in
the identity-key binding of a public key. In an autonomous DTN, without
a centralised PKI, or any other infrastructure but the nodes, verification
that the public key being distributed belongs to the associated node is
difficult. In a DTN application, public key confidence is how confident the
autonomous nodes are that the multiple instances of the same public key
they are receiving is actually owned by the node identity. It is a continuous
value consisting of the culmination of trust values. When the confidence
in a public key exceeds a threshold, public key authentication is achieved.
4. Trust Value is a real numerical value within a predefined range, that is
assigned to a single key or node by an entity describing the level of trust
it has in that key or node.
The following terms on how nodes categorise the receipt of keys are defined.
These reflect how the node came into possession of the public key.
1. Direct Key is a public key that a node has received from the owner - NA
has received the public key of NB (PB) directly from NB. Direct Keys are
stored in the Direct Key List (DA).
2. Carrier Key is a public key that a node has received from another node
who has previously met the owner of that public key - NA has received the
public key of NB (PB) from the carrier NC . A Carrier Key can either be
one of the following:
(a) Approved Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key
of NX (PX) from various carrier nodes (NC , ND, and NE) and is
confident that PX actually belongs to NX . Approved Keys are stored
in the Approved Key List (AA).
(b) Untrusted Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has not exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key of
NY (PY ) from various carrier nodes (NB, and NC) and is not confident
that PY actually belongs to NY . Untrusted Keys are stored in the
Untrusted Key List (UA).
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Table 3.2: Classification of Nodes and their Keys
Nodes
White Hat (NA) Key pair (KA)
Private Key (SA)
Public Key (PA)
Black Hat (NM)
Key pair (KM)
Private Key (SM)
Public Key (PM)
Spoofed ID
Private Key (S(M,A))
Public Key (P(M,A))
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the different classifications of nodes, keys
and revocation materials. They can be broadly categorised into two types of
nodes. White Hat Nodes (NA) are nodes that are legitimate, and have not been
compromised by an adversary or attacker. They generate a key pair (KA), which
consists of a White Public Key (PA) and a White Private Key (SA). Black Hat
Nodes (NM) are nodes that have been compromised by an adversary or attacker.
Like White Hat Nodes, they possess their own Key pair (KM), which consists of
a Black Public Key (PM) and a Black Private Key (SM). NM as part of their
malicious nature may create Spoofed ID material.
The first form is a Spoofed ID Public Key (P(M,A)). This is whenNM generates
a key that has the identity association of a White Hat node NA, but the key of
a Black Hat Node NM . It is created when NM changes the identity association
of its public key (PM) from itself (M) to the identity of a White Hat Node (A).
This results in a public key that other nodes think belongs to NA (that is NA
has the corresponding private key) however, NM holds the corresponding private
key.
3.2.4 Threat Model
Given the system model outlined in Section 3.2.1, the following threat model is
assumed:
1. Lack of Infrastructure - With no infrastructure to assist in key management
operations such as public key distribution, nodes will have to handle these
operations independently. An adversary node may take advantage of the
environment where nodes have to independently distribute their own keys
to assume the identity of another node. The lack of infrastructure also
affects the implementation of a trust and reputation system as there is
difficulty in the aggregation of trust scores to form a reputation system.
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2. Lack of Public Key Authentication - There is no trusted third party, and
therefore no assurance of public key authentication. There is no authentic-
ity between the public key and the identity of the owner [12]. An adversary
node is capable of associating its own public key to the identity of another
node, distribute this key, and perform a Man In The Middle (MITM) at-
tack.
3. Physical Tampering - DTN nodes may be subject to physical tampering
[106]. Attackers may gain physical access to a node, modifying the be-
haviour, public key bindings, and distribute Spoofed ID Keys from tam-
pered nodes. The physical tampering of nodes may be mitigated but cannot
be prevented. As such, nodes will need a mechanism to detect and protect
the network against potentially compromised nodes.
4. Eavesdropping and Modification of Communications - Since the connection
between nodes in a DTN are ephemeral, and with no static routing, nodes
may be required to pass on messages between nodes. This provides an
adversary the capability to overhear as well as the potential to modify
wireless communications between nodes [107]. Due to this threat, nodes
will need to establish secure end-to-end communications.
3.2.5 Adversary Capabilities
Adversarial nodes will attempt to exploit the threat model outlined for this net-
work. With a Spoofed ID Key, any adversary node is capable of impersonating
another node. This has consequences for the security of communications, and
future key management activities such as key revocation. Due to the character-
istics of a DTN, an adversary is capable of eavesdropping on communications,
and modifying data. These networks require communications to be passed on be-
tween nodes in a store and forward method [40]. A message or bundle encrypted
with a Spoofed ID Key that an adversary has generated, means that if the ad-
versary is capable of intercepting the message, they can successfully perform
a MITM attack [12]. An insider attack model was used, with the adversarial
nodes assumed to have similar abilities as outlined by [32] with the following
capabilities:
1. Adversarial nodes can obtain any message passing through the network
between two other nodes within communications range [40, 12, 107].
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2. They are a member of the network and can therefore initiate and receive
communications with other nodes in the network.
3. They are able to generate new Black Private and Public Keys (SM , PM) as
defined in Section 4.2.3 and distribute PM . SM and PM between adversary
nodes are independent to prevent White Hat nodes from blacklisting a
common PM between all adversary nodes [32].
4. They are able to generate and distribute Spoofed ID Keys (P(M,i)) as defined
in Section 4.2.3. This is when they associate their own private and public
key pair with another node's identity in their DM or AM Lists [12].
3.2.6 Security Properties
Given the system and threat model of the network, this section outlines the de-
sired security properties the key distribution scheme should achieve. Ultimately,
the aim is to provide public key authentication in an autonomous DTN node
during key distribution.
Property 1: A White Hat node (NA) should be able to generate a key
pair (KA), and distribute the public key (PA) to establish a secure end-to-end
communications channel with other nodes in the network.
Property 2: Any White Hat node should be able to utilise indirect relation-
ships through carried keys to allow a greater number of nodes to communicate
with.
Property 3: The effect of a Black Hat node (NM), wishing to modify the
identity-public key binding of a White Hat node (NA) by distributing a spoofed
ID key (P(M,A)) should be mitigated.
3.3 Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) Trust Sys-
tem
A new linear computation trust system called LCF is proposed to provide public
key confidence, and by extension public key authentication, to help establish
secure autonomous communications. The trust relationship between two nodes
is assumed to be linear, which is similar to many trust and reputation systems
for online retail sites such as eBay and Amazon [74]. Weighted scores similar to
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[21] were used to provide different trust components to formulate a trust score
between two nodes.
The proposed trust system leverages common contacts between two nodes
that are meeting for the first time. Nodes meet and exchange keys similar to
the PGP model. They also build a Web of Trust as they move around in the
community [138]. It is assumed that the more nodes (or in a social context
"friends") that the node has met (n), the more trustworthy and well established
it is in the community. Although the absolute number of nodes met is important,
the number of nodes shared in common (c) provides a more substantial metric
for establishing initial trust. The number of nodes shared in common (c) is
the quantity of mutual node interactions the two meeting nodes have previously
encountered. A comparison of the common node meetings between two nodes
meeting for the first time mitigates the effect an adversary node fabricating a
large list of friends to falsify a higher trust rating. These two properties, the
number of nodes met (n) and number of common nodes (c), both increase the
trust value.
Adversary nodes, exploiting the lack of public key authentication may mod-
ify the identity-public key binding of another node, and distribute this key to
perform a MITM attack. A legitimate node who has established the correct
identity-public key binding will become aware of this discrepancy in identity-
public key binding. As a result, the decreasing trust value (d) is the discrepancy
between two nodes over the binding of an identity and the public key. If there
is a discrepancy, both nodes will decrease trust value with respect to each other.
Nodes will take the default position of completely trusting themselves, and as-
sume their version of the public key is the correct key, whilst the neighbouring
node has a spoofed key. It is assumed that trust is diminished significantly faster
than increasing trust.
The linear relationship between common contacts and trust can be repre-
sented by the equation below:
The trust of NA assigns to to NB (T
B
A ) is given by Equation 3.1:
TBA = tneutral + (tn ∗ n) + (tc ∗ c) + (td ∗ d) (3.1)
where:
tn is the trust weighting given to number of contacts.
n is the number of nodes NB has met, where 0 ≤ n ≤ Node Population.
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tc is the trust weighting given to the common contacts of NA and NB.
c is the number of nodes in common with NA and NB, where 0 ≤ c ≤ Node
Population.
td is the distrust weighting upon discovering a potential spoofed key.
d is the number of discrepancy keys between NA and NB, where 0 ≤ d ≤ Node
Population.
tneutral is the starting value of trust.
Nodes use the LCF trust system independently to establish initial trust with
a neighbouring node. The trust system scores are not aggregated to form a rep-
utation system, but are calculated, and used solely by the individual node. Each
node will independently generate trust scores of other nodes based on Equa-
tion 3.1. The components n and c are positive trust components, which increase
the trust score a node will assign to another node. The component d, measuring
identity-public key binding discrepancies is a negative trust component, decreas-
ing the trust score of a node that is apparently distributing falsified public keys.
The trust score a node assigns to a neighbouring node can increase or decrease
after each meeting over time, as the components n, c, and d will continually
change over time.
3.4 Trust Weighting Selection
The values for the trust weightings tn, tc, and td were selected to satisfy several
criteria for key distribution. The process involved first choosing a weighting for
tn, and subsequently setting tc and td to satisfy the criteria.
The trust weighting tn was selected based on Dunbar's Number [35], which
suggests that for humans, there is a cognitive limit that a person can sustain
stable social relationships. The number of relationships is typically between 100
to 200 relationships [112, 63]. Studies into user relationships on online social
networking sites such as Twitter have also correlated the range of 100 to 200
users [51]. Using 100 as a starting value for upper limit of relationships between
nodes to mimic human behaviour, this number coincides with the experimental
node population size. Therefore tn was selected so that if a single node were to
have directly met the entire node population, their overall trust weighting should
be the upper bounds of trust (TBA = 1.0). Using this criteria, the trust weighting
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tn is set at 0.01.
To determine the criteria for selecting the common trust weighting tc, con-
cepts from the PGP Web of Trust scheme were adopted. The limitation of using
a PGP Web of Trust scheme in an autonomous system is the requirement for
a human to assign the initial trust establishment of a public key using discrete
levels (Full, Marginal). However, in the proposed scheme, the LCF trust system
provides the initial trust establishment between two nodes. This criteria, can
therefore be applied to the acceptance process of public keys in autonomous sys-
tems, as the criteria provides a guide on how autonomous nodes are to establish
trust. The status of a key is determined as valid if the two following conditions
is met for the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) implementation of PGP [25].
1. Key is signed by a enough valid keys that satisfies one of the following
conditions:
(a) The user has signed it personally
(b) The key has been signed by 1 Fully trusted key
(c) The key has been signed by 3 Marginally trusted keys
2. The path of signed keys between the two keys is less than 5 steps.
The modern OpenPGP reference RFC4880 [14] does not define the number
of Fully or Marginally trusted keys required before a key is considered valid, as
this relationship is dependant on the implementation of the OpenPGP reference.
Although the GPG implementation uses a Fully and Marginally trust relationship
of 1 and 3, the PGP 2.6 implementation uses a 2 and 4 Fully and Marginally trust
relationship. The number of Marginally trusted keys for a key to be considered
valid is useful to help set tc, such that nodes will have 3 to 4 instances of a key
from various carrier nodes (marginally trusted nodes). Using the various PGP
implementations as a guide, and having set tn = 0.01, the trust weighting tc is
determined to be in relation to tn to satisfy the following criteria:
1. tc > tn as to reflect that nodes in common should be considered a higher
trust weighting compared to the number of known nodes.
2. The number of carrier key instances required before trusting a key instance
should be on average between 3 and 4 instances.
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3. The minimum number of key instances before a node trusts a key should
be at least 2.
4. The maximum number of key instances before a node trusts a key should be
limited to twice the number of average key instances. Using these numbers
that limit is 8. Having a higher number would unnecessarily prolong the
key distribution.
5. The majority number of key approvals should require 3 or 4 key instances.
Figure 3.1 depicts the five number summary (minimum, 1st quartile, median,
3rd quartile, maximum) and average results of the number of key instances that
lead to approval whilst varying the Common Trust Weighting tc. The results
show that setting tc to 0.025 and 0.035 would satisfy the 5 criteria for number
of key instances. When tc = 0.025, the average number of key instances for
approval is 3.65 keys, while when tc = 0.035, the average is 3.39 keys. The
median of results for tc = 0.025 and tc = 0.035, is 4 and 3 respectively. From
these results, the common trust weighting tc was set to 0.025.
Finally the distrust key weighting td was set to be a significant disadvan-
tage for distributing a black hat key, having it set at a penalty of 10 times tc.
Therefore, td was set at −0.25.
3.5 Experimental Methodology
An open source DTN simulator was developed in Python called Traffic Djam
[30] that models the decentralised distribution of public keys between nodes
using a Web of Trust model to provide a fully distributed and decentralised
key distribution scheme. Random movement models for a predefined number
of nodes and the size of the simulation space was generated. This movement
model was recorded and re-used for each repeat of the experiment to provide a
controlled movement and node connection model. Nodes were initialised with a
random starting XY co-ordinate, a node ID, and a randomly generated public
key signature. The simulation space was divided into squares. For each node at
each time step, the simulator rolls a nine-sided die to determine whether the node
should move into the eight adjacent squares or stay in the current square. Nodes
within a predefined communications range of another node may then connect to
each other to engage in public key exchange.
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Figure 3.1: Common Trust Weighting (tc) variations.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
It is assumed that there is no public infrastructure, no trusted third party, and
no central point where nodes are initialised. Nodes self-initialise when they
are deployed in the simulation area. They generate a public and private key
pair similar to [119] during initialisation. Nodes are assumed to be resource
constrained and deployed in a small network area. They then move around
randomly in the simulation area and connect to other nodes within a defined
communications distance. When nodes connect, they exchange their public keys
for a pre-determined time. Jia et al. [72] used a time delay to accommodate for
the two channel cryptography steps in key exchange. Assuming that the nodes
in this simulation are resource limited, the nodes form temporary connections
only in close proximity. Using a low powered, close range wireless connection
such as Bluetooth, a time delay of 60 seconds was assumed. This was to be a
worst case scenario for nodes to establish a secure channel, handshake, exchange
public keys and transfer additional data such as messages. Initial experiments
of varying the time delay that nodes stop and transfer data bundles is shown
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in Figure 3.2. As expected, reducing the time delay for data bundle transfer
between nodes results in a faster key distribution as it allows more opportunistic
connections to be made than in a longer time delay scenario.
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Figure 3.2: Key distribution over time with varying connection time delay.
The public keys of each node are exchanged by meeting other nodes, forming
direct trust, the highest trust level. Keys in Di are easily verifiable as they were
received from the node that owns the public key. As nodes are highly mobile, they
receive the public keys of other nodes, thus becoming carriers. These carried keys,
belonging to other nodes are also distributed forming indirect trust relationships
between nodes using the transitive trust principle.
Because the identity-public key binding of carried keys cannot be easily ver-
ified in a distributed system in comparison to a centralised architecture, an ap-
proval system similar to [72] was used. The receiving node may approve or reject
the carried public key based on the trust value of the carrier node it received the
key from.
For example, NA may have received many instances of PB from various other
carriers. NA trusts these carriers with varying levels of trust, and assigns a trust
value to each carrier. If the total trust (or collective trust) of all carriers is above
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the public key confidence threshold, NA approves PB into AA. A rejected key that
is below the public key confidence threshold is placed in UA until the threshold is
met. The proposal in [72] required human reasoning and intervention to provide
the initial trust value of each carrier in this situation. Three trust establishment
methodologies are simulated and compared.
The first methodology is shown in Figure 3.3. It depicts the public key
exchange of two nodes when connected using no trust system. This scenario is
the control scenario of the experiments and is an absolute trust scenario. Upon
connection, both nodes flag a connected status and stop moving. In the direct key
exchange phase of Figure 3.3, NA sends PA toNB, andNB reciprocates by sending
PB. Each node then adds the directly received public key to their respective Di.
The next phase is the carrier key exchange as shown in Figure 3.3. This is when
NA sends the list of nodes it has met in the past, essentially DA. NB also sends
its respective list of nodes DB. NA may potentially provide false information
about DA to NB. This can be mitigated by sending a cryptographic hash or
Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as a challenge-response of
Di prior to sending the list. Each node scans the list and finds public keys that
are not in Di or Ai and adds them to their respective Ai.
Figure 3.3: Public key exchange with no trust system (absolute trust).
The second method is the random trust assignment outlined in [72]. Because
the approval process requires human reasoning and intervention to provide the
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initial trust value of each carrier, the initial trust value was randomly generated
for their simulation. This leads to an asymmetric trust relationship between the
two nodes. Figure 3.4 depicts the public key exchange with random trust as-
signment from [72]. It shows additional steps in the carrier public key exchange
phase. The carrier key exchange process now includes an approval process utilised
by [72], where the trust of carrier nodes is accumulated, and if above the thresh-
old, the carried key is approved. The initial trust establishment is randomly
generated.
Figure 3.4: Public key exchange with random trust assignment.
The third methodology is the proposed LCF trust system. Figure 3.5 de-
picts the public key exchange process using the proposed LCF trust system for
autonomous node applications. It shows that the establishment of initial trust
stage is more comprehensive compared to [72], as it requires both nodes to send
a list of direct contacts to each other. Trust is then computed based on these
lists, following which, the usual direct and carrier key exchange is carried out
before disconnecting.
This trust system is scalable in comparison to the Web of Trust model. The
use of a Direct and Approved Key List allows the introduction of new nodes into
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Figure 3.5: Public key exchange with LCF trust assignment.
the community at a later time without creating segregated networks. Initially,
new nodes introduced into the network will have a low trust rating. However, as
they move, meet, and interact with already established nodes their trust rating
will increase over time.
The efficient distribution of public keys in large scale DTN deployments is a
desirable property. The use of carrier nodes to assist with public key distribution
allows nodes to communicate with nodes they have not met. This provides a
scalable network that is not dependant on any other infrastructure for public
key distribution.
3.5.2 Adversary Setup
A single Black Hat node was introduced into the simulation. This simulated the
event of an attacker physically compromising a node in the network. A single
node was selected to observe the singular effect that one Black Hat node would
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have on the network. The designated node would perform a key spoof attack by
changing all the keys in DM and AM to the Black Hat Public Key PM . It would
then distribute these spoofed ID keys. Upon meeting another node (NA), the
Black Hat node would transfer the Black Hat public key (PM) and other spoofed
ID keys (P(M,i)) whilst accepting the public key of the neighbouring node (PA),
and then proceed to generate a spoofed ID public key (P(M,A)).
3.5.3 Experiments
An experiment consisted of three scenarios, each using different methods of es-
tablishing initial trust. The first scenario called Control, utilised an absolute
trust method. The second scenario called Random, utilised a random trust sys-
tem similar to the one proposed by [72]. The third scenario called LCF, utilised
the new LCF method described in Section 3.3. For each experiment, a random
movement model was generated and replayed for all the three scenarios. This
allowed the same movement and connections to nodes to be replayed for ev-
ery different method of establishing initial trust. The way each methodology of
establishing initial trust changed the rate of key distribution was observed.
Each scenario was simulated for a total of 10,000 seconds with 100 nodes
assigned in a 100m by 100m square grid. Nodes travelled at 1m/s with a com-
munications range of 1 metre. When detecting a neighbouring node, it would
engage in key exchange for a total of 60 seconds to simulate a worse case scenario
time for nodes to handshake, exchange keys using various key exchange protocols
and transfer additional data such as messages. During this period, the two nodes
would generate an initial trust value using one of the three methods, exchange
their own public keys, and public keys in Di, which would become approved keys
provided they exceeded the trust threshold. Upon completion of the public key
exchange process, nodes would disconnect and resume movement.
Using the Bluetooth communications standard [10], with a conservative Class
2 radio device range of 1 metre, the estimated baud rate provided is between 3
to 24 megabits per second (Mbits/s). Using a 256 bit ECC public key, and as-
suming a public key package size of 300 bytes to include additional key metadata
and information, a node transferring a full keyring of 100 public keys could be
completed in 0.01 to 0.08 seconds. This provides ample time during the 60 sec-
onds for two meeting nodes to establish initial trust, handshake, and exchange
public keys and other messages.
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Table 3.3 provides a summary of the simulation parameters. Jia et al. [72]
used a trust threshold value that was 0.1 above the highest trust value that
could be assigned to a node. Since the Random scenario generated a trust value
between 0 and 1, the trust threshold value was set at 1.1 for both Random and
LCF scenarios. The threshold value was also set such that a public key could not
be approved by just one trustworthy node, but had to be received by a minimum
of two nodes for approval. The threshold was set to match the threshold in [72]
to allow comparison of results.
Table 3.3: Experimental Simulation Constants
Parameter Value
Experiment Environment
Environment Size 100 x 100 Metres
Duration 10,000 Seconds
Movement Model Random
Node
Number of Nodes (N) 100
Node Speed 1 m/s
Node Wait Time N/A
Communications Standard Bluetooth
Communications Range 1 Metre
Key Exchange Time 60 Seconds
Trust
Trust Range [lower, upper] [0, 1] Continuous
Initial Trust Value 0.5
Trust Threshold ≥ 1.1
Black Hat Nodes
Number of Black Hat Nodes 1
In total, six experiments were conducted, each with three scenarios. The
Random scenario, was run three times for each experiment, and an average was
taken. Figure 3.6 depicts the placement of the nodes in the simulation space.
The X and Y axis depicting the XY co-ordinate position of the nodes, and the Z-
axis depicting the number of keys in the Direct and Approved Key List. It shows
a uniformly distributed placement and movement of nodes in the simulation.
However, due to the randomness of the initial node placement, this may not
always occur.
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Figure 3.6: Placement of nodes in simulation space and number of keys for each
node.
3.5.4 Security and Performance Evaluation Metrics
Three security and performance evaluation metrics were measured in this sim-
ulation. These metrics are used to determine whether the security properties
identified in Section 3.2.6 are met by the proposed key distribution scheme. The
security and performance evaluation metrics outlined are Public Key Distribution
Efficiency, Black Hat Public Key Distribution, and Spoofed ID Key Distribution.
1. Public Key Distribution Efficiency is a measure of the speed at which public
keys are distributed in the DTN. The more instances of a node's public
key in the network increases the confidence that the node actually owns
the public key. This makes it difficult for a Black Hat node to distribute
a Spoofed ID Key tied to the identity of another node. Therefore, it is
desirable for public keys to be distributed quickly amongst the nodes in
the bootstrapping process. Using a two tiered key system with Direct Key
and Approved Key Lists, two sub-properties of Public Key Distribution
Efficiency can be measured. The Direct Key List provides a list of other
nodes that a given node has met. While the Approved Key List provides
a list of nodes that the node is aware of exists, but has not yet directly
met. After the deployment process, nodes meet and exchange keys. It
is expected that the number of public keys in the Direct and Approved
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Key Lists will continue to increase over time. At a certain point, all nodes
will become aware of all other nodes, where the number of nodes in both
the Direct and Approved Key List equal the total number of nodes in the
network. As time approaches infinity, it is expected that the Approved Key
List will decline as nodes meet the other nodes they knew existed but had
not met previously. In this instance, the approved keys are promoted to
direct keys.
2. Black Hat Public Key Distribution is the measure of how widespread the
Black Hat Public Key (PM) as defined in Section 3.2.3 is distributed amongst
the nodes. The provision of public key confidence should be able to mit-
igate the distribution of such keys. This metric includes two sub-metrics
that are measured.
(a) The number of public keys the Black Hat node is able to collect from
neighbouring nodes. The more public keys and identities the Black
Hat node can collect from legitimate nodes, the more spoofed ID keys
P(M,i) it can generate.
(b) The number of White Hat nodes that have the PM in either Di or Ai.
When a White Hat node receives PM they also become carriers of this
key, and may pass it to other nodes it may meet.
Better security is achieved then the distribution of PM is mitigated, whilst
assisting the distribution of legitimate public keys.
3. The final evaluation metric measured is the number of Spoofed ID Keys
Distributed (P(M,i)) throughout the system. Spoofed ID Keys differ from
the Black Hat Public Keys in the second evaluation metric, in that they
explicitly exploit the identity-key binding as defined in Section 3.2.3. The
robustness of the key management and distribution scheme is measured by
the Spoofed ID Key Distribution. Public key confidence should also be
able to mitigate the distribution of P(M,i). These keys allow the Black Hat
node to eavesdrop on communications intended for the legitimate node,
and allow impersonation of the victim node.
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3.6 Results and Analysis
This section presents and discusses the experimental results on the three eval-
uation metrics discussed in Section 3.5.4. They are evaluated to determine
whether the key distribution scheme fulfils the security properties identified in
Section 3.2.6.
3.6.1 Public Key Distribution Efficiency
The first metric measured is the Public Key Distribution Efficiency. An efficient
distribution of public keys directly, as well as an efficient distribution of carried
(indirect) keys fulfils Security Properties 1 and 2 from Section 3.2.6. Figure 3.7
depicts the percentage of keys in the system over time for the Direct, Approved
and combined (Direct+Approved) key lists in the LCF scenario. Full key distri-
bution results can be found in Appendix A. The results show the keys distributed
directly increase linearly over time. At the end of the simulation, only 47% of
keys distributed were directly exchanged. The Approved key distribution results
allow an additional number of nodes to communicate using indirectly trusted
keys, thereby fulfilling Security Property 2. The results showed the percentage
of Approved keys exceeding Direct keys after 2,500 seconds into the simulation
where it peaks at around 7,000 seconds before declining. The decline in approved
keys is due to nodes directly receiving a public key currently in their Ai, thereby
upgrading the approved key to a direct key. The system and mobility model of
the simulation would result in all nodes eventually meeting every other node,
and the approved key distribution declining to 0%. However, in a large and open
system model, the approved key distribution would be useful to facilitate secure
communications to an additional number nodes, as not all nodes will meet every
other node.
Figure 3.8 compares the public key distribution of both direct and approved
keys for each scenario. It shows that the Control scenario provides the most
efficient key distribution with each node averaging 100 keys after 10,000 seconds.
This indicates that each node has either met or is aware of the other 99 nodes in
the simulation, and is capable of establishing secure end-to-end communications.
The Random and LCF scenarios show a slower, but still effective, public key
distribution. It is interesting to note that the Random scenario was slower than
the LCF scenario. The LCF trust system, resulted in a more relevant initial trust
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Figure 3.7: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for LCF Scenario.
value and a trustworthy distribution of keys in comparison to a randomly gener-
ated trust value in the Random scenario. This is demonstrated when analysing
the time taken for each scenario to distribute 50% of the keys. The Control
scenario distributed 50% of the keys in approximately 2,500 seconds, the fastest
of all three scenarios. The LCF scenario distributed the same amount of keys
in approximately 3,600 seconds, whilst the Random scenario took the longest
requiring approximately 4,200 seconds to distribute 50% of the keys.
When compared to Jia et al. [72], the Random scenarios indicate similar
trends in experimental results, with minor differences in public keys distribu-
tion. This is likely due to the difference in simulation engines. Jia et al. [72]
utilise the NetLogo [131] simulator, whilst this chapter utilises a fully customis-
able DTN simulator. Furthermore, experimental setup information necessary to
replicate the random movement model in [72], was also not defined. Random
movement could either be random direction, or random waypoint (direction and
speed) [73], where nodes randomly generate a destination, path and speed. In
this experiment, the direction was randomly generated, but the speed was kept
constant at 1m/s.
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Figure 3.8: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for the different trust
systems.
3.6.2 Black Hat Public Key Distribution
The second evaluation metric is the Black Hat Public Key Distribution. Miti-
gating the effect a Black Hat nodes has in the network fulfils Security Property
3 identified in Section 3.2.6. This metric can be further divided into two sub-
metrics, Black Hat node with Black Hat Keys, and White Hat nodes with Black
Hat Keys.
Table 3.4 shows that using the Random method to establish initial trust,
provides little or no additional security compared to the Control scenario, for
the prevention of Black Hat public keys being distributed. Some experiments
(see Appendix B) show that more Black Hat public keys are approved in the
Random scenario at the end of the simulation than the Control scenario.
Black Hat node with Black Hat Keys is the number of public keys NM was
able to obtain in both the DM and AM . For each experiment, the contents of
DM between all scenarios were identical. This was due to the same movement
pattern being replayed for all three scenarios, resulting in the same node meet-
ings. However, the contents of AM are different due to different trust systems
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Table 3.4: Experiment 1 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 42 42 42 42 42
with Black Hat Keys Approved 58 58 58 58 3
White Hat Nodes Direct 40 40 40 40 40
with Black Hat Keys Approved 50 51 54 50 53
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 30 16 25 29 2
Totals
Direct 82 82 82 82 82
Approved 138 125 137 137 58
All 220 207 219 219 140
Table 3.5: Averaged Experimental Results
Key List Control Random LCF
Black Hat Node Direct 46.33 46.33 46.33
with Black Hat Keys Approved 53.67 53.33 3.83
White Hat Nodes Direct 43.67 43.67 43.67
with Black Hat Keys Approved 44 47.78 48.17
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 50.67 53.22 6
Totals
Direct 90 90 90
Approved 148.33 154.33 58
All 238.33 244.33 148
between the scenarios. In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, this is called Black Hat node with
Black Hat Keys. In Table 3.5, the Control and Random scenarios have similar
results with 53.33 and 53.67 respectively, averaged between all conducted exper-
iments. Investigation of the Approved Key List for the Random scenario, found
that many of the keys were approved late in the simulation. Even with a random
trust value being assigned to a carrier node, if the carried key was received from
enough sources to exceed the trust threshold, the key could still be approved.
For the Random scenario, this typically occurred late in the simulation. In the
LCF scenario, nearly all experiments showed poor results in obtaining carrier
keys from other nodes. Table 3.5 shows an average of 3.83 keys. This is due to
the trust system employed.
In the LCF scenario, during the process of examining common contacts, a
node will check both the identities and public keys in Di of the neighbouring
node. If they are identical, the trust value is incremented. However if the public
key of the node is different, the trust value is decreased significantly at a rate
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of td per discrepancy. This is designed to establish a low initial trust value for
nodes that carry false keys. Due to the lack of a centralised key manager or trust
and reputation system, the only method of checking whether the node is carrying
spoofed keys is to compare public keys of nodes in common to both nodes. Since
the node assumes itself trustworthy, if there is a discrepancy in the compared
public key, it will assume the other node is carrying a spoofed key. The Black Hat
node carries multiple spoofed public keys (P(M,A), P(M,B), ..) that it regards as
correct and fully trustworthy. Therefore, if it meets another node with legitimate
public keys, it will assume that the other node is spreading spoofed public keys
and degrade the trust rating. With the introduction of multiple Black Hat nodes,
it is expected to segregate the network into the two groups of White Hat and
Black Hat nodes.
The second sub-metric, White Hat nodes with Black Hat Keys is the number
of White Hat nodes that have received PM , in either Di or Ai. Again, as the
movement model is the same for all the three scenarios, it was expected that Di
would be identical between the scenarios. However, the contents of Ai would be
different based on the trust system. In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, this is called White
Hat nodes with Black Hat Keys. The results indicate that both the Random
and LCF scenarios provide little security in preventing this. Table 3.5 shows the
average of all six experiments. The Control scenario had 44 Black Hat public
keys distributed as a baseline. The Random and LCF scenarios distributed
slightly more Black Hat public keys averaging 47.78 and 48.17 respectively. In
particular for the LCF scenario, the Black Hat public key is distributed by White
Hat nodes that have directly met the Black Hat node. They then receive the
Black Hat public key in Di, and distributed them to other White Hat nodes
through the approval process. Since the LCF scenario is designed to establish
a more appropriate initial trust value, the Black Hat key is still distributed
slightly better than both the Control and Random scenarios. Practically, this is
an acceptable result as it allows the Black Hat key owned by the Black Hat node
to be disseminated through the network.
3.6.3 Spoofed ID Public Key Distribution
The third evaluation metric measures the Spoofed ID Public Key Distribution.
Limiting the distribution of Spoofed ID Public Keys in the network fulfils Security
Property 3 identified in Section 3.2.6. These are public keys that have a White
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Hat identity but have the Black Hat public key (P(M,i)). P(M,i) keys pose a
larger threat to secure communications in the DTN as it allows the Black Hat
node to eavesdrop and modify messages being routed through a store-carry and
forward scheme [53]. Table 3.4 shows the penetration of the Black Hat Public
key in the system for one of the experiments conducted, and Table 3.5 depicts
the averaged results for all six experiments. Results for all experiments can be
found in Appendix B. The summation of these three metrics was also measured
over time. Figure 3.9 depicts the average of all six experiments showing the
distribution of Black Hat keys over time.
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Figure 3.9: Black Hat key distribution over time for the different trust systems.
From the experiments, it is evident that only the LCF trust system success-
fully mitigates the distribution of P(M,i) keys, averaging 6 instances as shown in
Table 3.5. This is an effective solution as the system segregates the network into
White Hat and Black Hat nodes. The Random scenarios show little to no effect
on mitigating the distribution of such keys, and in some experiments, performed
worse than the Control scenario. The Random scenarios averaged 53.22 falsified
keys, which was higher than the Control scenario of 50.67 Spoofed ID keys. The
mitigation of distributing Spoofed ID public keys by a Black Hat node is required
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to provide secure communications in such a network. Distribution of such keys
allow the Black Hat node to eavesdrop and modify communications, and allow
the impersonation of a White Hat node. The results show that the Black Hat
node is segregated through trust by other White Hat nodes in the LCF scenario,
with a low acceptance of Spoofed ID keys.
The total Black Hat key distribution over time in Figure 3.9 shows that the
LCF scenario mitigates a significant amount of Black Hat and Spoofed ID public
keys introduced by a single Black Hat node. It shows that the LCF scenario
distributed 40% less Black Hat keys at the end of the simulation than the Control
and Random scenarios. It also shows that the distribution of Black Hat keys
plateaus out around 7,000 to 8,000 seconds. Variations in the results are evident
in the Random scenarios for each experiment. Although the movement model
was replayed for each scenario, the initial trust value when two nodes meet in
the Random scenario was randomly generated. Replaying each simulation would
result in variations in the content of Ai due to the random trust value.
From the three security and performance evaluation metrics, it is evident that
the LCF trust system provides the best public key confidence in comparison to
the random trust system (Random) and no trust system (Control). With a 38%
reduction, the LCF trust system is capable of mitigating the distribution of Black
Hat public keys in the scenarios presented in this experiment. However, this
comes at the cost of Public Key Distribution Efficiency. The LCF trust system
takes 44% longer than no trust system to distribute 50% of the public keys. In
comparison to the random trust system, the proposed trust system is 16% faster
at distributing 50% of the public keys, whilst also more effective at mitigating the
distribution of Black Hat public keys by 40%. The results demonstrate that the
LCF trust system sufficiently provides public key authentication in a simulated
DTN environment.
3.7 Discussion
This section discusses the implications and issues related with the proposed
scheme, and results. The implementation of a trust and reputation system to
provide public key confidence, and by extension public key authentication for
key distributions provides a few interesting issues.
1. The implication of trust, key management are all integrated and cyclical.
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Traditional public key authentication schemes such as a CA must first
trust in the identity-public key binding before signing it to assert their
authority. Subsequently, when an entity wishes to authenticate the public
key, they must first trust the signer who asserted the identity-public key
binding. Having verified the signature, the entity can trust the public key.
In the proposed key distribution scheme, trust and key distribution are
parallel. The trust a node (NA) has of another node (NB) is dependent
on the public keys being distributed. Concurrently, the public keys being
distributed are trusted at a confidence level of the trust NA has of NB
and vice-versa. Thereby, the Quality of Service (QoS) a node provides
in distributing public keys, forms the trust value of that node, which the
public keys inherit.
2. Trust and reputation systems are not perfect. The implementation of a
trust and reputation system addresses the autonomous nature of the DTN
environment described. However, there will be issues of White Hat nodes
being labelled as Black Hat nodes (false positive), and Black Hat nodes
labelled as White Hat nodes (false negative). As a result, the scheme pro-
vides some assurances or confidence of the identity-public key binding, and
public key authentication is achieved by exceeding a threshold. Addition-
ally, the distributed nature of the proposed scheme does not qualify as a
reputation system, but rather a trust system as there is no aggregation or
collation of trust scores. Each node retains and manages independent trust
ratings of all other nodes it has met. The use of a reputation system may
reduce false positives or negatives, but will also be susceptible to gaming
from specific adversaries.
3. The proposed LCF scheme can be further applied to the CA model used
for the Internet. With over 600 CAs [36] performing certificate operations
on the Internet in an attempt to remove the single point of failure issue
with only a single CA, it becomes difficult in trusting all of them. Three
methodologies to provide trust in CAs could be applied using the LCF
scheme. The first is a trust establishment scheme amongst the CAs them-
selves. The second is a trust establishment scheme amongst end users, and
the third is a composite trust establishment scheme consisting of both CAs
and end users.
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CA trust establishment amongst themselves: CAs could apply the
distributed LCF trust establishment scheme to provide a trust score
rating for each other CA. Metrics including quantity of certificates
issued over a variety of measurements such as time and location could
be applied to form an aggregated reputation score for each CA.
CA trust establishment amongst end users: End users could apply
the distributed LCF trust establishment scheme to provide a trust
score rating for each other CA. Aggregation of trust scores from a
large quantity of end users could provide an accurate reputation score
of CAs and the certificates issued.
Composite trust establishment scheme: Combining both CA trust es-
tablishment amongst themselves and end users would result in a com-
posite trust establishment scheme. Scores of both would provide ac-
curate reputation scores of CAs and the certificates issued, whilst
mitigating gaming of scores by one of the parties.
4. The proposed LCF scheme and the results obtained have broader impli-
cations in DTN applications, particularly in Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs), where autonomous vehicles are becoming more prevalent in
society. The application of the LCF trust system to assist key distribution
could be used in Internet of Things (IoT) autonomous networks involving
location networks, flash networks, or expendable networks. These are net-
works where they are created for a specific or particular purpose, deployed
as necessary, and with no prior planning.
3.8 Conclusion
Providing public key authentication is a current problem, which is further com-
plicated by the distributed and decentralised characteristics of DTNs and its
application with autonomous nodes. Public key authentication is important to
assert that the identity-public key binding is valid and has not been modified
by an adversary. The consequences of this include the potential to eavesdrop
on communications, modify messages, and deceive their origin. Therefore the
provision of public key authentication in DTNs is critical and important, partic-
ularly in autonomous system networks. The research presented in this chapter
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has addressed this critical problem by combining an initial trust establishment
system with a key distribution scheme similar to PGP to provide confidence in
the identity-public key binding. The main contributions of this chapter are:
• The investigation, development, and evaluation of the LCF trust system:
A public key distribution scheme that utilises a trust system to provide
public key authentication. Some of the sub contributions include:
 A key distribution scheme that is efficient in the distribution of public
keys using a store, carry, and forward exchange.
 A key distribution scheme that mitigates the effect an adversary has
in distributing spoofed public keys that modifies the identity-public
key binding.
The LCF trust system provided a more useful initial trust value between
nodes with no prior history, and without using a centralised trust and repu-
tation manager. It also provided an effective mitigation in the distribution of
adversary keys by 40%. In particular the distribution of spoofed public keys was
significantly reduced from an average of 50.67 keys in the Control scenario to
an average of 6 keys in the LCF scenario. These results indicate the combining
of a trust system and key distribution scheme can provide public key authen-
tication in autonomous DTNs. This has implications for autonomous VANET
applications.
The limitations of this work is acknowledged in that area of selection criteria
for trust weightings (tn, tc, and td). The criteria for tn was adopted from the
cognitive limit of human stable social relationships and correlated with additional
research into online social relationships. OpenPGP implementations of GPG and
PGP 2.6 criteria determined the criteria for tc. Although the values selected for
these trust weightings was purposely chosen to fulfil the above criteria, variations
in values is an area for future experimentation.
Chapter 4 extends the LCF trust system presented in this chapter to also
include location based data to assist public key authentication during key distri-
bution. This is to further improve the Spoofed Key Distribution metric against
multiple and stationary adversaries. The experimental environment is expanded
to a realistic large scale geographic DTN deployment involving vehicular nodes.
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Chapter 4
DTN Location Based Key
Distribution
The previous chapter described in detail the design, development, and evaluation
of a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) public key distribution scheme that utilised
the Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) trust system to provide public key au-
thentication. The proof-of-concept scheme utilised a common and effective linear
trust computation engine to provide trust in the identity-public key binding in
autonomous nodes in a completely decentralised and distributed environment
with no other infrastructure. The scheme was evaluated in a small controlled
simulation environment. However, many DTN applications include large scale
deployments such as Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs), where large quantity
of nodes may be deployed over large geographic areas.
Many prior works in VANET trust and reputation systems, and key man-
agement utilise a centralised or infrastructure based approach. The reliance on
fixed Road Side Units (RSUs) may be a valid assumption in densely populated
areas such as Central Business Districts (CBDs), however may not be valid in
more rural or under-developed areas. The simulation and evaluation of the pro-
posed schemes are conducted in small controlled simulation environments over a
short period of time. The work presented in this chapter addresses these issues
by extending the work presented in Chapter 3, by applying and evaluating the
LCF trust system in a realistic VANET environment, and adding location based
information to the trust computation. Therefore, this chapter addresses the two
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research questions identified in Chapter 1. Research Question 2: Is it possible
to apply a trust or reputation system for DTN Key Distribution for a large scale
realistic DTN application? and Research Question 3: Is it possible to leverage
location data to assist a trust or reputation system for DTN Key Distribution?
Specifically, it focuses on:
• The evaluation of the LCF trust system in a large scale VANET application
under attack from a variety of adversaries.
• The design, development, and evaluation of the Location based Leverage
of Common Friends (LLCF) trust system to include co-localisation data to
assist public key authentication and key distribution.
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a de-
tailed outline of the System Model and Security Properties of the network, along
with definitions, threat model and adversary capabilities. Section 4.3 presents
the newly proposed LLCF trust system to assist in the provision of public key
authentication during key distribution. Section 4.4 outlines the experimental
methodology including experimental and adversary setup, the experiments con-
ducted as well as the security and performance metrics used to evaluate both the
LCF and LLCF trust system. Section 4.5 presents the experimental results and
evaluation of how both trust systems provide public key authentication when
under attack from a variety of adversaries. Section 4.6 discusses the implications
and issues related to the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 4.7 summarises the
research and contributions presented in this chapter.
4.1 Background and Related Work
Many past evaluations of trust or reputation systems for DTNs have focused
on closed and small scale simulations [108, 59, 60, 104], typically covering small
geographic areas, a small deployment of nodes, unrealistic movement models,
and a closed system. However, many DTN applications such as autonomous
VANETs are open and large scale. These deployments can span large geographic
environments with a large deployment of nodes. The vehicles or nodes, have
vehicular movement models, and can enter and leave the network freely and at
any time, making the deployment an open network. Therefore, there is a need
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to evaluate the LCF trust system on a realistic VANET application environment
to provide security in a VANET.
Several security requirements are necessary for securing Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V) VANETs. These requirements are distilled from the European Union (EU)
[9] and United States (US) [61, 130] V2V Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) pro-
posals. They are Certification and Validation, Scalability and Efficiency, Revo-
cation, and Privacy.
Certification and Validation are the key properties of a PKI and are
closely linked to the cryptographic algorithms and protocols. A certificate is
essentially the public key that belongs to an entity in the system that is signed
by the certificate authority. The certificate is used to ensure that the public
key that is received with a message does belong to the entity that it claims.
Without certification, an attacker may be able to substitute their own public
key for another entity and send messages claiming to be from them. If a PKI
possesses the certification property, the system should be able to successfully
distribute public key certificates to the entities that they belong to.
Scalability and Efficiency. The PKI for VANETs are large scale infras-
tructures that are intended to span continents in terms of geographic distances.
The means that the number of vehicle, known as nodes, are expected to run into
the hundreds of millions. This is a challenge as the only other PKI system that
is similar in magnitude is the one provided on the Internet. As a result of the
massive scale of the PKI, all computations, communications and storage usage
must be carefully considered. Part of this requirement is that these performance
metrics does not place a burden on the system. The vehicle communication
system must be functional despite the PKI system used to secure it.
Revocation. One of the key functions of a PKI system is the ability to
maintain trust and security by notifying nodes of invalid or corrupted certificates.
A mechanism must exist that allows the nodes to recognise that the central
authority no longer accepts a particular public key. This is a necessary function
as it cannot be assumed that secret keys and their associated public keys can be
kept secure indefinitely.
Privacy. One of the key requirements of a V2V PKI is that the privacy of the
car device is maintained. There are two aspects of privacy. First is operational
privacy. There are many situations where the need for cars to be anonymous
from other cars and external entities to the system while they are sending and
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receiving messages in normal operations. Second is the desire for car devices to
be anonymous from the Certificate Authority (CA) and the other components of
the system that make up the certificate distribution system.
Both the EU and US V2V PKI standards attempt to provide these require-
ments with centralised infrastructure-based PKI. However, scenarios exist such
as remote and isolated areas where the reliance on centralised infrastructure
cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, this chapter will specifically address two of
the requirements necessary for securing VANETs; Certification and Validation,
and Scalability and Efficiency. More specifically, the provision of these two re-
quirements in a VANET environment where there is no infrastructure, thereby
requiring a fully decentralised and distributed key management scheme.
Furthermore, as the nodes in a VANET are autonomous vehicles, they also
maintain Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities for navigation. This
co-localisation data can be further extended and input as an additional trust
component to the LCF trust system to form a location based trust system to
further enhance the capabilities of the LCF trust system.
4.2 Location Based Key Distribution SystemModel
and Security Properties
In this section, the System Model and Security Properties of the application en-
vironment identified from relevant literature presented in Chapter 2 are outlined
and identified. In addition, the likely application and landscape of the network
is also discussed in System Model. Terminology and notations such as types
of nodes and keys are defined. The system model is susceptible to attack by
adversaries that will attempt to exploit a threat model, which is defined. The
capabilities of the adversary are defined along with the extent of their attacks.
Having defined the system model of the network, threat model and adversary
capabilities, the security properties that the proposed key distribution scheme
should achieve is outlined. Throughout this chapter, the notations in Table 3.1
are used to refer to nodes, keys, trust, and black hat nodes.
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Table 4.1: Notations
Notation Description
Node ID Notations
i Unique Persistent Identifier i
Ni Node i
Key Notations
Ki Keypair of Ni
Si Secret (Private) Key of Ni
Pi Public Key of Ni
Di Direct Key List of Ni - List of public keys received directly
from another node
Ai Approved Key List of Ni - List of trusted public keys received
from carrier nodes
Ui Untrusted Key List of Ni - List of untrusted public keys
received from carrier nodes
Trust Notations
T ji Trust Value Ni has of Nj
tn Trust component weighting given to each contact
n Number of contacts
tc Trust component weighting given to each common contact
between two nodes
c Number of common contacts between two nodes
td Trust component weighting given to each key discrepancy
instance
d Number of key discrepancies
tl Trust component weighting given to each location
l Normalised trust score of a particular area
tneutral Initial starting value of trust
Black Hat Notations
S(m,i) Spoofed Private Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm
P(m,i) Spoofed Public Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm
4.2.1 System Model
The system is assumed to be a large scale open VANET, spanning a large
geographic area. The deployment environment has no other entities except
nodes themselves. There is no centralised PKI or any form of Trusted Third
Party (TTP), and there is no public communications infrastructure. Nodes are
considered fully autonomous and mobile, requiring no human intervention. They
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self-initialise on deployment with no a-priori knowledge of the network or their
neighbours. There is no pre-deployment initialisation phase by an oine author-
ity. The key management phases of Moore et al. [100] are adopted, but given
the lack of a pre-deployment phase, the key management phases are; initial boot-
strapping (distribution), operation, and revocation.
Nodes retain a persistent unique identity [108], and generate Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) public and private key pairs [98, 78]. These keys are used
to perform security based tasks such as providing confidentiality, data integrity,
and message authentication. It is also assumed that the key pairs have a long but
finite time period of validity, similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) where keys
may last 1 to 2 years. It is an open network, where nodes freely join or leave, with
a large number of nodes in the system at any time. VANET nodes solely rely
on V2V communications as there is no other existing infrastructure. They com-
municate through wireless communications using the IEEE 802.11 specification
suite [71]. Due to their mobile nature, they create ephemeral or opportunistic
bi-directional connections between neighbours [65]. When nodes connect, they
require a defined amount of time to stay within communications range to al-
low key exchange. Using the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
specification [71], the time required can be calculated based on the transmission
rate and the data bundle size. If the nodes are within communications range for
the required time to allow the key exchange process it is performed successfully.
However, if there is insufficient time, incomplete data bundles are transferred,
and the exchange fails. Partial bundles are assumed to be dropped. These com-
munications connections are used to exchange the public keys they own, as well
as the public keys of other nodes they have met and carry. Public key exchange
is considered to be a low-cost communications procedure as the exchange occurs
at one-hop distances between nodes [13]. The public key exchange is completed
over a two channel or side channel scheme [72]. Due to the large number of nodes
and geographic size of the system, it is assumed that adversary nodes will exist
in the system, and that it might not be feasible to expel such a node. Nodes in a
VANET are assumed to be less resource constrained than nodes in a DTN such
as in [69, 76, 18, 28]. This is assumed as VANET nodes have greater significant
capacity in energy, computation, and memory.
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4.2.2 Trust Model
Using the same transitive trust model outlined in Section 3.2.2 [138], the public
keys of each node are exchanged when nodes are within communications range.
These keys form Direct trust, and are easily verifiable as they were transferred
by the node owning the corresponding private key. Carried keys belonging to
other nodes are also distributed in the key exchange process. Indirect trust
relationships between autonomous nodes are formed if the collective trust values
are sufficient similar to the trust model in Chapter 3.
4.2.3 Definitions
The following terminology used throughout this chapter is defined:
1. Key Distribution is the process where a node distributes their public key
(Pi) to another entity in the network for the use of providing end-to-end
secure communications.
2. Public Key Authentication - Is the verification of the identity-key binding
of a public key. In a decentralised public key distribution scheme such as
PGP and the Web of Trust, public key authentication is achieved by the
human user confirming the entity's claimed identity is associated with their
corresponding public key. It is measured as a boolean (Y or N).
3. Public Key Confidence is proposed in this thesis as having confidence in
the identity-key binding of a public key. In an autonomous DTN, without
a centralised PKI, or any other infrastructure but the nodes, verification
that the public key being distributed belongs to the associated node is
difficult. In a DTN application, public key confidence is how confident the
autonomous nodes are that the multiple instances of the same public key
they are receiving is actually owned by the node identity. It is a continuous
value consisting of the culmination of trust values. When the confidence in
a public key has exceeded a threshold, public key authentication has been
achieved.
4. Trust Value is a real numerical value within a predefined range, that is
assigned to a single key or node by an entity describing the level of trust
it has in that key or node.
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The following terms on how nodes categorise the receipt of keys are defined.
These reflect how the node came into possession of the public key.
1. Direct Key is a public key that a node has received from the owner - NA
has received the public key of NB (PB) directly from NB. Direct Keys are
stored in the Direct Key List (DA).
2. Carrier Key is a public key that a node has received from another node
who has previously met the owner of that public key - NA has received the
public key of NB (PB) from the carrier NC . A Carrier Key can either be
one of the following:
(a) Approved Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key
of NX (PX) from various carrier nodes (NC , ND, and NE) and is
confident that PX actually belongs to NX . Approved Keys are stored
in the Approved Key List (AA).
(b) Untrusted Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has not exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key of
NY (PY ) from various carrier nodes (NB, and NC) and is not confident
that PY actually belongs to NY . Untrusted Keys are stored in the
Untrusted Key List (UA).
Table 4.2: Classification of Nodes and their Keys
Nodes
White Hat (NA) Key pair (KA)
Private Key (SA)
Public Key (PA)
Black Hat (NM)
Key pair (KM)
Private Key (SM)
Public Key (PM)
Spoofed ID
Private Key (S(M,A))
Public Key (P(M,A))
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the different classifications of nodes, keys
and revocation materials. They can be broadly categorised into two types of
nodes. White Hat Nodes (NA) are nodes that are legitimate, and have not been
compromised by an adversary or attacker. They generate a key pair (KA), which
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consists of a White Public Key (PA) and a White Private Key (SA). Black Hat
Nodes (NM) are nodes that have been compromised by an adversary or attacker.
Like White Hat Nodes, they possess their own Key pair (KM), which consists of
a Black Public Key (PM) and a Black Private Key (SM). A Black Hat Node as
part of their malicious nature may create Spoofed ID Material.
The first form is a Spoofed ID Public Key (P(M,A)). This is when the Black
Hat node generates a key that has the identity association of a White Hat Node,
but the key of an Adversarial Node. It is created when NM changes the identity
association of its public key (PM) from itself (M) to the identity of a White Hat
Node (A). This results in a public key that other nodes think belongs to NA (that
is NA has the corresponding private key) however, NM holds the corresponding
private key.
4.2.4 Threat Model
Given the system model outlined in Section 4.2.1, a similar threat model to
Chapter 3 was assumed:
1. Lack of Infrastructure - With no infrastructure to assist in key management
operations such as public key distribution, nodes will have to handle these
operations independently. An adversary node may take advantage of the
environment where nodes have to independently distribute their own keys
to assume the identity of another node. The lack of infrastructure also
affects the implementation of a trust and reputation system as there is
difficulty in the aggregation of trust scores to form a reputation system.
2. Lack of Public Key Authentication - There is no trusted third party, and
therefore no assurance of public key authentication. There is no authentic-
ity between the public key and the identity of the owner [12]. An adversary
node is capable of associating its own public key to the identity of another
node, distribute this key, and perform a Man In The Middle (MITM) at-
tack.
3. Physical Tampering - VANET nodes may be subject to physical tamper-
ing [106]. Attackers may gain physical access to a node, modifying the
behaviour, public key bindings, and distribute Spoofed ID Keys from tam-
pered nodes. The physical tampering of nodes may be mitigated but cannot
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be prevented. As such, nodes will need a mechanism to detect and protect
the network against potentially compromised nodes.
4. Eavesdropping and Modification of Communications - Since the connection
between nodes in a VANET are ephemeral, and with no static routing,
nodes may be required to pass on messages between nodes. This provides
an adversary the capability to overhear as well as the potential to modify
wireless communications between nodes [107]. Due to this threat, nodes
will need to establish secure end-to-end communications.
5. Open and Dynamic Network - Nodes may be deployed, join, or leave the
network at any time. With no TTP to provide public key authentication or
detection of adversaries, it is easy for an attacker to deploy new adversarial
nodes into the network. Therefore, it is possible for the network with a
large population of nodes to always consist of a population of adversarial
nodes, which cannot be expelled.
4.2.5 Adversary Capabilities
Adversarial nodes will attempt to exploit the threat model outlined for this net-
work. With a Spoofed ID Key, any adversary node is capable of impersonating
another node. This has consequences for the security of communications, and
future key management activities such as key revocation. Due to the character-
istics of a DTN, an adversary is capable of eavesdropping on communications,
and modifying data. These networks require communications to be passed on be-
tween nodes in a store and forward method [40]. A message or bundle encrypted
with a Spoofed ID Key that an adversary has generated, means that if the ad-
versary is capable of intercepting the message, they can successfully perform
a MITM attack [12]. An insider attack model was used, with the adversarial
nodes assumed to have similar abilities as outlined by [32] with the following
capabilities:
1. Adversarial nodes can obtain any message passing through the network
between two other nodes within communications range [40, 12, 107].
2. They are a member of the network and can therefore initiate and receive
communications with other nodes in the network.
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3. They are able to generate new Black Private and Public Keys (SM , PM) as
defined in Section 4.2.3 and distribute PM . SM and PM between adversary
nodes are independent to prevent White Hat nodes from blacklisting a
common PM between all adversary nodes [32].
4. They are able to generate and distribute Spoofed ID Keys (P(M,i)) as defined
in Section 4.2.3. This is when they associate their own private and public
key pair with another node's identity in their DM or AM Lists [12].
5. They are able to remain stationary in an area with high node density to
increase the impact of their attack.
Two variations of adversaries with two differing movement models specific to
VANET applications [20, 108] are introduced:
1. Static adversary movement model is when the adversary nodes are placed
in a common location together. The nodes are unable to move, and remain
stationary. These take the form of long-term parked vehicles, or fixed
devices introduced by the adversary.
2. Dynamic adversary movement model is when the adversary nodes are mo-
bile. These take the form of mobile vehicles, which have been compromised
to behave as adversarial nodes.
4.2.6 Security Properties
Given the system and threat model of the network, this section outlines the de-
sired security properties the key distribution scheme should achieve. Ultimately,
the aim is to achieve public key authentication in an autonomous VANET node
during key distribution.
Property 1: A White Hat node (NA) should be able to generate a key
pair (KA), and distribute the public key (PA) to establish a secure end-to-end
communications channel with other nodes in the network.
Property 2: Any White Hat node should be able to utilise location informa-
tion to assist the approval process of carried keys to form indirect relationships.
Property 3: The effect of a Black Hat node (NM), wishing to exploit the
lack of public key authentication of a White Hat node (NA) by distributing a
spoofed ID key (P(M,A)) should be mitigated.
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Property 4: Any White Hat node should be able to utilise location infor-
mation to assist the identification of spoofed ID keys (P(M,A)) by a stationary
Black Hat node (NM) in a high node density location.
Property 5: The trust system should create a segregation between Black
Hat nodes and White Hat nodes, thereby making it easy to distinguish between
legitimate and adversarial nodes.
4.3 Location based Leverage of Common Friends
trust system
A new linear computation trust system called LLCF is proposed to provide public
key confidence, and by extension public key authentication, to establish secure
autonomous communications. The proposed trust system extends the LCF trust
system of Chapter 3 with the inclusion of co-localisation data. The trust rela-
tionship between two nodes is assumed to be linear, which is similar to many
trust and reputation systems for online retail sites such as eBay and Amazon [74].
Weighted scores similar to [21] were used to provide different trust components
for formulate a trust score between two nodes.
The two properties, the number of nodes met (n) and number of common
nodes (c), both increase the trust value. Whilst the decreasing trust value (d)
is the discrepancy between two nodes over the binding of an identity and the
public key. If there is a discrepancy, both nodes will decrease trust value with
respect to each other. Nodes will take the default position of completely trusting
themselves, and assume their version of the public key is the correct key, whilst
the neighbouring node has a spoofed key. It is assumed that trust is diminished
significantly faster than trust is increased. Location information can increase and
diminish trust based on the reputation of the particular location the key exchange
occurs. With the inclusion of location to the calculation of trust between nodes,
the linear relationship between common contacts and location to trust can be
represented by Equation 4.1. The trust of NA assigns to NB (T
B
A ) is given by:
TBA = Tneutral + Tnumber + Tcommon + Tkey_disc + Tlocation (4.1)
Where −1 ≤ TBA ≤ 1. Tneutral is the starting value of trust. Tnumber is the
trust value assigned for the number of nodes NB has met. Tcommon is the trust
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value assigned for the common contacts of NA and NB. Tkey_disc is the trust value
assigned for key discrepancies between NA and NB. Tlocation is the trust value
assigned for the location where NA received the key of NB. Tnumber, Tcommon,
Tkey_disc, and Tlocation can be calculated from Equations 4.2 to 4.5.
Tnumber = tn × n (4.2)
Tcommon = tc × c (4.3)
Tkey_disc = td × d (4.4)
Tlocation = tl × l (4.5)
Where tn is the trust weighting given to number of contacts, and n is the
number of nodes NB has met. The term tc is the trust weighting given to the
common contacts of NA and NB, and c is the number of nodes in common with
NA and NB. The term td is the distrust weighting upon discovering a potential
false key, and D is the number of discrepancy keys between NA and NB. The
relationship between tn, tc, and td is set by initial experiments conducted in
Section 3.4
The addition of the term Tlocation provides location based information to estab-
lish a trust value between NA and NB, with tl the upper value of trust assigned
to a location, and L is the value of trust assigned to a location. Due to the
method by which l is calculated, tl was set as the maximum value the location
trust term (Equation 4.5) can contribute to Equation 4.1.
The trust value assigned to a location term l of Equation 4.5, is the value
that NA assigns to the location it received PB from NB. As nodes move, they
keep a history log of locations they have visited. For each location, nodes log
the number of Direct Keys received from other nodes, and the number of key
discrepancies during Carrier Key exchange between other nodes. The number
of Direct Keys provides a metric of the number of potential White Keys trans-
ferred in a particular location. The number of key discrepancies in the Carrier
Key exchange process provides a metric of the number of potential Black Keys
transferred in a particular location. These keys can only be detected if there are
two or more different public keys bound to one node identity. For each location,
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nodes independently calculate Kdiff by Equation 4.6, the difference of Direct
Key count (DKcount) or White Keys, and number of key discrepancies (KDcount)
or Black Keys.
Kdiff = DKcount −KDcount (4.6)
l =

Kdiff−KeyWhite(Min)
KeyWhite(Max)−KeyWhite(Min) if Kdiff > 0
−
(
Kdiff−KeyBlack(Min)
KeyBlack(Max)−KeyBlack(Min)
)
if Kdiff < 0
0 if Kdiff = 0
(4.7)
Equation 4.7 represents how l is calculated. For the locations where Kdiff is
positive, it represents that the number of White Keys exchanged in this location
exceeded the number of Black Keys exchanged. The location trust value l is a
normalised value of Kdiff for all locations, such that 0 < l ≤ 1. The location a
node assigns l = 1 is the potential location where the most number of White Keys
are being exchanged. For the locations where Kdiff is negative, it represents the
number of Black Keys exchanged in this location exceeded the number of White
Keys exchanged. The location trust value l is a normalised value of Kdiff for
all locations, where −1 ≤ L < 0. The location a node assigns l = −1 is the
potential location where the most number of Black Keys are being exchanged.
For all locations where Kdiff = 0, meaning the number of White Keys equalled
the number of Black Keys exchanged in this location, the location trust value
l = 0, resulting in the original LCF trust computation engine. The location
weighting term tl was set at 0.5 to ensure that −0.5 ≤ Tlocation ≤ 0.5.
The addition of Tlocation to the computation engine allows nodes to detect
locations where adversary nodes congregate and exchange Spoofed ID Keys as
defined in Section 4.2.4. This provides additional security against a static ad-
versary, as nodes would compute the adversarial location to be untrustworthy,
which would affect the trust value of received keys in that area.
The trust score of each location is calculated independently by each node.
It is relative only to the other locations that the node has calculated a trust
score of, and is independent of the trust score a differing node will assign to
the same location. Since there is no aggregation of trust score by collective
nodes, nodes cannot game or influence the location trust of another node. Each
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node independently determines the location relative to every other location. At
deployment, a node will only be aware of a small number of locations. However,
as the time a node operates in a network increases, they will visit an increasing
number of locations and become aware of a larger number of locations. The use
of a normalised location trust component given by Equation 4.7 takes this into
consideration, as nodes will form their own independent view of the world.
4.4 Experimental Methodology
An open source DTN and VANET simulator was developed in Python called
Traffic Djam [30] that models the decentralised distribution of public keys be-
tween nodes using a Web of Trust model. Traffic Djam initialises nodes with a
persistent unique node identifier (Node ID) similar to [108], and a public and
private key pair signature similar to key fingerprints in PGP [138]. Nodes follow
a movement path based on city vehicle movement models. Nodes within a pre-
defined communications range of another node connect and engage in public key
exchange whilst in motion. The simulator engine focuses on the security of the
application layer of a DTN or VANET.
4.4.1 Movement Model
A movement model based on the Cabspotting [38] project in San Francisco was
used. The Cabspotting project tracks the activity of commercial taxi cabs in San
Francisco. Each taxi (or node), is assigned a unique anonymous identifying tag,
and is tracked using a GPS receiver at intervals of less than 10 seconds. The GPS
location in decimal latitude and longitude pairs along with the timestamp and
taxi occupancy are updated to a central server. The Dartmouth EPFL Mobility
Dataset [110], detailed in [111] was used, taking a 48 hour subset window of this
vehicle dataset with the highest concentration of nodes. Within this 48 hour
period, a maximum of 497 unique nodes are present. This data is replayed in
the Traffic Djam simulator.
A simulation square space of approximately 20km by 20km was created
around the city of San Francisco, which is depicted in Figure 4.1. Nodes within
the simulation space are considered active and are able to perform key exchange
with other nodes in the simulation space. Nodes outside the boundaries are con-
sidered inactive until they enter the simulation space. The reverse applies to
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Figure 4.1: Boundaries of Simulation Space in relation to the City of San Fran-
cisco (http://mapbox.com).
nodes leaving the simulation space. Figure 4.2 depicts the movements of a single
node in the simulation space. Certain San Francisco road features can clearly
be seen, such as the financial district, Mission Street, and the Bay Area Bridge
heading to Berkeley, Emeryville, and Oakland.
Nodes may travel outside the pre-defined simulation space boundaries. Over
the 48 hour period of the dataset, the number of nodes in the simulation space
(active nodes) were measured and compared to the number of nodes outside
the simulation space (inactive nodes). Figure 4.3 depicts the number of active
nodes in the vehicular movement model over the duration of the simulation. The
number of active nodes peak to approximately 360 in the first 3 hours of the
simulation before gradually declining to a little over 200 active nodes in the final
hour of the simulation.
A location based node frequency analysis was also conducted to determine
which areas nodes would congregate, and which areas nodes rarely visited. Fig-
ures 4.4a and 4.4b depict the two dimensional and three dimensional node loca-
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Figure 4.2: Location tracking of a single node in the City Vehicle Model.
tion representation within the simulation space.
The 20km by 20km simulation space was divided into 40,000 100m by 100m
cells. For each second of the simulation a snapshot was taken of where the nodes
were placed, with each cell counting the number of nodes within its boundary.
Over the 172,800 seconds (48 hours) of the simulation, this node count was accu-
mulated to provide an idea of areas where nodes congregated. The analysis found
a cell with a significantly higher node count at (X = 87, Y = 116). This repre-
sents a busy intersection and street corresponding to Mission Street in Downtown
San Francisco.
Due to the open nature of the vehicular movement model, nodes may freely
join and leave the network as they enter and exit the simulation boundaries.
This movement model affects the Direct Key distribution when compared to a
closed random path model. A preliminary direct key distribution analysis was
conducted between the vehicular movement model and a random path move-
ment model. Figure 4.5 shows a comparison of Direct Key distribution over time
between the Random Path and Vehicular Movement models. As expected in a
closed system with a fixed number of nodes such as the Random Path model, as
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Figure 4.3: Number of active nodes over time.
time approaches infinity (or increases) nodes will eventually meet all other nodes
and exchange keys they own resulting in a Direct Key list with the population
of nodes. For the Vehicular Movement model, the results differ significantly
from the Random Path Movement Model in that only 8.6% of possible keys are
distributed. Due to the nature of the movement model where nodes leave the sim-
ulation area or become inactive, as time increases, nodes will not eventually meet
all other nodes. In a VANET with distributed keys and communications, only
reaching 8.6% of possible nodes would hinder communication protocols [53]. To
further extend the number of communication partners in a distributed VANET,
the carrier and approved key system used in Chapter 3 [31] was adopted. With
the use of both Direct and Approved Keys, Figure 4.6 shows that nodes in a
VANET are capable of communicating with up to 51% of the population by the
end of the simulation.
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Figure 4.4: Placement of nodes in simulation space.
112 Chapter 4. DTN Location Based Key Distribution
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0  20000  40000  60000  80000  100000  120000  140000  160000
D
i r
e
c
t  
K
e
y
s
 D
i s
t r
i b
u
t e
d
 (
%
)
Time (seconds)
Random Path Movement
City Vehicle Movement
Figure 4.5: Direct key distribution over time for Random Path and City Vehicle
Movement Models.
4.4.2 Experimental Setup
Using the vehicle movement model described in section 4.4.1, it is assumed a
similar node deployment environment to Chapter 3, with no public infrastructure,
no trusted third party, and no central point for node bootstrap or initialisation.
Nodes solely rely on V2V communications and self initialise when deployed. In
this experimental setup, public key authentication of carried keys cannot be easily
verified in a distributed system when compared to a centralised architecture. As
a result, adversaries can easily attack the system. An approval system similar
to Chapter 3 [31] was used to provide a three-tiered key trust system: Direct,
Approved and Untrusted Keys. The receiving node may approve or reject the
carried public key based on the trust value of the carrier node it received the key
from and the trust algorithm.
The first method implemented is Control scenario. The Control scenario is a
public key exchange between two nodes using no trust system. When two nodes
detect each other within communications range, they initiate key exchange. NA
sends PA to NB, and NB also sends PB to NA. These are then added to DA
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Figure 4.6: Key Distribution over Time for City Vehicle Movement Model.
and DB respectively. NA may potentially provide false information about DA
to NB. This can be mitigated by sending a cryptographic hash or Hash-Based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as a challenge-response of the Di prior
to sending the list. When NA sends DA to NB, NB also sends DB to NA in the
Carrier Key exchange process. Each node scans the list and finds nodes that are
not in the respective Di or Ai and adds them to their respective Ai. This key
exchange process occurs whilst the nodes are moving. If the nodes fall out of
communications range whilst the key exchange process is occurring, then a failed
exchange occurs and the nodes discard the partial data bundles.
The second method of public key exchange for autonomous VANET appli-
cations is using the LCF trust system as detailed in Chapter 3. The process is
similar to the Control scenario, with the exception of an initial trust establish-
ment phase prior to the Direct Key exchange phase. This is where both nodes
send the respective Di to each other. The trust value of a node is then calculated
using these lists. The Carrier Key exchange phase for LCF has the addition of
an approval process where the trust of carrier nodes is accumulated. If the trust
value exceeds the public key confidence threshold, the Carried Key is approved
114 Chapter 4. DTN Location Based Key Distribution
and added to the respective Ai.
The third method of public key exchange for autonomous VANETs is using
the proposed LLCF trust system as presented in Section 4.3. Figure 4.7 shows the
establishment of initial trust phase. In the LLCF scenario, each node determines
its location and generates Tlocation from Section 4.3 during the establishing initial
trust phase. The location value contributes to the LLCF trust value assigned to
the other node. The Direct Key and Carrier Key phases occur the same as the
LCF scenario, with an additional step. Before disconnecting from each other, the
nodes individually update their location data l based on the number of White
Keys and Black Keys detected, and normalise all the results in the location table.
4.4.3 Adversary Setup
A varying number of adversary nodes was introduced into the system at t = 0.
For the static adversary node experiments, the adversary nodes were introduced
into cell (X = 87, Y = 116). From the location based node frequency analysis
in Section 4.4.1, this cell has the highest density of nodes, and provides a worst
case scenario for an attack on the system. The adversary nodes for this scenario
remain in this cell for the duration of the simulation. For dynamic adversary
node experiments, the adversary nodes were introduced based on the movement
model of the individual node. As a result, the adversary nodes are mobile for
the duration of the simulation.
The adversary node has the capabilities as detailed in Section 4.2.5. Upon
receiving keys from a neighbouring node, the adversary node will change the
key to its own private and public key pair and proceed to distribute these Black
Keys to other nodes. This is essentially a key spoof attack. Each adversary node
would generate its own private and public key pair instead of using a master
Black Key common to all adversary nodes. This increases the difficulty for a
White Hat node to detect an Adversary Node from a common master Black Key.
Location spoofing is also considered out of scope for the adversary capabilities
in this experiment.
4.4.4 Experiments
An experiment consisted of three scenarios, each using Control, LCF or LLCF
methods of establishing initial trust. For each scenario, the same movement
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Figure 4.7: Establishing initial trust between two nodes for LLCF Scenario.
model and node connections were replayed. This allowed the observation and
measurement of how each methodology of establishing initial trust affected key
distribution. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the experimental simulation con-
stants. Each scenario was simulated for a total of 48 hours or 172,800 seconds
in a 20km by 20km square. A total of 497 nodes was used as constrained by the
number of taxi cabs in the Cabspotting dataset. The communications range was
set using a conservative assumption of 100m for DSRC communications [108].
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The DSRC communications standard has a similar baud rate to the Bluetooth
specification used in Chapter 3, of 3 to 27 megabits per second (Mbits/s) [85].
Using the same 256 bit ECC public key, and assuming a public key package size
of 300 bytes to include additional key metadata and information, a node trans-
ferring a full keyring of 497 public keys could be completed in 0.04 to 0.4 seconds.
Unlike the node connection model in Chapter 3, the nodes in this experiment
remain moving, and do not stop during connection. Therefore, the simulator
communication model determined whether two nodes were within the 100 me-
tre communications range of each other for a significantly greater time period
than the 0.4 seconds worst case scenario. If the two nodes had sufficient time in
communications range, the data bundle was transferred successfully, otherwise
partial data bundles were dropped. Since the vehicular nodes travel at differing
speeds, a sub-routine in the simulator would perform a high frequency check to
determine whether there was sufficient time between two nodes within commu-
nications range to transfer their respective data bundles. It is also assumed that
there is minimal interference from buildings and obstacles in the communications
model.
For scenarios that used a trust system to establish initial trust between nodes,
the initial trust value was set as 0, and could range from a continuous value be-
tween −1.0 to +1.0 similar to [20]. These values also correspond to normalised
trust scores, commonly utilised by trust and reputation systems [105]. The val-
ues of −1.0 and +1.0 represent complete un-trustworthiness and trustworthiness
respectively. The public key confidence threshold was set to greater than 1.0 for
both the LCF and LLCF scenarios. The threshold value was set so that a public
key had to be approved by a minimum of two or more nodes. For both the LCF
and LLCF scenarios, the initial starting value (tneutral) was set at 0 to reflect
a neutral trust value. The trust constants tn and tc were set the same as the
experiments in Chapter 3. The distrust weighting (td) for having a false key in
possession was heavily weighted at 0.05 to reflect that it is easier to distrust than
a node to trust. These figures were set from initial data analysis of the model.
In total, 10 experiments were conducted, each with the three scenarios using
trust establishment methods; Control, LCF, and LLCF. The number of Black
Hat nodes was varied from 0, 1%, 10%, 20%, and 30% of node population. This
was conducted for both the static and dynamic Black Hat movement models.
The number of adversaries in the network is not a required parameter for both
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the LCF and LLCF trust systems to work. The variations of Black Hat nodes
is to determine the limitations of the schemes, in particular the Black Hat node
population thresholds where the LCF and LLCF begin to break down. This
work, associates each adversary node to a Byzantine failure in the Byzantine fault
tolerance system, or a traitor in the generalised Byzantine Generals' Problem.
Common solutions to Byzantine fault tolerance require the number of failures
(traitors) should not exceed one third of the total nodes (generals). Hence, only
an adversary population of less than 33% was analysed [81].
Table 4.3: Experimental Simulation Constants
Parameter Value
Experiment Environment
Environment Size 20 x 20 Kilometres
Duration 172,800 Seconds (48 Hours)
Movement Model Vehicular Taxi Cab
Node
Number of Nodes (N) 497
Node Speed Dependant on movement model
Node Wait Time Dependant on movement model
Communications Standard DSRC
Communications Range 100 Metres
Trust
Trust Range [-1, 1] Continuous
Initial Trust Value 0
Trust Threshold >1.0
Black Hat Nodes
Number of Black Hat Nodes [0%, 1%, 10%, 20%, 30%]
Location of Static Black Hat Nodes (X = 87, Y = 116)
4.4.5 Security and Performance Evaluation Metrics
Four security and performance evaluation metrics were measured and investi-
gated in this experiment. They are used to compare the effectiveness of different
trust systems and whether they are suitable in providing public key authentica-
tion in an autonomous VANET. They are White Key Approval and Black Key
Approval, Spoofed ID Key Distribution, Key Trust Metrics, and Public Key Dis-
tribution Quantity.
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1. White Key Approval and Black Key Approval is the measure of how many
White Keys and Black Keys received from carrier nodes were approved to
be trusted. These keys had exceeded the public key confidence threshold
for the node to trust them and have ultimately been added to the respective
Ai. Because these keys were not received directly from the node that owns
them, but instead received from carrier nodes, it is of interest to observe
how effective a trust system is by determining which keys should be trusted
and added to the respective Ai, and which keys should remain untrusted
in the the respective Ui. It is the desire for the trust system to allow
White Keys to be approved, while preventing the approval of Black Keys.
This metric is calculated as a percentage of White Carried keys and Black
Carried keys that were distributed.
2. Spoofed ID Key Distribution is a measure of the quantity of Spoofed ID
Keys throughout the system. An adversary with the capabilities outlined
in Section 4.2.5 can successfully exploit the threat of lack of public key
authentication by generating Spoofed ID Keys. It is these keys that can
result in the eavesdropping of communications, and modification of data.
The robustness of the key distribution and management scheme is measured
by the Spoofed ID Key Distribution metric. The use of a trust system to
provide public key confidence, and by extension public key authentication
in key distribution for an autonomous VANET should be able to mitigate
the distribution of such keys.
3. Key Trust Metrics is a measure of the trust values assigned to each public
key in the Direct Key List. The trust system will assign a trust value to
the identity of the public key of a node upon meeting. This trust value
determines how trustworthy or untrustworthy the node is, and provides an
effective metric in determining whether the trust system is able to identify
Black Hat nodes and the Black Keys they are distributing. Only White
Hat nodes are included as the trust systems are designed for a White Hat
node to identify Black Keys and Black Hat Nodes. Several sub-metrics are
measured to determine the effectiveness of the different trust systems. The
first is a histogram of the distribution of trust values assigned, the second
is the average key trust value assigned for both Black and White Keys,
and the third is a five number summary box and whisker plot covering the
minimum, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile and maximum. These sub-
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metrics provide a picture of the distribution of trust values that the trust
system assigns to both Black and White Keys, as well as if the trust system
is successfully segregating the network.
4. Public Key Distribution Quantity is a performance metric that is a measure
of the amount of public keys that are distributed in the VANET. It is
measured as a percentage of the total possible keys that can be distributed,
a condition when every node has the public keys of every other node. A
high Public Key Distribution Quantity is desirable as it allows nodes to
create secure and authenticated end-to-end communications with a large
number of nodes. Increasing the number of instances of a node's public
key in the network also increases the confidence in the identity associated
with the public key and the key itself.
4.5 Results and Analysis
For each of the experiments conducted, the four security and evaluation metrics
described in Section 4.4.5 were used to determine the effectiveness and behaviour
of the proposed trust system. The first metric is White Key Approval and Black
Key Approval. The second investigates the Spoofed ID Key distribution and
approval, the third metric is the Key Trust Values assigned to a key by White
Hat Nodes, and the final metric is the Key Distribution Efficiency. For each
experiment, the respective Di between the Control, LCF and LLCF scenarios
were identical. This was due to the same movement and connection model being
replayed for all scenarios, which resulted in identical node meetings. However,
the respective Ai differ due to the varying trust systems for each scenario.
4.5.1 White Key and Black Key Approval
The White Key and Black Key Approval metric investigates the acceptance of
Carried public keys. Although the number of direct keys distributed will be the
same between all scenarios in an experiment, the number of approved keys will
differ between the Control, LCF, and LLCF scenarios. To determine whether
the different trust systems are correctly approving White Hat keys, the quanti-
ties and percentages of White Carried keys that were approved were measured.
Conversely, to determine whether the trust system is mitigating the approval of
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Table 4.4: Static Black Hat Node Experiment Results
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
White Carried Keys Black Carried Keys
Total App. % Total App. %
0
Control 104603 104603 100.00 0 0 N/A
LCF 104603 70363 67.27 0 0 N/A
LLCF 104603 71943 68.78 0 0 N/A
1%
Control 101658 101658 100.00 3919 3919 100.00
LCF 101658 69432 68.30 3919 837 21.36
LLCF 101658 70634 69.48 3919 810 20.67
10%
Control 78323 78323 100.00 24908 24908 100.00
LCF 78323 52715 67.30 24908 9582 38.47
LLCF 78323 53604 68.44 24908 8454 33.94
20%
Control 59095 59095 100.00 40407 40407 100.00
LCF 59095 37810 63.98 40407 17122 42.37
LLCF 59095 38675 65.45 40407 15049 37.24
30%
Control 43345 43345 100.00 52768 52768 100.00
LCF 43345 27110 62.54 52768 22458 42.56
LLCF 43345 27794 64.12 52768 20134 38.16
Black Hat keys, the quantities and percentages of Black Carried keys that were
approved were also measured. Full results showing key quantities can be found
in Appendix C. This metric provides evidence on the LCF and LLCF trust sys-
tems in this experimental environment fulfilling Security Property 1 identified in
Section 4.2.6. The LCF and proposed LLCF trust systems rely on the Di of an
individual node to provide an initial trust value. However, both trust systems
only affect the public key confidence of Carried Keys.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 depict the results of White Key and Black Key approvals
for the static and dynamic adversary experiments respectively. For both White
Carried Keys and Black Carried Keys columns, the total number of keys (Total)
of each are shown. For all scenarios (Control, LCF, and LLCF) in an experiment,
the total quantities of carried keys exchanged was the same. However, the differ-
ing trust systems would affect the quantities approved (App.). The percentage
of carried keys approved is also shown.
The static adversary results in Table 4.4 provides evidence that the LCF
trust system is effectively mitigating the approval of Black Keys, at the minor
expense of White Key approval. Using the 10% Black Hat node population as a
typical experiment, 61.5% of Black Carried keys were not approved by the LCF
trust system at the expense of not approving 32.7% of White Carried Keys. For
all variations of Black Hat node population experiments, the LCF consistently
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Table 4.5: Dynamic Black Hat Node Experiment Results
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
White Carried Keys Black Carried Keys
Total App. % Total App. %
0
Control 104603 104603 100.00 0 0 N/A
LCF 104603 70363 67.27 0 0 N/A
LLCF 104603 71943 68.78 0 0 N/A
1%
Control 102539 102539 100.00 2392 2392 100.00
LCF 102539 69688 67.96 2392 668 27.93
LLCF 102539 70630 68.88 2392 663 27.72
10%
Control 75107 75107 100.00 29458 29458 100.00
LCF 75107 52949 70.50 29458 9756 33.12
LLCF 75107 52058 69.31 29458 8517 28.91
20%
Control 52215 52215 100.00 52409 52409 100.00
LCF 52215 38243 73.24 52409 16829 32.11
LLCF 52215 36673 70.23 52409 14217 27.13
30%
Control 35272 35272 100.00 69471 69471 100.00
LCF 35272 27603 78.26 69471 21779 31.35
LLCF 35272 26222 74.34 69471 17644 25.40
achieves a 63-68% approval of White Carried Keys. Black Carried key approval
percentages for the LCF scenario vary from approving 21.4% of Black Carried
keys at a 1% Black Hat node population, to approving a maximum of 42.6% of
Black Carried keys at 30% Black Hat node population.
Comparing the results of the LLCF trust system to the LCF trust system,
provides evidence that LLCF consistently out-performs LCF. For all static adver-
sary experiments, the LLCF trust system consistently provided a higher White
Carried key approval, and a lower Black Carried key approval when compared to
the LCF trust system. Using the 10% Black Hat node population as a typical ex-
periment, the 1.1% improvement in White Carried key approvals, resulted in an
additional 889 White Hat Keys approved. More importantly, the 4.5% reduction
in Black Carried key approvals, resulted in a reduction of 1,128 Black Hat Keys
approved. At the highest Black Hat node population of 30%, the LLCF trust sys-
tem achieved a 4.4% reduction in Black Carried key approvals, corresponding to
a reduction of 2324 Black Hat keys approved. This trend of a marginally higher
White Carried key approval, and reduced Black Carried Key approval, provides
evidence of the LLCF trust system benefiting from the inclusion of co-localisation
data.
The dynamic adversary results in Table 4.5 shows the LCF trust system
providing a higher White Carried key approval percentage of 67-78% for all
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experiments when compared to the static adversary results. The Black Carried
key approval percentages for the LCF trust system also provides an improvement
in approval of carried Black Hat keys, achieving around a 30% approval for most
experiments. Comparing the Black Carried key results of the LLCF trust system
to the LCF trust system shows a reduction in Black Carried key approvals.
However, this reduction comes at the cost of White Carried key approvals in the
dynamic experiments. The dynamic adversary experiments with 10% Black hat
nodes or more, show that the LLCF also has a reduction in White Carried key
approvals. These results provide evidence that the LLCF trust system benefits
from the inclusion of co-localisation data in environments with static adversaries
and small numbers of dynamic adversaries (less than 10%).
4.5.2 Spoofed ID Key Distribution
The second security metric measured is the Spoofed ID Key Distribution. This
measures the number of public keys that an adversary has distributed that is
a Black Key, with a White Hat Node identity (P(M,i)). The metric provides
evidence on the LCF and LLCF trust systems in this experimental environment
fulfilling Security Properties 3 and 4 identified in Section 4.2.6. Although the
number and percentage of total Black Keys directly distributed and approved
is an important metric for the security of a network, it is the Spoofed ID Keys
that provide a real threat to the secure communications of a VANET. With the
ability for adversarial nodes to eavesdrop on communications and modify data,
it is desired to mitigate the spread of such keys throughout the network.
Table 4.6 depicts the Spoofed ID Key results for the static and dynamic ad-
versary experiments. It shows the quantity of Direct, Approved and totals of
Spoofed ID Keys. The quantity of Spoofed ID Keys in the Direct Key Lists are
constant between each scenario of each experiment. The adversary capabilities
outlined in Section 4.2.5, mean that Spoofed ID Keys are distributed by adver-
sarial nodes only. Because of this, no White Hat Node would have received a
Spoofed ID Key in their respective Di, as they would have received the legitimate
key from that node. Spoofed ID keys are based on second hand confidence in
the identity-public key binding, that is distributed by adversarial nodes. As a
result, the Direct Key results in Table 4.6, show the quantity of Spoofed ID Keys
that all adversary nodes have generated and are subsequently distributing. As
the adversary population is increased, it is expected that the number of keys the
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Table 4.6: Spoofed ID Key Results
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
Static Dynamic
Dir. App. Total Dir. App. Total
0
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCF 0 0 0 0 0 0
LLCF 0 0 0 0 0 0
1%
Control 379 2914 3293 187 1626 1813
LCF 379 82 461 187 97 284
LLCF 379 45 424 187 78 265
10%
Control 3601 14542 18143 1908 18769 20677
LCF 3601 2061 5662 1908 3104 5012
LLCF 3601 940 4541 1908 2068 3976
20%
Control 6279 22714 28993 3375 31061 34436
LCF 6279 4851 11130 3375 4896 8271
LLCF 6279 2884 9163 3375 3189 6564
30%
Control 8930 29189 38119 4366 37304 41670
LCF 8930 6166 15096 4366 5798 10164
LLCF 8930 4056 12986 4366 3557 7923
adversarial nodes are spoofing would increase. The results in Table 4.6 reflect
this occurrence. The Spoofed ID Keys in their respective Ai is the metric that
the trust system has influence over.
For all static adversary experiments, the LCF trust system provides consid-
erable resilience against the approval of Spoofed ID Keys in comparison to the
Control scenarios. With the addition of location data to the LCF trust sys-
tem, there is a further significant reduction in Spoofed ID Keys approved for
the LLCF scenarios. In the experiments with a low static adversary population,
there is an additional reduction of 50% or greater in the LLCF scenarios. As the
adversarial population is increased, the LLCF trust system continues to provide
an additional reduction of at least 20% when compared to LCF. The dynamic
adversary results show a similar result to the static adversary results. As the
dynamic adversary population is increased, the quantity of Spoofed ID Keys also
increases. For the Approved Key Lists in all experiments, the LCF trust system
also provides considerable resilience against the approval of Spoofed ID Keys in
comparison to the Control scenarios. There is also a further reduction in Spoofed
ID Keys approved for the LLCF scenarios when compared to the LCF scenarios.
To further compare between experiments and adversary models, Table 4.7
shows percentage of approved keys that are Spoofed ID Keys. It is important
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to note, the different trust systems will approve different quantities of keys.
Therefore to facilitate comparison between experiments and adversary models,
Table 4.7 provides percentages of Spoofed ID keys of the keys approved. For
the static adversary experiments, the LCF trust system consistently provides
a substantial reduction in the quantity of Spoofed ID keys approved. Using
the 10% static adversary node experiment, in the Control scenario the Spoofed
ID keys consisted of 14% of all approved keys. The LCF system provided a
significant improvement with Spoofed ID keys making only 3.3% of all approved
keys. The LLCF trust system provided a further improvement, with Spoofed ID
keys making only 1.5% of all approved keys. This trend is consistent for all static
adversary experiments.
In comparison to the dynamic adversary experiments, the Black Hat nodes
were able to distribute Spoofed ID keys over a variety of locations. Similar trends
were observed with the static adversary experiments, with Control having the
highest penetration of Spoofed ID keys in all the approved keys, LCF providing
a significant improvement, and LLCF providing a further reduction in Spoofed
ID Keys. An interesting observation is that the dynamic experiments generally
had a greater percentage of Spoofed ID keys in Ai than the corresponding static
experiments. Exceptions include some results in the 1% and 30% experiments.
These exceptions are due to the mobility model of the Black Hat nodes affecting
the distribution of Spoofed ID keys.
These results, along with the results from Section 4.5.1, provide evidence that
even though the LCF and LLCF trust systems may be approving less keys than
the Control scenario, they are approving significantly less Spoofed ID keys, and
in turn providing significant improvements in security at the cost of distribution
of keys. The results from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 indicate that the LCF trust system
provides additional security to the VANET by significantly reducing the quantity
of approved Spoofed ID Keys. With the addition of location data to the LCF
trust system to form the LLCF trust system, there is a further reduction in
approved Spoofed ID Keys. When comparing the impact on the percentage of
approved keys, a similar trend is established. Although the LCF and LLCF
trust systems approve less keys than the Control scenario, they provide better
mitigation to the approval of Spoofed ID keys. The mitigation of the distribution
and approval of Spoofed ID Keys that LCF and LLCF provide, is a significant
security improvement to the secure communications of a VANET, at the cost
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Table 4.7: Percentage of Approved Keys that are Spoofed ID Keys
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
Approved Keys that
are Spoofed ID Keys
Static (%) Dynamic (%)
0
Control 0.00 0.00
LCF 0.00 0.00
LLCF 0.00 0.00
1%
Control 2.76 1.55
LCF 0.12 0.14
LLCF 0.06 0.11
10%
Control 14.09 17.95
LCF 3.31 4.95
LLCF 1.51 3.41
20%
Control 22.83 29.69
LCF 8.83 8.89
LLCF 5.37 6.27
30%
Control 30.37 35.61
LCF 12.44 11.74
LLCF 8.46 8.11
of key distribution performance. Further evidence of the LCF and LLCF trust
systems assisting the provision of public key authentication is discussed in the
Key Trust Metric results.
4.5.3 Key Trust Value Metrics
The Key Trust Value metrics were also analysed to evaluate whether the utilised
trust system is effectively identifying White Keys and Black Keys. These met-
rics provide evidence of the LCF and LLCF trust systems in this experimental
environment fulfilling Security Property 5, and indirectly fulfilling Security Prop-
erties 2 and 4 identified in Section 4.2.6. These metrics include the distribution
of trust assigned by White Hat nodes for all keys, the average trust assigned by
White Hat Nodes to the keys in their respective Di, and the five-number sum-
mary of trust for both Black Keys and White Keys. These metrics only consider
the Di of White Hat Nodes, as the trust system is designed for legitimate nodes
to detect the difference between White Keys and Black Keys. The adversary
capabilities also skews the trust values that an adversarial node would assign to
White or Black Keys.
Figures 4.8a and 4.8b show histograms for the key trust distribution in the
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10% static adversary experiment for LCF and LLCF respectively. Similar re-
sults were achieved when the number of static adversaries was varied and the
10% experiment is presented as a representative result. Key trust distribution
results for all experiments can be found in Appendix D. At the end of the simu-
lation, the LCF trust system in Figure 4.8a depicts that a large majority of key
trust values are at the extremes of −1.0 to −0.9, and 0.9 to 1.0. This indicates
that LCF is polarising trust values between the Black Keys and White Keys.
The proposed LLCF trust system in Figure 4.8b achieves an improvement over
LCF, with greater quantities of keys in the same two extremes. The key trust
distribution between the positive trust range of 0.0 to 0.9 show different results
between the LCF and LLCF scenarios. The LCF scenario shows a long tail
distribution skewed to 0.0, with a large quantity of keys being assigned a trust
value in the indecisive range of 0.0 to 0.5. The LLCF scenario shows a more
normal distribution between the ranges of 0.0 to 0.9, indicating that the trust
system is assigning higher trust values to keys considered White Keys. The dis-
tribution of trust between the ranges of −0.9 to 0.0 for both the LCF and LLCF
scenarios shows a relatively small quantity of keys. This is because both LCF
and LLCF trust systems deduct trust from identified Black Keys more severely
than the accumulation of trust to White Keys, which is an expected result from
the selection of Tkey_disc in Section 4.3.
In comparison, Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show histograms for the key trust dis-
tribution in the 10% dynamic Black Hat nodes experiment for LCF and LLCF
respectively. Similar results were achieved when the number of dynamic Black
Hat nodes was varied and the 10% experiment is presented as a representative
result. For both the LCF and LLCF scenarios, a large quantity of keys are placed
in the 0.9 to 1.0 trust range. However, the lower extreme of −1.0 to −0.9 shows
a significant reduction in the quantity of keys assigned to this trust range when
compared to the static Black Hat results. The LCF results in Figure 4.9a de-
picts a similar long tail distribution as the static Black Hat nodes between the
indecisive trust range of 0.0 to 0.5. The LLCF results in Figure 4.9b depict a
similar normal distribution as the static Black Hat node results in the indecisive
trust range. The histograms indicate that the addition of location data in LLCF
provides additional security against static Black Hat nodes over dynamic Black
Hat nodes.
The average trust of all White Keys, and the average trust of all Black Keys
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Figure 4.8: Key Trust Distribution for 10% Static Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure 4.9: Key Trust Distribution for 10% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes.
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were also calculated for White Hat Nodes. Table 4.8 depicts the average key trust
assigned byWhite Hat Nodes for both static and dynamic adversary experiments.
The static adversary results show that the average key trust for White Keys
is consistently greater for LLCF when compared to LCF, indicating that the
location factor is providing a higher and more useful trust value in White Keys.
For Black Keys, the average key trust for LLCF is consistently less than LCF,
indicating that location contributes to a lower trust value for Black Keys. At
low populations of adversarial nodes, the LLCF trust system provides a 30%
improvement in average key trust over LCF. As the adversarial node population
increases, the improvement drops to approximately 18%.
The dynamic adversary results show that the average key trust for White
Keys is greater only for low populations of adversarial nodes. After an adversar-
ial penetration of 20%, LLCF is marginally less effective at approximately 94%
of the average trust of LCF. For Black Keys, the average trust for LLCF has
been demonstrated to be less than the corresponding LCF scenario. At low ad-
versarial populations, LLCF provides an improvement of 25% for 1% adversarial
population. When increased to 30% adversarial population, there is a significant
increase of 257% in distrust value for Black Hat Keys with LCF at -0.067, and
LLCF at -0.239. These results show that as the dynamic adversary node popu-
lation is increased, the LCF trust system has difficulty identifying Black Keys,
while the LLCF trust system is still capable of identifying Black Keys, while still
achieving 94% of the average key trust value for White Keys. This is a desired
result, as the inclusion of location data in LLCF provides additional security in
identifying Black Keys at minimal expense of White Key trust values.
The average key trust metric was also compared between the static adversary
and dynamic adversary experiments. The average White Key trust values in the
static adversary experiments are comparable in value to the dynamic adversary
experiment. The average Black Key trust values between the two adversary
movement models differ significantly. Due to the node capabilities for dynamic
adversaries, multiple locations are considered untrustworthy by other nodes. This
is evident with the average White Key trust value for LLCF being marginally
lower than LCF. However, the dynamic adversary experiment results for Black
Keys trust value indicates that both LCF and LLCF have difficulty in detecting
Black Keys. An example is the 20% adversarial population experiments. The
LCF trust system had an average Black Key trust value of -0.495 for the static
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Table 4.8: Average Key Trust Assigned by White Hat Nodes
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
Static Dynamic
White Black White Black
0
LCF 0.633 N/A 0.633 N/A
LLCF 0.716 N/A 0.716 N/A
1%
LCF 0.630 -0.558 0.629 -0.458
LLCF 0.685 -0.732 0.687 -0.572
10%
LCF 0.634 -0.537 0.639 -0.125
LLCF 0.687 -0.703 0.647 -0.300
20%
LCF 0.619 -0.495 0.641 -0.085
LLCF 0.681 -0.623 0.622 -0.259
30%
LCF 0.609 -0.518 0.655 -0.067
LLCF 0.672 -0.612 0.621 -0.239
adversary experiments, and an average Black Key trust value of -0.085 for the
dynamic adversary experiments. The proposed LLCF trust system had an aver-
age Black Key trust value of -0.623 for the static adversary experiments, and an
average Black Key trust value of -0.259 for the dynamic adversary experiments.
This trend is consistent as the adversarial node population increases for both
adversary movement models.
The final analysis of the key trust value metrics is the box and whisker plot
of the five number summary (minimum, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile, max-
imum) for both Black Keys and White Keys in the 10% adversary experiments.
Similar results were achieved when the number of static adversaries was varied
and the 10% experiment is presented as a representative result. Figure 4.10a
presents the results for the 10% static adversary experiment. Full results for all
experiments can be found in Appendix E. The range of trust assigned for Black
Keys for both LCF and LLCF span the entire trust range of −1.0 to +1.0, with
the median and 1st quartile at the lower limit of −1.0. However, the quartile
span for Black Keys under the LLCF trust system is significantly smaller and
skewed towards the lower limit in comparison to the LCF results. The White
Key results show a greater range for LLCF compared to LCF. However, the
LLCF results show a smaller higher quartile span, and a higher median when
compared to the LCF results. The White LLCF results also have some negative
trust values indicating some White Keys were falsely identified as Black Keys.
These are the keys received in an area with a high concentration of adversary
nodes.
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The dynamic adversary experiment results in Figure 4.10b show similar re-
sults for the White Keys between LCF and LLCF. However, the Black Key
results depict how both trust systems have difficulty identifying such keys when
the adversary is mobile. The Black Key results show that LCF and LLCF assign
trust that spans the entire range of −1.0 to +1.0. Although the quartile span of
the LLCF results is greater than the LCF results, it is skewed towards −1.0, with
the 1st and 3rd quartile, and the median lower than LCF. These results show
that in both static and dynamic adversary movement models, the LLCF trust
system provides better identification and assignment of trust to Black Keys than
the LCF trust system. The comparison between the static and dynamic adver-
saries also indicates that the implemented trust systems are better at mitigating
the capabilities of static adversaries.
4.5.4 Public Key Distribution Quantity
Public Key Distribution Quantity is a performance metric that assesses how ef-
fective the trust systems were at distributing public keys. These metrics provide
evidence on the evaluated trust systems fulfilling Security Properties 2 and 4
identified in Section 4.2.6. A Public Key Distribution Quantity of 100% was not
achieved due to the open nature of the system model. With nodes able to leave
and join the network freely, with some nodes spending very little time in the
network, it is not possible to have a public key distribution quantity of 100%
even as time approaches infinity. Figure 4.11 depicts the key distribution effi-
ciency when there are no black hat nodes for the three scenarios; Control, LCF,
and LLCF. Full results are available in Appendix F. This metric considers both
Direct and Approved keys as they represent keys that have exceeded the public
key confidence threshold, thereby achieving public key authentication. For all
scenarios in Figure 4.11, the rate of key distribution significantly plateaus after
80,000 seconds of simulation. From Figure 4.11 it is evident that the Control
scenario provides the best key distribution, with 50.9% of total keys distributed.
Although the LCF and LLCF scenarios show a reduction in Key Distribution
Efficiency, the LLCF scenario with 37.7% of keys distributed, has a slight im-
provement over LCF with 37.0% of keys distributed by the end of the simulation.
The key distribution efficiency is affected when static adversary nodes are
introduced. The correlation between the increase of key distribution with the in-
crease of adversary nodes is attributed to the placement of the attacking nodes.
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Figure 4.10: Five number summary for Black and White keys for 10% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure 4.11: Key Distribution over Time for no Black Hat Nodes.
They are placed in a busy intersection with high node density, and thus distribut-
ing and exchanging keys more abundantly. Both the LCF and LLCF scenarios see
a slight increase in key distribution as the adversary node population is increased,
but remains steady in the 37-47% keys distributed range. Comparing LCF and
LLCF key distribution, for all experiments with static adversary nodes, the two
scenarios had key distribution percentages within 1% of each other, showing that
LLCF has similar key distribution efficiency to LCF regardless of adversary node
population.
For the dynamic adversary node experiments, the key distribution for all Con-
trol scenario experiments remained within the 50-51% range. This is expected
as the adversary nodes are constantly moving as determined by the movement
model. Therefore, the key distribution efficiency remains consistent between all
experiments. Both the LCF and LLCF scenarios have a reduction in percent-
age of keys distributed as the population of adversary nodes increases. With an
increase in adversaries, there is an increase in distribution of black keys. As a
result of this, the LCF and LLCF scenarios are approving less carried keys and
thus reducing the key distribution. The LLCF scenarios for all experiments show
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Figure 4.12: Key Distribution over Time for 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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a trade-off in key distribution efficiency for security in comparison to the LCF
scenarios. The cost is in the order of 1-2%, and can be attributed to the fact
the LLCF relies on detecting and determining the location of adversary nodes to
form a location trust value, whereas the LCF trust system does not. Due to the
mobile movement of the adversaries in the dynamic experiments, it is difficult
for the LLCF trust system to determine and assign a location as untrustworthy
or trustworthy. This is reflected in the cost to key distribution percentages of
the LLCF trust system in comparison to the LCF trust system. Similar key
distribution results were observed as the adversarial node count was increased.
The key distribution efficiency also shows that the bootstrapping process oc-
curs during the first 40,000 seconds, the time period with the highest number
of nodes active in the simulation area. Although the total number of keys dis-
tributed is important as it allows nodes to communicate, it is the approved key
metrics that assist in evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the LCF and
LLCF trust systems on a VANET. It is these keys that are distributed through
a carrier node (Approved and Untrusted Keys), and they are the only types of
keys that the trust system has any influence in trusting or not trusting. The
minor performance cost in key distribution for the LCF and LLCF scenarios is
a minor trade-off in the additional security achieved in the previous evaluation
metrics.
4.6 Discussion
This section discusses the implications and issues related with the proposed loca-
tion based key distribution scheme, and results. The implementation of a trust
and reputation system to provide public key authentication, through public key
confidence for key distribution provides a few interesting issues.
1. A fully decentralised public key distribution in an open and dynamic net-
work is difficult, as evident by the public key distribution efficiency re-
sults. An example of the difficulty for an open and dynamic network is the
PGP Web of Trust. The use of centralised key servers [96, 42] are popular
amongst PGP users as it assists in the distribution of keys, whilst retaining
a transitive trust principle for public key authentication.
2. The LLCF scheme can be used for any DTN node that logs location, rang-
ing from mobile phones, to other vehicles such as boats, planes, drones,
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and space networks. LLCF would still provide security for nodes with a
predictable movement model, such as a satellite or bus route, as the detec-
tion of adversaries would be easier than an unpredictable movement model
as simulated in this contribution.
3. The LLCF scheme through the addition of co-localisation information can
also provide safe locations for mobile phone users in a Mobile Ad-Hoc
Network (MANET) and drivers in a VANET. The ability for the LLCF
scheme to determine safe and unsafe locations could assist in crime mapping
of a city to assist law enforcement agencies in pro-active crime mapping
based on trustworthiness scores rather than reactive incident based scores.
4. The adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is concurrent with the
abundance of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) addresses. Approximately
3.4 x 1038 addresses can be utilised to provide each IoT device a unique
Internet Protocol (IP) address. An IP address in cyberspace is analogous
to a location in real life. As a result, the LLCF trust system can provide
location based trust and reputation management based on IP addresses.
This has cyber-defence implications for trade and commerce, and national
security. Using the LLCF trust scheme, ranges of addresses that are un-
trustworthy could be categorised, resulting in un-reputable merchants be-
ing blocked. In addition, address groupings by nation could be used to help
mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks originating from par-
ticular countries. Other applications for cyber-defences that are based on
originating IP addresses could benefit from the application of the LLCF
trust scheme.
4.7 Conclusion
Past proposals in the area of VANET key management, and trust and reputation
systems have been restrictively evaluated in small constrained closed environ-
ments. The lack of realistic, large geographic, and open environment simulations
has limited the impact of scaling a decentralised key management or trust and
reputation scheme to large scale deployments. The provision of public key au-
thentication, and establishment of initial trust in a VANET application can also
be assisted with the inclusion of co-localisation data. The impact of varying
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numbers and varieties of adversaries are also an important consideration. The
research presented in this chapter has addressed these issues by simulating and
evaluating the LCF trust system on a realistic vehicle movement data from San-
Francisco taxis. The evaluation consisted of nearly 500 nodes deployed in an
open 400 square kilometre environment over a period of 48 hours. The main
contributions of this chapter are:
• The extended scalability evaluation of the LCF trust system using realistic
deployment conditions for a VANET environment.
• The investigation, development, and evaluation of the LLCF trust system:
A public key distribution scheme that utilises co-localisation data with the
LCF trust system to provide public key authentication in VANETs. The
sub-contributions include:
 A key distribution scheme that mitigates the effect a stationary adver-
sary has in distributing spoofed public keys that modifies the identity-
public key binding.
 The segregation of Black and White Hat node populations.
The use of an open and dynamic simulation environment where nodes are
free to join and leave the network impacted key distribution as opposed to a
closed environment. However, significant results were obtained from the exper-
iments. The LCF trust system is applicable and suitable for deployment in a
large geographic scale DTN application such as VANETs. It provides a more
useful initial trust value between nodes with no prior history, and without using
a centralised trust and reputation manager, even when scaled to large quantities
of nodes. It successfully mitigates the impact of Spoofed ID keys under various
adversarial conditions and attacks, reducing the approved key list penetration
by up to 70% in some experiments. The inclusion of co-localisation data to form
the LLCF trust system provided further security improvements for establishing
initial trust and public key authentication. It provided better security under a
stationary adversary threat, where location data provided an additional trust
component on whether to trust the identity-public key binding. The impact of
Spoofed ID keys was further reduced by 50% using the LLCF trust system in sta-
tionary adversary conditions. The additional security performance achieved also
resulted in a performance degradation of around 13%. These results indicate the
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LCF trust system is scalable and effective in providing public key authentication
in large scale DTNs. With the addition of co-localisation data, further security
improvements are achieved. The LLCF trust system has potential application as
a trust and reputation system for IP based white and black listing, in particular
with the explosion of IoT devices and IPv6 address.
The limitations of this work is acknowledged in that area of movement model
variation. The use of an open and dynamic simulation environment was necessary
to provide a realistic application of DTNs. Different movement models including
different vehicular types such as buses and private cars would provide more vari-
ety of movement. Including pedestrian movement models with vehicular models
would provide a combined MANET and VANET application. The LLCF trust
system could be further extended to include time and freshness of data to trust
components, thereby also providing a methodology for the discarding of unused
public keys.
Chapter 5 provides a public key authentication scheme for the final stage of
key management, key revocation and replacement. Using a similar quantity of
nodes and geographic area to the experiments conducted in this chapter, the pro-
vision of public key authentication for autonomous DTNs during key revocation
is a critical aspect of DTN security.
Chapter 5
DTN Key Revocation and
Replacement
In Chapter 3, an autonomous Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) public key dis-
tribution scheme utilising the Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) trust system
to provide public key authentication was designed, developed, and evaluated.
Additional evaluation and extension in the form of the Location based Leverage
of Common Friends (LLCF) trust system was provided in Chapter 4. These
previous chapters focused on the key distribution phase of key management and
its subsequent application. However, more importantly, the continued operation
and maintenance of any network utilising keys, also requires the ability to revoke
and replace these keys. The key management phase of Key Revocation and Re-
placement is the focus of this chapter. The ability to revoke old or compromised
keys as well as re-distributing or replacing them with new keys is critically im-
portant in establishing, and maintaining secure end-to-end communications in an
autonomous DTN. Just as public key authentication is of foundational impor-
tance in ensuring the general security principles of confidentiality, data integrity,
and message authentication in the key distribution phase, it is also integral to
the key revocation phase.
This chapter completes the key management scheme through providing public
key authentication for autonomous DTNs during key revocation, and the sub-
sequent key replacement. It specifically addresses Research Question 4: Is it
possible to utilise a trust or reputation system to assist in DTN Key Revoca-
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tion such that Public Key Authentication can be achieved without a trusted third
party? It also addresses Research Question 5: Is it possible to provide trust trans-
ferral of an old compromised public key to a newly generated public key without
a trusted third party during an unplanned key revocation event? In addressing
the relevant research questions, this chapter focuses on the distributed signing
of revocation certificates to provide public key authentication of the old and
new public keys. Subsequently, the proposed scheme includes the provision of
allowing trust transferral between the revoked key and new public key.
The proposed scheme is compared, analysed and evaluated against other LCF
based revocation schemes in a similar experimental environment as in Chapter 4,
using a pedestrian movement model. The results obtained are evidence of the
provision of public key authentication during key revocation and the subsequent
key replacement.
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 describes the
background and a related work specific to this chapter. Section 5.2 provides a de-
tailed outline of the System Model and Security Properties of the network, along
with definitions, threat model and adversary capabilities. Section 5.3 presents
the newly proposed Distributed Signing (DS) revocation scheme to assist in the
provision of public key authentication during key revocation. Section 5.4 out-
lines the experimental methodology including experimental and adversary setup,
the experiments conducted as well as the security and performance metrics used
to evaluate the various revocation schemes. Section 5.5 presents the experimen-
tal results and evaluation of how the proposed DS revocation scheme provides
public key authentication and trust transferral. Section 5.6 discusses the implica-
tions and issues related to the proposed revocation scheme. Finally, Section 5.7
summarises the research and contributions presented in this chapter.
5.1 Background and Related Work
In this section, the background of key revocation specific to the motivations
surrounding the process are categorised and discussed. A related work is also
discussed and analysed.
The use of up-to-date keys in a DTN is integral to the security of the nodes
and the network. Hence, during the key management life cycle (pre-deployment,
initial bootstrapping, operation, and revocation [100], nodes may be required to
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revoke and update their keys [117]. A node may perform key revocation under
two circumstances. The first is considered to be a planned revocation. This may
be for reasons such as a limited time validity on the key, enforcement of security
policies, increasing key security, or planned obsolescence. As a result, a new
key pair is required to provide the confidentiality, data integrity, and message
authentication requirement in the DTN. This is possible under the assumption
that the node still retains sole control of the old private key. However, there are
instances where the private key may have been compromised, with the node no
longer retaining sole control and possession. This poses a major security vul-
nerability as the compromised private key allows any node to decrypt messages
and impersonate another node. This is the second circumstance of key revoca-
tion, and is considered to be an unplanned key revocation event. Unplanned
revocation events are harder to prepare and plan for, and are reactive in nature.
Key Transition Messages used in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [17] provide a
planned key revocation solution over conventional networks without centralised
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The Key Transition Message informs other
users of the requirement that the old key is no longer being actively used, and that
users should begin using the new key. Unique key identifiers such as fingerprints,
and user identity are included in the message. The message is then signed by
both the old and new private keys to signify control of both, allowing another user
to perform public key authentication of both keys. The dual signature also acts
as a transfer of trust between the old key to the new key, effectively transferring
the Web of Trust. However, in an unplanned key revocation scenario, where a
node is revoking the old key due to the potential compromise of the private key,
a Key Transition Message cannot be used.
In preparation for an unplanned revocation event, PGP provides users with
the option to generate a revocation certificate immediately after they generate
their key pair, whilst they still retain control of the private key [138]. How-
ever, the revocation certificate must also be secured against accidental or ma-
licious disclosure by an adversary. There is also no trust transfer between the
old key and new key when key revocation is invoked. This raises the question
whether the trust associated with the old key can be transferred to the new
key in an unplanned key revocation scenario for an autonomous DTN. Previous
work in revocation for DTNs focus on node revocation, where a misbehaving
node is removed from the network [100, 116, 65]. Key revocation schemes that
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are presented are dependant on a centralised infrastructure such as Road Side
Units (RSUs) in Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) [87], along with Certificate
Authoritys (CAs) to handle the trust transference [117], and Certificate Revo-
cation Lists (CRLs). Proposals that move away from a centralised scheme to a
distributed scheme still rely on the CA and CRLs as the most trusted party in
the network, which are difficult to scale [80].
One such proposal of interest, is Hoeper and Gong [65], which not only pro-
posed a revocation scheme for the removal of misbehaving nodes, but also in-
cluded a provision for a node to self-revoke their private keys in the form of
a Harakiri message. When a node realises that its private key has been com-
promised, it creates the Harakiri message informing other nodes to cease using
the key pair. The message, is propagated to neighbouring nodes. Finally, each
node updates their own key revocation list based on the validity of the receiving
messages.
The scheme uses Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), and the inherent issues
with using IBC such as key escrow are also addressed by using a (t, n) threshold
scheme to distribute the responsibilities of the Key Generation Centre (KGC).
The Harakiri message generated by a node when its private key has been com-
promised is a simple message containing the Node ID, both public and private
keys, key metadata such as expiry date and revision, and a simple "revoke" sta-
tus. The inclusion of the private key is a requirement as it provides verification
for the key to be revoked by the node. This prevents an adversary from trigger-
ing a revocation event of another node as all other components of the Harakiri
message are public knowledge. However, a Harakiri message is triggered on the
condition that an adversary has compromised the private key, thereby allowing
it to potentially craft a spoofed Harakiri message. Although this would render
the compromised key useless to the adversary [65], it still provides the adversary
the capability to revoke the node from the network. The inclusion of the pri-
vate key in the Harakiri message also presents a backward secrecy issue. As the
Harakiri message is propagated between nodes, the private key becomes publicly
available, and affects the security of all prior messages signed or encrypted with
the key pair to be revoked. To counter this issue, Hoeper and Gong [65] pro-
posed the use of dedicated key pairs for different uses. However, this adds to
the complexity of node key management. Another solution to this was proposed
by the same authors in [64], which forgoes the inclusion of the private key. This
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proposal relies on pre-shared keys for public key authentication, adding to the
complexity of key management.
The provision of public key authentication during a planned revocation event
can be achieved through Key Transition Messages. The use of a pre-generated
revocation certificate is a mechanism for unplanned key revocation. However, this
requires the user to store and secure the revocation certificate from accidental
or malicious disclosure. Past proposals to provide public key authentication for
DTNs has resulted in the disclosure of private key materials, or multiple key
pairs for different roles. This leads to backward secrecy issues, as well as an
added complexity in key management. As a result of these shortcomings, the
issue of providing public key authentication during key revocation is still an open
problem.
5.2 Key Revocation System Model and Security
Properties
This section outlines the System Model and Security properties of the application
environment. The likely application and landscape of the network is described.
Terminology such as types of nodes and keys are defined. The system model is
susceptible to attack by adversarial agents that will attempt to exploit a threat
model, which is defined and described. The adversary capabilities and the extent
of their attacks are also outlined. Given the system model of the network, and the
threat model and adversary capabilities, the security properties that the proposed
revocation scheme should achieve are identified. Throughout this paper, the
notations in Table 5.1 to refer to nodes, keys, revocation, trust, and black hat
nodes are used.
5.2.1 System Model
The system is assumed to be a large scale DTN such as a Mobile Ad-Hoc Net-
work (MANET) or VANET, spanning a large geographic area. The deploy-
ment environment has no other entities except nodes themselves. There is no
centralised PKI or any form of Trusted Third Party (TTP), and there is no
public communications infrastructure. Nodes are considered fully autonomous
and mobile, requiring no human intervention. They self-initialise on deployment
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Table 5.1: Notations
Notation Description
Node ID Notations
i Unique Persistent Identifier i
Ni Node i
Key Notations
Kni Keypair of Ni (version n)
Sni Secret (Private) Key of Ni (version n)
P ni Public Key of Ni (version n)
Di Direct Key List of Ni - List of public keys received directly
from another node
Ai Approved Key List of Ni - List of trusted public keys received
from carrier nodes
Ui Untrusted Key List of Ni - List of untrusted public keys
received from carrier nodes
Revocation Notations
Ci Revocation Certificate of Ni - Certificate stating the cease of
operations of Ni's public key
Qi Revocation Request of Ni - Request intent for the cease of
operations of Ni's public key
Qji Revocation Request of Ni signed by Nj
Ri Key Revocation List of Ni - List of trusted Revocation
certificates and Revoked keys
Gi List of Signatories for Ni - Nodes that have signed Qi
Trust Notations
T ji Trust Value Ni has of Nj
T(i,j) The Common Trust Value of nodes between Ni and Nj - Trust
value of nodes in common between two nodes
TDi The Collective Trust Value of Ni Direct List - Trust value
of all trustworthy nodes (T ji > 0) in Di
TGi The Signature Trust Value of Ni Signature List - Trust
value of all signatories in Gi
Black Hat Notations
S(m,i) Spoofed Private Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm (version n)
P n(m,i) Spoofed Public Key with identity of Ni, generated by
malicious Nm (version n)
C(m,i) Spoofed Revocation Certificate with identity of Ni,
generated by malicious Nm
Q(m,i) Spoofed Revocation Request with identity of Ni,
generated by malicious Nm
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with no a-priori knowledge of the network or their neighbours. There is no pre-
deployment initialisation phase by an oine authority. The key management
phases of Moore et al. [100] are adopted, but given the lack of a pre-deployment
phase, the key management phases are; initial bootstrapping (distribution), op-
eration, and revocation.
Nodes retain a persistent unique identity [108], and generate Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) public and private key pairs [98, 78]. These keys are used
to perform security based tasks such as providing confidentiality, data integrity,
and message authentication. The key pairs are assumed to have a long but finite
time period of validity, similar to PGP where keys may last 1 to 2 years. It
is an open network, where nodes freely join or leave, with a large number of
nodes in the system at any time. Nodes communicate to each other through
wireless communications using the IEEE 802.11 specification suite [71]. Due
to their mobile nature, they create ephemeral or opportunistic bi-directional
connections between neighbours [65]. These communications connections are
used to exchange the public keys they own, as well as the public keys of other
nodes they have met and carry. Public key exchange is considered to be a low-cost
communications procedure as the exchange occurs at one-hop distances between
nodes [13]. The public key exchange is completed over a two channel or side
channel scheme [72]. Due to the large number of nodes and geographic size of
the system, it is assumed that adversary or malicious nodes will exist in the
system, and that it might not be feasible to expel such a node.
Key revocation events are also considered rare [87] in comparison to other key
management operations such as distribution. Although this work focuses on an
unplanned key revocation event - the scenario when a key has been compromised
and requires to be revoked, the proposed scheme is also applicable to expired
keys and their replacement in a planned revocation event.
5.2.2 Trust Model
Using the same transitive trust model outlined in Section 3.2.2 [138], the public
keys of each node are exchanged when nodes are within communications range.
These keys form Direct trust, and are easily verifiable as they were transferred
by the node owning the corresponding private key. Carried keys belonging to
other nodes are also distributed in the key exchange process. Indirect trust
relationships between autonomous nodes are formed if the collective trust values
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are sufficient similar to the trust model in Chapter 3.
5.2.3 Definitions
The following terminology throughout this paper is defined:
1. Key Revocation is the process where a node no longer (or believes that it
no longer) has sole possession and control of the private key. As a result,
the node wishes to cease using the compromised key.
2. Key Replacement is the process where a node generates a new key pair to
replace a revoked key pair.
3. Revocation Certificate is a message a node generates to distribute to neigh-
bouring nodes with intent to cease the use of a public key. It also includes
the new public key.
4. Public Key Authentication - Is the verification of the identity-key binding
of a public key. In a decentralised public key distribution scheme such as
PGP and the Web of Trust, public key authentication is achieved by the
human user confirming the entity's claimed identity is associated with their
corresponding public key. It is measured as a boolean (Y or N).
5. Public Key Confidence is proposed in this thesis as having confidence in
the identity-key binding of a public key. In an autonomous DTN, without
a centralised PKI, or any other infrastructure but the nodes, verification
that the public key being distributed belongs to the associated node is
difficult. In a DTN application, public key confidence is how confident the
autonomous nodes are that the multiple instances of the same public key
they are receiving is actually owned by the node identity. It is a continuous
value consisting of the culmination of trust values. When the confidence in
a public key has exceeded a threshold, public key authentication has been
achieved.
6. Trust Value is a real numerical value within a predefined range, that is
assigned to a single key or node by an entity describing the level of trust
it has in that key or node.
The following terms on how nodes categorise the receipt of keys are defined.
These reflect how the node came into possession of the public key.
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1. Direct Key is a public key that a node has received from the owner - NA
has received the public key of NB (PB) directly from NB. Direct Keys are
stored in the Direct Key List (DA).
2. Carrier Key is a public key that a node has received from another node
who has previously met the owner of that public key - NA has received the
public key of NB (PB) from the carrier NC . A Carrier Key can either be
one of the following:
(a) Approved Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key
of NX (PX) from various carrier nodes (NC , ND, and NE) and is
confident that PX actually belongs to NX . Approved Keys are stored
in the Approved Key List (AA).
(b) Untrusted Key is a public key that was distributed by a carrier node
that has not exceeded the public key confidence threshold to be trusted
- Using the example from Figure 2.7, NA has received the public key of
NY (PY ) from various carrier nodes (NB, and NC) and is not confident
that PY actually belongs to NY . Untrusted Keys are stored in the
Untrusted Key List (UA).
Table 5.2: Classification of Nodes and their Keys
Nodes
White Hat (NA)
Key pair (KnA)
Private Key (SnA)
Public Key (P nA)
Revocation
Revocation Request (QA)
Certificate (CA)
Black Hat (NM)
Key pair (KnM)
Private Key (SnM)
Public Key (P nM)
Spoofed ID
Private Key (Sn(M,A))
Public Key (P n(M,A))
Revocation Request (Q(M,A))
Revocation Certificate (C(M,A))
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the different classifications of nodes, keys
and revocation materials. They can be broadly categorised into two types of
nodes. White Hat Nodes (NA) are nodes that are legitimate, and have not been
compromised by an adversary or attacker. They generate a key pair (KnA), which
148 Chapter 5. DTN Key Revocation and Replacement
consists of a White Public Key (P nA) and a White Private Key (S
n
A). In the
event of key revocation, a White Hat Node may generate Revocation Materials
to distribute. These include a Revocation Request (QA), which signifies the intent
of Node A to revoke their key pair, and a Revocation Certificate (CA), which is
distributed to other nodes.
Black Hat Nodes (NM) are nodes that have been compromised by an adver-
sary or attacker. Like White Hat Nodes, they possess their own Key pair (KnM),
which consists of a Black Public Key (P nM) and a Black Private Key (S
n
M). A
Black Hat Node as part of their malicious nature may create Spoofed ID Ma-
terial. The first form is a Spoofed ID Public Key (P n(M,A)). This is when the
Black Hat node generates a key that has the identity association of a White Hat
Node, but the key of an adversarial node. It is created when NM changes the
identity association of its public key (P nM) from itself (M) to the identity of a
White Hat Node (A). This results in a public key that other nodes think belongs
to NA (that is NA has the corresponding private key) however, NM holds the
corresponding private key.
The Black Hat Node may also attempt to generate a Spoofed ID Revocation
Request (Q(M,A)) or Spoofed ID Revocation Certificate (C(M,A)). For both the
Request and Certificate, the Black Hat node generates a revocation material that
has the identity association of a White Hat Node, and a Spoofed ID Public Key.
This results in a revocation request or certificate that other nodes think belongs
to NA (that is NA is requesting the key revocation) with the NM attempting to
insert P n(M,A).
5.2.4 Threat Model
Given the system model outlined in Section 5.2.1, the following threat model is
assumed:
1. Lack of Infrastructure - With no infrastructure to assist in key management
operations such as public key revocation and replacement, nodes will have
to handle these operations independently. An adversary node may take
advantage of the state of change as keys are being revoked and replaced to
assume the identity of another node. The lack of infrastructure also affects
the implementation of a trust and reputation system as there is difficulty
in the aggregation of trust scores to form a reputation system.
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2. Lack of Public Key Authentication - There is no trusted third party, and
therefore no assurance of public key authentication. There is no authentic-
ity between the public key and the identity of the owner [12]. An adversary
node is capable of associating its own public key to the identity of another
node, distribute this key, and perform a Man In The Middle (MITM) at-
tack.
3. Physical Tampering - DTN nodes may be subject to physical tampering
[106]. Attackers may gain physical access to a node, modifying the be-
haviour, public key bindings, and distribute Spoofed ID Keys from tam-
pered nodes. The physical tampering of nodes may be mitigated but cannot
be prevented. As such, nodes will need a mechanism to detect and protect
the network against potentially compromised nodes.
4. Eavesdropping and Modification of Communications - Since the connection
between nodes in a VANET are ephemeral, and with no static routing,
nodes may be required to pass on messages between nodes. This provides
an adversary the capability to overhear as well as the potential to modify
wireless communications between nodes [107]. Due to this threat, nodes
will need to establish secure end-to-end communications.
5. Open and Dynamic Network - Nodes may be deployed, join, or leave the
network at any time. With no TTP to provide public key authentication or
detection of adversaries, it is easy for an attacker to deploy new adversarial
nodes into the network. Therefore, it is possible for the network with a
large population of nodes to always consist of a population of adversarial
nodes, which cannot be expelled.
5.2.5 Adversary Capabilities
Adversarial nodes will attempt to exploit the threat model outlined for this
network. With a Spoofed ID Key, any adversary node is capable of imperson-
ating another node. This has consequences for secure communications, data
integrity, message authentication, and future key management activities such as
key revocation. Due to the characteristics of a DTN, an adversary is capable
of eavesdropping on communications. These networks require communications
to be passed on between nodes in a store and forward method [40]. A message
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or bundle encrypted with a Spoofed ID Key that an adversary has generated,
means that if the adversary is capable of intercepting the message, they can suc-
cessfully perform a MITM attack [12]. An insider attack model was used, with
the adversarial nodes assumed to have similar abilities as outlined by [32] with
the following capabilities:
1. Adversarial nodes can obtain any message passing through the network
between two other nodes within communications range [40, 12, 107].
2. They are a member of the network and can therefore initiate and receive
communications with other nodes in the network.
3. They are able to generate new Black Private and Public Keys (SnM , P
n
M) as
defined in Section 5.2.3 and distribute P nM . S
n
M and P
n
M between adversary
nodes are independent to prevent White Hat nodes from blacklisting a
common P nM between all adversary nodes [32].
4. They are able to generate and distribute Spoofed ID Keys (P n(M,i)) as defined
in Section 5.2.3. This is when they associate their own private and public
key pair with another node's identity in their DM or AM Lists [12].
5. They are able to perform a Sybil Attack where they assume the identity
of a White Hat Node, so that they revoke their keys, and generate false
revocation certificates to insert Spoofed ID Keys as defined in Section 5.2.3.
6. Adversary nodes are capable of compromising the private key of neighbour-
ing nodes if in close contact through side channel attacks.
5.2.6 Security Properties
Given the system and threat model of the network, this section outlines the
desired security properties the key revocation scheme should achieve. Ultimately,
the aim is to achieve public key authentication in the node requesting a key
revocation and replacement.
Property 1: A White Hat node (NR) should be able to self-revoke their own
key pair (KnR) when they suspect it has been compromised. This comprises of
a timely removal of the compromised public key (P nR) from other nodes in the
network to prevent the compromise of messages by an adversary.
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Property 2: The same White Hat node (NR) should be able to generate a
new key pair (Kn+1R ), and distribute the replacement public key (P
n+1
R ) as part of
the key replacement process to re-establish a secure end-to-end communications
channel with other nodes in the network.
Property 3: A Black Hat node (NM) should not be able to perform a key
revocation event under the guise or identity of another node, causing a false
revocation event with a spoofed revocation certificate (C(M,R))
Property 4: The effect of a Black Hat node (NM), wishing to exploit the key
revocation and replacement process of a White Hat node (NR) by distributing a
spoofed ID key (P n(M,R)) should be mitigated.
Property 5: During an unplanned revocation event, the revoking White Hat
node (NR) through some trust mechanism, should be able to inherit trust from
the compromised public key (P nR) to the replacement public key (P
n+1
R ).
5.3 New Key Revocation and Replacement Pro-
cess
Assuming the system model outlined in Section 5.2.1, three applicable self-
revocation schemes were analysed. The first is the Remove Only (RO) revo-
cation scheme, where compromised keys are removed, but the new public keys
are distributed using the LCF key distribution mechanism [31]. The second is
the Remove and Replace (RR) revocation scheme. This is where the new public
key is inserted into the key list where the compromised key resided. The third
scheme is the newly proposed revocation scheme designed to provide public key
authentication, called the DS revocation scheme. This is where neighbouring
friendly nodes attest and vouch for a nodes' identity during the key revocation
process.
In this section, the proposed key revocation and replacement scheme suitable
for application in an autonomous DTN without any centralised PKI is outlined.
The requirements as well as two base line alternatives based on the LCF trust
and reputation schemes are also discussed.
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5.3.1 Requirements
Due to the distributed and decentralised nature of the system model outlined in
Section 5.2.1, the revocation schemes should avoid distributing the entire CRL
to all nodes. Instead, it is more desirable to distribute only the ∆CRL. This
reduces the communications overhead particularly as the CRL increases in size.
Therefore, the following revocation certificate structure that a revoking node
(NR) would generate was adopted:
CR = [R,P
n
R, certificate metadata, P
n+1
R ] (5.1)
Nodes should maintain their own independent version of the revoked key list,
dependant on whether they trust the revocation certificate. Discrepancies in the
revoked key list between nodes will exist due to the independent trust values
nodes will assign each revocation certificate they receive. This is expected as the
nodes manage trust independently due to the lack of a centralised trust authority.
As more nodes self-revoke keys, the revoked key list for each node will continue
to grow. To reduce the size of this list, the revoked key entries may be removed
after a pre-determined length of time. The assumption here is that the DTN
may span a large geographic area, and due to the openness of the network where
nodes freely join and leave at any time, some nodes may never meet or have any
contact with another node at opposite sides of a country. It can be assumed that
the revocation certificate in this scenario would have little context for a node,
and therefore may safely remove the entry.
Although the adversary may have compromised the private key, allowing it
to compromise the security of previous messages encrypted and signed by the
private key, the proposed scheme does not further compromise the security of
prior messages by including the private key for other nodes in the revocation
certificate such as in [65]. There is no need for confidentiality for the revocation
certificate as it is considered public knowledge for all nodes, similar to an issued
PGP revocation certificate [138].
5.3.2 Remove Only (RO) Revocation Scheme (without trust
transferral)
The RO revocation scheme without trust transferral revocation process is an
adaptation of Hoeper and Gong's Harakiri message [65]. The CR is passed be-
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tween nodes, and P nR is removed. P
n+1
R is distributed using the traditional LCF
key distribution from [31]. There is no trust transferral between P nR and P
n+1
R .
Figure 5.1 depicts the RO revocation process between the revoking node NR
and a neighbouring node NA. Initially, NR generates a new key pair K
n+1
R . It
also generates a revocation certificate CR, which contains information on the old
public key P nR. NR sends CR to neighbouring NA. NA receives CR and extracts
information on P nR, and searches the Direct (DA), Approved (AA), and Untrusted
(UA) key lists for an occurrence of P
n
R. If P
n
R is found in any of the key lists,
it is removed and added to a Revoked Key list RA much like a CRL. NA now
also becomes a carrier of CR and passes them onto other nodes who have not yet
received the certificate. Any node with the certificate is a carrier and dissemi-
nates the certificate to every node they encounter. The new public key P n+1R is
distributed using the LCF trust system.
Figure 5.1: RO Revocation Process.
5.3.3 Remove and Replace (RR) Revocation Scheme (with
absolute trust transferral)
The RR revocation process follows a similar process to the RO revocation process,
with a variation in how P n+1R is distributed. Figure 5.2 depicts the RR revocation
154 Chapter 5. DTN Key Revocation and Replacement
process. The actions of the NR are the same to the RO revocation process.
When NA receives CR and searches through DA, AA, UA key lists removing any
instances of P nR, it replaces those instances with P
n+1
R . P
n
R is also added to RA.
This revocation process has a complete trust transferral model from P nR to P
n+1
R .
Figure 5.2: RR Revocation Process.
In the RO, and RR revocation scenarios, the revocation certificate is accepted
as a 'first in, first accepted' basis. The authenticity of the revocation certificate
may be in question if more than one node is requesting a key revocation for
the same identity. To address this issue, and provide public key authentication
during a key revocation event, the DS revocation process is proposed.
5.3.4 Distributed Signing (DS) Revocation Scheme
The DS revocation process adds security through public key authentication; by
determining that the key to be revoked actually belongs to the corresponding
identity. The Web of Trust property from PGP [138] of signing public keys to
provide confidence in identity-key binding is utilised. The revocation request, and
resulting new public key must be signed by a group of trustworthy nodes called
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signatories. When a node NR intends to revoke P
n
R, it generates a revocation
request QR. However, instead of distributing QR, NR broadcasts to neighbouring
nodes to sign (or attest for) QR. The signing of QR by a neighbouring node such
as NA signifies the confidence of NA that P
n
R is to be revoked and the newly
generated P n+1R actually belongs to a trustworthy node. By extension, the most
likely owner of the key and identity (public key confidence). The signing process
of public keys is computationally expensive and time consuming [66]. However,
its use in a revocation event is justified as key revocation would be a more scarce
occurrence compared to more common key distribution events in PGP [138]. The
node requesting the revocation may then choose whether to accept or reject the
signature from a neighbouring node based on their trust relationship. Once a
critical number of signatures are collected, the revocation request is elevated to
a revocation certificate and distributed. These steps are outlined below.
The signing process is detailed in Figure 5.3. NR after generating QR and
Kn+1R , broadcasts its intention for signatories. Neighbouring node NA receives
QR and extracts both P
n
R and P
n+1
R . It then checks whether P
n
R ∈ DA meaning
NA has previously met NR. If they previously haven't met, there is no prior trust
relationship between the two nodes and NA does not sign QR. If there is a prior
relationship, NA requests DR and uses this list and its own DA to calculate the
Common Trust between both nodes (T(R,A)), which is shown in Equation 5.2. T
D
A
is also calculated using Equation 5.3. The values T(R,A) and T
D
A are compared
such that if T(R,A) > T
D
A , NA agrees to sign QR. The positive trust values of the
direct key list are used to prevent Black Hat nodes from spamming and lowering
the threshold of signing.
T(i,j) =
∑
x∈{y|Py∈γ}
T xi
|γ| where γ = {Di ∩Dj} (5.2)
TDi =
∑
x∈{y|Py∈Di}∧T yi >0
T xi
|Di| (5.3)
If NA agrees to sign QR, it sends the signed QR and P
n+1
R back to NR, which
has the opportunity to accept or reject the signature. Upon a successful signature
by NA, NR must determine whether NA is trustworthy. Figure 5.4 depicts the
process of NR accepting the signature from NA. NR requests DA. From this,
NR calculates T(R,A). From DR, NR computes T
D
R . These values are compared
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Figure 5.3: DS Revocation Request Signing Process.
such that if T(R,A) > T
D
R , NR accepts the signature from NA. The positive trust
values of the direct key list are used to prevent Black Hat nodes from spamming
and lowering the threshold of signing.
The signing process and signature acceptance or rejection process is repeated
until there are sufficient signatures on the revocation request. Each node records
the number of common nodes between the two nodes in each direct key exchange.
At the time of revocation, the revoking node computes the average number of
common nodes from their past interactions with other nodes and this forms the
required number of signatures. This average number provides an indication of
the number of nodes in common (from the perspective of the revoking node)
between nodes in the DTN. If the revocation process was triggered early in the
bootstrapping of the network, where the revoking node had only met a very small
number of nodes, the required number of signatories would reflect this, providing
a realistic number of signatories required. The number of signatories required
can also be limited, to prevent an excessive amount of nodes required to sign
QR.
Once the threshold of signatures has been reached, the QR is elevated to a
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Figure 5.4: DS Revocation Request Signing Acceptance Process.
revocation certificate CR. CR is then distributed and carried through to other
nodes using an epidemic style routing [127]. When a node receives CR, it de-
termines whether to trust the certificate and proceed with the key revocation
process. Figure 5.5 outlines the process of accepting or rejecting the DS revo-
cation certificate. NA receives CR from either NR directly or from a carrier.
From CR, NA extracts P
n
R, P
n+1
R , and GR. The average trust of signatories T
G
R
is calculated from GR using Equation 5.4.
TGi =
∑
x∈{y|Py∈σ}
T xi
|σ| where σ = {Gi ∩Dj} (5.4)
The collective signatories trust (TDA ) is calculated using Equation 5.3. If
TGR < T
D
A , then CR and R
n+1
R are rejected, otherwise they are both accepted
and the key revocation process continues. Each of the key lists DA, AA, and
UA are searched and any instances of P
n
R removed. Both the certificate and old
public key (CR, P
n
R) are also added to NA's internal key revocation list RA. The
adoption of P n+1R is determined based on how the receiving node took receipt of
CR. NA may have received the revocation certificate from one of two sources.
The first is directly from NR, the node that is requesting the revocation of P
n
R. In
this instance P n+1R is added to DA. The second scenario is receipt from a carrier
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Figure 5.5: Receiving a DS Revocation Certificate Process.
node passing on CR. In this instance, P
n+1
R is accepted into AA.
5.4 Experimental Methodology
An open source DTN and VANET simulator was developed called Traffic Djam
[30] that models the decentralised distribution of public keys between nodes using
a Web of Trust model. This simulator provides complete control over the key
exchange process. The simulator initialises nodes with a persistent unique node
identifier similar to [108], and a public and private key pair signature similar to
key fingerprints in PGP [138]. Nodes follow a random movement path model
[73]. Nodes within a predefined communications range of another node connect
and engage in public key exchange whilst in motion. At some defined time, a
node will initiate a self key revocation and replacement process.
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5.4.1 Experimental Setup
A similar node deployment environment to Chapters 3 [31] and 4 were assumed,
with no public infrastructure, no trusted third party, and no central point for
node bootstrap or initialisation. Nodes solely rely on peer-to-peer communica-
tions and self initialise when deployed. An approval system similar to [31] was
used to provide a three-tiered key trust system: Direct, Approved and Untrusted.
The receiving node may approve or reject the carried public key based on the
trust value of the carrier node it received the key from and the trust algorithm.
The revocation occurs when a White Hat node meets and performs a key
exchange with an adversary or Black Hat node. Because these meetings may oc-
cur in close proximity, the White Hat node suspects that their private key might
have been compromised. The White Hat node then triggers a key revocation and
replacement event. As such, the security and evaluation metrics were measured
from the time subsequent after the key revocation event.
5.4.2 Adversary Setup
Adversary nodes in this network will exploit the lack of public key authentication
and issue Spoofed ID Keys. They will bind their own public key with the identity
of a White Hat Node to trick other nodes into believing this false binding. They
will then distribute these keys to other nodes as the keys are used for inter-nodal
communications.
The adversary nodes are introduced into the network at the very beginning
of the simulation during the key distribution phase. The adversary has the op-
portune moment to attack the network and attempt to distribute the Spoofed
ID Keys during the key distribution phase. This attack simulates the scenario of
an outsider adding adversarial nodes into the network to allow eavesdropping of
inter-nodal communications. The distribution of Spoofed ID Keys is detrimental
to the security of the network. Nodes may transmit bundles encrypted with a
Spoofed ID Key believing it to be for the desired receiver. Spoofed ID Keys pro-
vide an adversary the capability to eavesdrop on network traffic and impersonate
other nodes.
A Black Hat node will also perform a Sybil Attack in the event a White
Hat node undergoes key revocation. The Black Hat node may become aware of
this key revocation event, and attempt to replace the key being revoked with
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a spoofed ID key instead of the new legitimate key from the White Hat node.
The adversary performs a Sybil Attack to assume multiple identities and begin
distributing the Spoofed ID key and a falsified revocation request under the guise
of distributing the new key that is to replace the old revoked key.
Two scenarios for adversary nodes performing the Sybil Attack were investi-
gated. The first called Single is where a single node performs the Sybil Attack
while the other designated adversary nodes perform the Key Spoof Attack. This
scenario results in only a single designated node performing the Sybil attack
targeting the key revocation phase and provides insight to the effect of a sin-
gle adversary node. The second called Multiplying is where multiple nodes begin
performing the Sybil Attack as they become aware of a White Hat node revoking
their keys. As described in Section 5.2.5, all adversary nodes begin the simulation
performing a Key Spoof Attack. When an adversary comes into contact with a
node that is requesting or conducting a key revocation action (QR signing, CR
distribution), they become aware of the Node ID that is attempting to revoke
old keys and distribute new keys. As a result, the adversary will in addition to
the Key Spoof Attack, begin a Sybil Attack on the Node ID attempting key re-
vocation. This results in a staggered introduction of adversary nodes performing
a Sybil Attack.
Figure 5.6 depicts how Black Hat nodes begin the Sybil Attack. This diagram
shows an interaction of 7 nodes. Nodes A, B, and R are White Hat Nodes, with
Node A the revoking node. Nodes m1, m2, m3, and m4 are Black Hat Nodes.
At time t in Figure 5.6a, NR is the revoking node and has generated CR and
P n+1R to distribute. It is connected to NA and passes CR and P
n+1
R . NB and
Nm1 are connected, along with Nm3 and Nm4. At time t + θ in Figure 5.6b, the
nodes have moved and formed new connections. NA has connected to NB and
now distributed CR previously obtained from NR at time t. NR has connected to
Nm1 and passed on CR and P
n+1
R . Because Nm1 is a Black Hat node, and it has
become aware of a node performing a revocation (NR), it begins the Sybil Attack
by assuming the identity of NR and generating a spoofed revocation certificate
with a spoofed key inserted (C(m1,R) and P
n
(m1,R)). At time t+ 2θ in Figure 5.6c,
the nodes have moved again and new connections have been formed. NR has
connected with Black Hat node Nm4, resulting in Nm4 beginning a Sybil Attack
and assuming the identity of NR. NA having carried CR, is now connected to
Black Hat node Nm3, who also begins a Sybil Attack on NR. Nm1 having been
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(a) t (b) t+ θ (c) t+ 2θ
Figure 5.6: Black Hat Nodes detect key revocation process and initiate Sybil
Attacks
the first Black Hat node to begin a Sybil Attack at time t+θ, meets fellow Black
Hat node Nm2 to initiate a Sybil Attack on NR.
Figure 5.7 depicts a typical staggered introduction of Black Hat nodes per-
forming a Sybil Attack. The figure shows the percentage of the Black Hat node
population that is performing the Sybil Attack. The DS revocation scenario
shows a delay in the Black Hat nodes beginning to perform the attack when
compared to the RO and RR scenarios. This is due to the fact that the RO and
RR scenarios immediately distribute the revocation certificate, while there is a
delay in signing and verifying the revocation request or certificate for the DS
scenario. Even during this delay, the percentage of Black Hat nodes that begin
the Sybil attack is still increasing, as they meet the node requesting revocation
directly. As other adversary nodes become aware and start performing the Sybil
attack, they also trigger other Black Hat nodes they come into contact to perform
the Sybil attack.
This method of introducing Black Hat nodes performing the Sybil attack is a
realistic method because it is assumed that there is no centralised infrastructure
or authority. As a result, the Black Hat nodes do not have the capability of
coordinating a systematic Sybil attack at the same time as the White Hat node
requested a key revocation. The Black Hat nodes attack independently of each
other and become aware of a key revocation event through dissemination through
the DTN network. Each Black Hat node will generate independent P n(m,i).
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Figure 5.7: Black Hat Nodes performing Revocation Attack over Time at 10%
of Node Population.
5.4.3 Experiments
An experiment consisted of three scenarios, each using different methods of pub-
lic key revocation. The first scenario called RO, utilised the revocation method
outlined in Section 5.3.2. The revoking node generates CR and distributes it
between nodes that it meets. P nR is removed from the keyring of other nodes and
P n+1R is distributed using the LCF trust system as in Chapter 3. The second sce-
nario called RR utilised the RR revocation method outlined in Section 5.3.3.
The revoking node generates CR and distributes it amongst nodes it meets.
P nR is removed from the keyring of other nodes and replaced with P
n+1
R . The
third scenario DS utilised the newly proposed revocation method described in
Section 5.3.4. For each scenario, the same movement model and node connec-
tions were replayed. This allowed the observation and measurement of how each
methodology of key revocation affected the removal of P nR and the adoption of
P n+1R . Table 5.3 summarises the simulation constants used. Each scenario was
simulated for a little longer than 24 hours for a total of 100,000 seconds, in a
10km by 10km square similar to a large central business district of a city. A total
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of 500 nodes was used, each with a conservative communications range of 50m.
Nodes move at a walking speed range of 1km/h to 9km/h between each indi-
vidual waypoint. Upon reaching their destination, nodes wait for a time period
between the ranges of 10 to 120 seconds before generating a new destination and
travel speed.
The 802.11g communications standard has a baud rate of 6 to 54 megabits
per second (Mbits/s) [71]. Using the same public key setup as in Chapters 3
and 4 of a 256 bit ECC public key, and assuming a public key package size of 300
bytes to include additional key metadata and information. Full keyring transfer
of all 500 public keys could be completed in 0.02 to 0.2 seconds. The simulator
communication model determined whether two nodes were within the 50 me-
tre communications range of each other for a significantly greater time period
than the 0.2 seconds worst case scenario. If the two nodes had sufficient time in
communications range, the data bundle was transferred successfully, otherwise
partial data bundles were dropped. Since the pedestrian nodes travel at differing
speeds, a sub-routine in the simulator would perform a high frequency check to
determine whether there was sufficient time between two nodes within commu-
nications range to transfer their respective data bundles. It is also assumed that
there is minimal interference from buildings and obstacles in the communications
model.
Experiments varying the adversary node population were conducted, each
with the three revocation schemes or scenarios RO, RR, and DS. The number
of adversary nodes was varied from 0, 1 node, 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%
and 30% of node population. In this work, each adversary node is associated
to a Byzantine failure in the Byzantine fault tolerance system, or a traitor in
the generalised Byzantine Generals' Problem. Common solutions to Byzantine
fault tolerance require the number of failures (traitors) should not exceed one
third of the total nodes (generals). Hence, only an adversary population of
less than 33% was analysed [81]. The range of percentages of adversary nodes
provides observations on the system when there are low populations of adversaries
operating, as well as at adversary populations approaching the Byzantine fault
tolerance threshold of 33%.
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Table 5.3: Experimental Simulation Constants
Parameter Value
Experiment Environment
Environment Size 10 x 10 Kilometres
Duration 100,000 Seconds
Movement Model Pedestrian Waypoint
Node
Number of Nodes (N) 500
Node Speed 1 - 9 Km/h
Node Wait Time 10 - 120 Seconds
Communications Standard IEEE 802.11 Suite
Communications Range 50 Metres
Trust
Trust Range [-1, 1] Continuous
Initial Trust Value 0
Trust Threshold >1.0
Black Hat Nodes
Number of Black Hat Nodes [0%, 1, 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%]
5.4.4 Security Evaluation Metrics
Three security evaluation metrics were investigated in this simulation. These
metrics are used to determine whether the security properties outlined in Sec-
tion 5.2.6 are met by the proposed key revocation scheme. These include; the
timely removal of a self-revoked White Hat key from the network, along with the
distribution of a replacement key to provide secure end-to-end communications,
the mitigation of a Black Hat node distributing a spoofed ID key, and finally
trust transferral between the self-revoked White Hat key and the replacement
key. The metrics are also used to compare the effectiveness of the different trust
systems, and whether they are suitable for providing public key authentication
and trust transferral for key revocation in an autonomous DTN. The metrics
are Public Key Distribution, Revocation Request or Certificate Distribution, and
Revocation Certificate Trust Value.
1. The Public Key Distribution metric involves measuring several sub-metrics,
they are: Revoked Key Distribution, New Public Key Distribution, and
Spoofed Public Key Distribution. The trust based revocation process can
achieve security through the timely removal of old revoked keys from other
nodes, a prompt distribution of new public keys generated to replace the
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old revoked keys, and the mitigation of spoofed revocation public keys,
which pose a threat to MITM attacks.
(a) Revoked Key Distribution is a measure of the percentage of nodes that
still hold P nR over time. This metric is important to determine whether
the revocation process is actually removing P nR from circulation and
use. It is expected that the proposed revocation process would remove
instances of P nR as quickly as possible as to prevent their use in message
encryption or verification.
(b) New Public Key Distribution is the measure of the percentage of
nodes that have received P n+1R designed to replace P
n
R for encryption
or verification purposes. The expectation is for P n+1R to be distributed
promptly to facilitate the operational security of the network and pre-
vent potential adversaries from exploiting a window of opportunity
during the key transition phase.
(c) Spoofed Key Distribution measures the percentage of nodes that hold
a spoofed revocation public key such as P n(M,R) as defined in Sec-
tion 5.2.3. This represents a successful attack by the adversary to
exploit an opportunistic moment to inject a public key with falsified
identity-key bindings. It is expected that the spoofed key distribution
be mitigated to prevent adversaries from performing further attacks
on the network such as a MITM attack.
2. Revocation Certificate Distribution involves measuring several sub-metrics,
they are White Hat Certificate Distribution, Spoofed Certificate Distribu-
tion, and more specifically Certificate True or False Positives.
(a) White Hat Certificate Distribution is the measure of percentage of
nodes that received CR. The expectation here is that as many White
Hat nodes in the population to receive CR to allow for prompt removal
of P nR and adoption of P
n+1
R .
(b) Spoofed Certificate Distribution is the measure of percentage of nodes
that received a spoofed revocation certificate such as C(M,R) generated
by an adversary node in an attempt to remove P nR and insert P
n
(M,R).
It is expected that the revocation scheme mitigate the distribution of
spoofed revocation certificates, thus hindering a mechanism of P n(M,R).
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(c) Certificate True or False Positives focusses on the percentage of nodes
that are White Hat nodes, in possession of a White Hat revocation
certificate such as CR (True Positive), and the percentage of nodes that
are White Hat nodes, in possession of a spoofed revocation certificate
such as C(M,R) (False Positive). The requirement is for the revocation
scheme to maximise the True Positive occurrences, while minimising
the False Positive occurrences. Since the proposed revocation scheme
is designed to protect White Hat nodes, the analysis of this metric
does not consider Black Hat nodes.
The Revocation Certificate Distribution metrics are important to determine
how effective the revocation schemes are at providing security by distribut-
ing legitimate White Hat certificates, and suppressing falsified Black Hat
certificates. Although the Revocation Certificate Distribution metrics are
related to the Public Key Distribution metrics, they will not be the same.
Public keys are still distributed through direct contact and carrier nodes
so although the results may not be identical, they follow a similar trend
for the individual experiments.
3. The Revocation Certificate Trust Value metric only applies to the DS re-
vocation scenarios. It measures the average trust of the Revocation Cer-
tificate (CR) that nodes assign as a result of the List of Signatories (GR)
attached to the certificate. Since signatory nodes will only sign CR if they
are confident in the identity-public key binding of the revoking node NR,
the trust associated with P nR is translated to GR by the signing node. GR
forms the trust assigned to CR and P
n+1
R for a node receiving the certificate.
The Revocation Certificate Trust Value is an indicator for trust transferral
between P nR and P
n+1
R .
5.5 Results and Analysis
For each of the experiments conducted, the two security evaluation metrics de-
scribed in Section 5.4.4 were used to determine the effectiveness and behaviour
of the proposed key revocation system.
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5.5.1 Public Key Distributions
The quantity of revoked keys in the system over time indicates if the proposed
key revocation system is effective in removing the revoked keys from active use. A
timely removal of the revoked key (P nR) fulfils Security Property 1 in Section 5.2.6.
Meanwhile, the quantity of new public keys (P n+1R ) over time provides a metric on
whether the P n+1R are actually replacing P
n
R. The distribution of P
n+1
R to nodes
fulfils Security Property 2 in Section 5.2.6. With the constant threat of Black
Hat nodes in the network, the distribution of Black Hat revocation keys (P n(M,R))
provides an important metric on whether the proposed key revocation system
is allowing the distribution of new legitimate public keys such as P n+1R , whilst
preventing the distribution of spoofed identity keys such as P n(M,R). Mitigating
the distribution of P n(M,R) fulfils Security Property 4 in Section 5.2.6.
5.5.1.1 Revoked Key Distribution
Figure 5.8 depicts the revoked key distribution over time for the RO, RR, and
DS scenarios when there are no Black Hat nodes. The time is measured in
the number of seconds after the revocation event. The RO and RR scenarios
follow the same trend as their revocation process is identical. This is because
the only restrictions or safeguards in removing P nR from active use is CR. All
three scenarios initially start with 71% of nodes in the system holding P nR. For
the RO, and RR scenarios, all instances of P nR were successfully removed from
active use after the first 5,000 seconds post revocation event. The DS scenario,
requiring signatories on the QR to elevate it to a CR, has a delay, which is shown
by the dotted line signifying the time when QR was elevated to CR. Prior to
CR being distributed, the number of P
n
R instances actually increased. This is
because the only node that has removed the key from use is the owner of the
key (the revoking node NR) and no other node has been instructed to remove
P nR from use. Therefore, it is still being distributed by carrier nodes. When the
threshold of signatories is reached and QR is elevated to CR, the quantity of P
n
R
begins to decline as the CR is distributed. Unlike the RO and RR scenarios,
the DS scenario does not remove all instances of P nR from active use and begins
to plateau out. It is expected that given enough time and no adversary nodes,
eventually all instances of P nR would be removed from active service.
With the introduction of Black Hat nodes into the simulation, there are some
variations in the revoked key distribution results. The 10% Black Hat nodes
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Figure 5.8: Revoked Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes.
experiment is presented as a typical experiment, with similar trends in the other
experiments with varying Black Hat node populations. All revoked key distri-
bution results can be found in Appendix G. Figure 5.9 depicts the revoked key
distribution over time with a 10% Black Hat node population for a Multiplying
attack. Similar results were obtained for a Single attack. Due to the presence of
Black Hat nodes attacking the system prior to the revocation event, the start-
ing percentage of revoked keys in active service is only 61%. As the Black Hat
node population is increased, the starting percentage of revoked keys in service
decreases. The RO and RR scenarios depict a quick removal of P nR, with all
instances removed within 5,000 seconds after the revocation event. The DS re-
vocation scenario, requiring signatories for QR to elevate it to CR, has a delay
shown by the dotted line signifying the time when QR was elevated to CR. Prior
to CR being distributed, the percentage of P
n
R actually increased. This is because
the only node that has removed P nR from use is the owner of the key (NR) and
no other node has been instructed to remove P nR from use. Therefore, it is still
being distributed by carrier nodes. When the threshold of signatories is reached
and QR is elevated to CR, the percentage of P
n
R begins to decline as the CR
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is distributed. At the end of the measurement window, only 2% of nodes still
retain P nR for the DS revocation scenario. It is expected that given enough time,
eventually all instances of P nR would be removed from active service.
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Figure 5.9: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes
(Multiplying Attack).
The time required for the DS scenario to gather signatories and elevate QR
to CR was around 3,300 seconds. The rate of P
n
R removal for the DS scenario
is around 1 key every 12 seconds, while for RO and RR scenarios the removal
rate is around 1 key every 5.5 seconds. The contribution of both a time delay in
gathering signatories and a slower P nR removal rate attributes to the increasing
disparity in time for P nR removal between the RO and RR scenarios, and the DS
scenario. Taking the point where 20% of the node population still has P nR, both
RO and RR scenarios achieve this 1,760 seconds after the revocation event, while
the DS scenario only achieves this after 8,575 seconds. Although the RO and
RR scenarios outperform the DS scenario in the removal of P nR, the distribution
of replacement key P n+1R is also considered.
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5.5.1.2 New Public Key Distribution
With no adversary nodes, Figure 5.10 depicts the percentage of nodes with new
public keys over time after the revocation event. Unlike the revoked key distri-
bution over time, the RO and RR scenarios differ as they distribute the newly
generated keys through different methods. The RO scenario completes key dis-
tribution to all 500 nodes after 30,000 seconds, plateauing after 25,000 seconds.
The RR scenario provides the most efficient new public key distribution with
15,000 seconds, half the time required for the RO scenario. The DS scenario pro-
vides the slowest response when there is no adversary nodes. In the first 10,000
seconds, the DS scenario manages to distribute the new public key to 56% of
nodes, outpacing the RO scenario. However, in the next 40,000 seconds until the
end of the measurement window, the DS scenario only manages to distribute to
an additional 31% of nodes ending with a total of 87% of nodes with P n+1R . It is
expected that given enough time and no adversary nodes, eventually all nodes
in the network will have received P n+1R . Another interesting observation is the
efficiency the RR scenario has for distributing the new public key. In the time
taken for the DS scenario to sign and elevate QR to CR, the RR scenario man-
aged to distribute the new public key to 85% of nodes. These results indicate
how efficient and effective the RR scenario is in distributing the new public key
due to the absolute trust transferral. However, this only holds when there are
no adversaries in the network.
Figure 5.11a depicts the new public key distribution over time with a 10%
Black Hat node population for a Single Attack. All new public key distribution
results can be found in Appendix H. Even with only a single node undertaking
the Sybil Attack, there is a significant degradation in new public key distribution
for the RO and RR scenarios. The RO scenario plateaus around 40% of nodes
with P n+1R 15,000 seconds after the revocation event, and remains there with
minor fluctuations until the end of the measurement window. This indicates
that NR had difficulty in distributing P
n+1
R to other nodes, as the single Black
Hat revocation node performing the Sybil attack had already provided a spoofed
key (P n(M,R)).
The RR scenario, which provided the best new public key distribution with
no adversaries, reached a peak of 71% of nodes with P n+1R when there is only a
single Black Hat node performing the Sybil Attack. After 10,000 seconds post
the revocation event, the percentage of nodes with P n+1R decreases. This is due
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Figure 5.10: New Public Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes.
to the method of how P n+1R is distributed. The RR scenario inserts P
n+1
R into
the keyring where P nR was previously found. From the experiments, many of
the P n+1R instances were in fact in the Approved Key Lists of nodes. However,
with a Black Hat node performing a Sybil attack, it is also distributing a spoofed
revocation key directly, through direct communications. This in turn means that
the spoofed revocation key is also being carried by the nodes who have met the
Sybil Black Hat node directly, thereby exploiting the two tiered trust system.
The key distribution mechanism means that if a node receives the key directly, it
takes a higher trust value than a key received indirectly through carriers. So as
seen in Figure 5.11a, the slow decline in nodes with new public keys is attributed
to approved key list instances being replaced with direct key instances of the
spoofed revocation key.
The DS revocation scenario provides the best new public key distribution
of the three scenarios when there is only a single Black Hat node performing
the Sybil Attack. In the time prior to QR being elevated to CR in Figure 5.11a,
there is a steady increase of nodes with P nR, whilst theNR is collecting signatories.
However, once enough signatories have been collected and QR is elevated to CR,
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there is a large increase with over 50% of nodes possessing P n+1R in the first
10,000 seconds post revocation event. After that, a slow but steady increase of 1
new public key every 400 seconds is distributed until 45,000 seconds, where the
number of nodes with the new public key begins to plateau at 71%.
With only a single Black Hat node performing the Sybil attack, an adoption of
P n+1R of only 40% in the RO Scenario, 59% in RR, and 71% in the DS revocation
scenario was observed. With the addition of a multiplying adversary where
multiple Black Hat nodes perform the Sybil attack, there is a degradation in
new public key distribution for all scenarios.
Figure 5.11b depicts the new public key distribution over time with a 10%
Black Hat node population for the Multiplying attack. The RO and RR sce-
narios show a significant loss in adoption of P n+1R , with results of 2% and 10%
respectively at the end of the measurement period. The characteristic spike in
the RR scenario was observed. This is where many of the approved instances of
P n+1R are replaced with direct instances of the spoofed revocation key. The rate
of replacement in this scenario is significantly faster than the single Black Hat
node experiment in Figure 5.11a, due to the significantly greater number of Black
Hat nodes performing the Sybil Attack. The DS revocation scenario, achieved
an adoption of 45%. Although this only leaves less than half the network with
P n+1R , it provides a significant improvement over the RO and RR scenarios.
The percentage of nodes with P n+1R at the end of the measurement window
was also measured. Figure 5.12a depicts the percentage of nodes with new public
keys for each experiment with single adversary attack. Then there are no Black
Hat nodes, the RO and RR scenarios distribute P n+1R to all the nodes, while the
DS only achieves distribution to 87% of nodes. However, with the introduction
of a Black Hat node performing the Sybil attack, the percentage of nodes with
P n+1R substantially declines for both the RO and RR scenarios. Even at a Black
Hat node population of 1 node, the RO scenario only manages to distribute P n+1R
to 44% of nodes. In all experiments where Black Hat nodes are present, the DS
revocation scenario always outperformed the RO and RR scenarios. A constant
decline in percentage of new public keys is evident as the Black Hat population
is increased and at 30% Black Hat node population the DS revocation scenario
only manages to distribute new public keys to 50% of nodes, aligning to the
Byzantium Generals Problem threshold [81].
Figure 5.12b depicts the percentage of nodes with new public keys for each
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(b) Multiplying Attack
Figure 5.11: New Public Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes
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experiment with a multiplying adversary attack. With multiple nodes performing
the Sybil attack, both the RO and RR scenarios struggle to distribute the new
public key. As with the results from the Single node attack in Figure 5.12a,
the DS revocation scenario outperforms both the RO and RR scenarios. It is
important to note that even with a 1% Black Hat node population, there is 1
White Hat revoking node, while there are potentially 5 Black Hat revoking nodes.
At a Black Hat node population of 5%, there is still 1 White Hat revoking node,
whilst there are potentially 25 Black Hat revoking nodes assuming the identity of
a single node. With a White Hat to Black Hat ratio such as 1:5 for 1% and 1:25
for 5%, the DS revocation scenario still managed to distribute the new public
key to nearly 70% of nodes for a Black Hat population of 1%, and over 50% for a
Black Hat population of 5%. At 20% Black Hat node population (100 nodes), the
DS scenario has difficulty to even distribute P n+1R to 20% of nodes. Reciprocal
results are observed in the percentage of nodes with spoofed revocation keys.
The results from the New Public Key Distribution metric show that a DTN
environment with no adversaries, the RO and RR revocation schemes provide an
efficient distribution of P n+1R , to a greater number of nodes than the DS revoca-
tion scheme. The provision of public key authentication for the DS scheme, re-
sults in an additional delay while QR is being signed before being elevated to CR,
which is then distributed. However, with the introduction of Black Hat nodes,
the RO and RR schemes have difficulty in distributing P n+1R , due to the lack of
public key authentication. This lack of public key authentication allows Black
Hat nodes to distribute P n(M,R), which displaces the legitimate P
n+1
R from other
nodes. The provision of public key authentication in the DS revocation scheme
is effective in mitigating the distribution of P n(M,R), and allows the distribution
of P n+1R even at high Black Hat node populations. The Spoofed Revocation Key
distribution results provide further evidence supporting this finding.
5.5.1.3 Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution
Figure 5.13a depicts the spoofed revocation key distribution over time with a
10% Black Hat node population for Single Attack. All spoofed revocation key
distribution results can be found in Appendix I. For the RO scenario, the number
of spoofed revocation keys steadily increases at a rate of 1 key every 53 seconds
until about 15,000 seconds, where the percentage of nodes with spoofed revoca-
tion keys plateaus at around 50%. The percentage of nodes with the spoofed
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Figure 5.12: Percentage of nodes with New Public Keys for each experiment.
176 Chapter 5. DTN Key Revocation and Replacement
revocation keys in Figure 5.13a exceeds the percentage of nodes with the new
public key as in Figure 5.11a. The RR Scenario also sees a steady increase of 1
key every 9 minutes after 10,000 seconds, which is similar to the rate of decrease
in new public keys after the same point in time. This supports the observation
that the new public keys in approved lists are being replaced by direct spoofed
revocation keys. At the end of the measurement period, 31% of the nodes in
the RR scenario have a spoofed revocation key. The DS scenario provided the
best result in mitigating the distribution of spoofed revocation keys when there
is a single adversary performing the Sybil Attack. In the first 15,000 seconds,
the number of spoofed revocation keys increases at a rate of 6.3%/10000s, before
plateauing at approximately 10% of nodes. In the single adversary attack exper-
iment, the DS scenario provided a three-fold improvement to the RR scenario,
and a five-fold improvement to the RO scenario in minimising the distribution
of spoofed revocation keys.
Figure 5.13b depicts the spoofed revocation key distribution over time with
a 10% Black Hat node population for Multiplying Attack. Both the RO, and
RR scenarios fared poorly in mitigating the distribution of spoofed revocation
keys. The Black Hat nodes in the RO scenario managed to penetrate 98% of
nodes with a spoofed revocation key. They managed to achieve this result in the
first 10,000 seconds post revocation event. The RR scenario also fared poorly in
a multiple Black Hat node Sybil attack. The Black Hat nodes in this scenario
managed to penetrate 90% of nodes with a spoofed revocation key, achieving that
result in 15,000 seconds post revocation event. Both these scenarios demonstrate
the strong adversary capabilities in flooding a network with spoofed revocation
keys. The DS scenario provided the best result in mitigating the distribution of
spoofed revocation keys. The Black Hat nodes in this scenario only managed to
penetrate 53% of nodes with the adversary key, achieving this level after 15,000
seconds post revocation event. Although the number of nodes with spoofed
revocation keys may exceed the number of nodes with legitimate new public
keys, this result is still a significant improvement over the RO and RR scenarios.
The DS scenario still leaves the NR with approximately half of the network with
legitimate keys. Varying the number of Black Hat nodes performing the Sybil
attack demonstrates that the DS scheme still outperforms both the RO and
RR scenarios. However, at higher quantities of Black Hat nodes performing the
Sybil Attack, it becomes exceptionally difficult to provide a secure revocation
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Figure 5.13: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 10% Black
Hat Nodes.
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environment. This is due to the reduction in number of potential nodes to act as
signatories, and the number of nodes that are willing to pass on the revocation
certificate is significantly reduced.
Figure 5.14a depicts the percentage of nodes with spoofed public keys for
each experiment with a single adversary attack. Reciprocal to the new public
keys in Figure 5.12a, the percentage of nodes with a spoofed revocation key in
the RO scenario significantly increases with the introduction of Black Hat nodes.
The RR scenario trends mitigate the spoofed revocation key by half, with the
DS revocation scenario achieving another half reduction in addition to the RR
scenario. Interestingly, the percentage of nodes with spoofed revocation keys de-
creases as the Black Hat node population increases. This can be explained by the
nature of the single attack. As the Black Hat node population is increased, the
single node performing the Sybil attack has greater difficulty in finding potential
nodes to provide the spoofed revocation key, as Black Hat nodes will spoof the
revocation key with their own key. This accounts for the decline in percentage of
nodes with spoofed revocation keys as the Black Hat node population increases.
It is expected that when multiple nodes perform the Sybil attack, the percentage
of nodes with spoofed revocation keys will be directly proportional to the Black
Hat node population.
Figure 5.14b depicts the percentage of nodes with new public keys for each
experiment with a multiplying adversary attack. As expected, with multiple
nodes performing a Sybil attack, the percentage of nodes with spoofed revo-
cation keys increases as the Black Hat node population increases. With the
introduction of Black Hat nodes, the DS revocation scenario outperforms both
RO and RR scenarios by mitigating the spread of spoofed revocation keys. Black
Hat node populations between 1 node and 15% achieved a 40-60% reduction in
nodes with spoofed revocation keys. While experiments with 20% and greater
Black Hat nodes achieved a smaller margin in spoofed revocation key reduction.
Taking the 10% Black Hat node population experiment, the Black Hat nodes
in this scenario only managed to penetrate 53% of nodes with the adversary
key. Although the number of nodes with spoofed revocation keys may exceed
the number of nodes with legitimate new public keys, this result is still a signif-
icant improvement over the RO and RR scenarios. The DS revocation scenario
still leaves the revoking node with approximately half of the network with legiti-
mate keys. Varying the number of Black Hat nodes performing the Sybil attack
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Figure 5.14: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Keys for each exper-
iment.
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demonstrates that the DS revocation scheme still outperforms both the RO and
RR scenarios. However, at higher quantities of Black Hat nodes performing the
Sybil Attack, it becomes exceptionally difficult to provide a secure revocation
environment. This is because of the reduction in both; the number of potential
White Hat nodes to act as signatories, and the number of nodes that are willing
to pass on the revocation certificate.
5.5.2 Revocation Certificate Distribution
The distribution of revocation certificates both legitimate (CR) and falsified
(C(M,R)) demonstrates the proposed revocation scheme achieves the Security
Properties described in Section 5.2.6. More specifically, Security Property 3 is
achieved by the distribution of the White Hat Certificate CR, the prevention of
distribution of the Spoofed Certificate C(M,R), and the distinguishing of of these
two certificates. As such, three sub-metrics were measured: First is the White
Hat Certificate distribution, second, is the Spoofed Certificate distribution, and
finally the Certificate True or False Positives.
5.5.2.1 White Hat Certificate Distribution
Figure 5.15 depicts the distribution of revocation certificates from White Hat
nodes over time when there are no adversary nodes. The dotted line indicates
the time when the revocation request was elevated to a certificate for the DS
scenario. In the time elapsed for the request to be elevated to a certificate
for the DS scenario, both RO and RR scenarios have achieved nearly a 100%
revocation certificate distribution. It achieved 100% distribution within the first
5,000 seconds of the revocation event. The DS scenario however has a large
initial spike, before gradually reaching approximately 85% at the end of the
measurement window. Given there are no adversary nodes, it is expected that
given sufficient time and random movement of nodes, the DS scenario would also
achieve a 100% distribution.
With the introduction of adversarial nodes into the system, at the level of
10% Black Hat nodes, with only a single node performing the Sybil attack, there
was a reduction in White Hat revocation certificate distribution. Figure 5.16a
depicts the distribution of revocation certificates from White Hat nodes over
time in a 10% Black Hat node single attack scenario. All white hat certificate
distribution results can be found in Appendix J. Both the RO and RR scenarios
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Figure 5.15: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with no Black Hat Nodes.
plateau at a distribution of 87% of nodes. A decrease in White Hat certificate
distribution of 13% was observed, compared to the results with no Black Hat
nodes in Figure 5.15. The DS scenario also followed a similar trend to the results
with no Black Hat nodes. There was a slight decrease of 6% to achieve a White
Hat certificate distribution of 79% compared to 85% in the experiment with no
Black Hat nodes.
Figure 5.16b depicts the White Hat Certificate distribution over time for the
multiple 10% Black Hat nodes experiment. The results of both the RO and RR
scenarios indicate that all the certificates were distributed within the first 5,000
seconds post revocation event. The maximum certificate distribution is 64% of
nodes. The DS revocation scenario only started distributing the certificate after
QR was elevated to CR, which was about 3,300 seconds post revocation event. A
significant amount of certificates were distributed within the first 10,000 seconds,
with the DS scenario equalling the result of the RO and RR scenarios within the
first 20,000 seconds. There is a steady increase of approximately 1 certificate
distributed every 4 minutes. At the end of the measurement window, the DS
182 Chapter 5. DTN Key Revocation and Replacement
scenario achieved a White Hat Certificate distribution of 79% of nodes. The
DS revocation scenario had no Q(M,R) ever elevated to a C(M,R) for distribution.
This provided NR the opportunity to distribute CR without competition from
instances of C(M,R) from the Black Hat nodes. If even one instance of Q(M,R) was
elevated to C(M,R) and subsequently distributed after the measurement period
(t = 50000 + 1), the ability to distribute this instance of C(M,R) to other nodes
would be hampered since 79% of nodes would already have CR. This leaves only
a potential 21% of the node population that may receive C(M,R). Without the
particular details on the signatories of C(M,R), the spoofed revocation certificate
may still not be accepted by other nodes due to the proposed distributed revo-
cation framework proposed. Thus, leaving an even smaller potential sample of
nodes that would accept C(M,R).
5.5.2.2 Spoofed Certificate Distribution
The percentage of nodes that received a spoofed revocation certificate was also
measured. Figure 5.17b shows the results when multiple Black Hat nodes perform
the Sybil attack with 10% Black Hat node population. All spoofed certificate dis-
tribution results can be found in Appendix K. In this experiment, both RO and
RR scenarios saw a C(M,R) distribution of 26%. In contrast, the DS revocation
scenario saw a complete prevention in distribution of C(M,R), as Q(M,R) was never
elevated. Although only 26% of the node population received C(M,R) for RO and
RR scenarios, the percentage of nodes who have received P n(M,R) in Figure 5.12b
is nearly 98% and 90% respectively. This discrepancy between certificates dis-
tributed and public keys distributed is attributed to the compounding effect of
carried certificates being passed on, and the Black Hat node directly distributing
P n(M,R). It then becomes important for nodes to be able to distinguish between a
legitimate certificate, and a spoofed certificate.
In the single attack, there is only one Black Hat node attempting to distribute
a spoofed revocation certificate. Figure 5.17a depicts the results over time for
the experiment with 10% Black Hat nodes single attack. The RO and RR sce-
narios both see a 13% distribution of the spoofed revocation certificate, while the
distributed revocation sees a complete prevention in distribution of the spoofed
revocation certificate, as the spoofed revocation request was never elevated to a
certificate since there was not enough signatories.
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Figure 5.16: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure 5.17: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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5.5.2.3 Certificate True or False Positives
The Certificate True or False Positives for White Hat nodes was also measured.
A certificate True Positive is when a White Hat node receives a White Hat
revocation certificate, while a certificate False Positive is when a White Hat
node receives a spoofed revocation certificate. This metric used the multiplying
attack to observe the compounding effect of multiple nodes perpetrating the
Sybil attack. Figure 5.18 depicts a summary of True Positive percentages for
the varying Black Hat node populations. When there are no adversary nodes,
the RO and RR scenarios are successful in distributing a legitimate certificate
to all nodes. The addition of public key authentication in the DS scheme results
in a small percentage of nodes either not receiving CR, or not accepting CR
due to the public key confidence is still below the threshold. However, with the
introduction of adversaries, the DS revocation scenario outperformed both RO
and RR scenarios. As the number of Black Hat nodes increases, the RO and RR
scenarios decline at a greater rate than the DS scenario. In the extreme case
where the Black Hat node population makes up 30% of the node population,
The percentages of nodes with True Positives is less than 30% for the RO and
RR scenarios, while the DS scenario still exceeds 50% of the node population.
This indicates that over half of the node population holds a legitimate revocation
certificate.
Figure 5.19 depicts a summary of False Positive percentages for the varying
Black Hat node populations. As expected, when the Black Hat node population
is increased, the percentage of certificate False Positive instances also increases.
For all experiments, the provision of public key authentication in the DS scenario
resulted in 0 False Positive certificates distributed. No instance of Q(M,R) was
elevated to C(M,R) and subsequently distributed. However, for the RO and RR
scenarios, even at the lowest Black Hat node population of 1 node, 13% of the
node population accepted a False Positive Certificate. This gradually increases
to a little over 40% as the Black Hat node population increases to 30% of the
node population.
The certificate true or false positives metric provides additional evidence that
the DS revocation scheme is providing public key authentication. In an environ-
ment with adversaries, the DS scheme results in a greater number of true positive
certificates being distributed than the RO and RR scenarios, which provide no
public key authentication. By providing public key authentication for the revo-
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Figure 5.18: Percentage of True Positives (White Hat Node with White Certs)
for Multiplying Attack.
cation certificate, the DS scheme successfully prevents a White Hat node from
accepting a spoofed revocation certificate. As the results indicate, no White Hat
node approved a spoofed revocation certificate in any experiment.
5.5.3 Comparison of Revocation Certificate and Key Dis-
tributions
This section will focus on the multiplying Black Hat attack. When comparing
the results of the key distribution in Figure 5.12b and the results of the revo-
cation certificate in Figure 5.18, a significant difference in results was observed.
In this experimental system setup and adversary model, distributing CR does
not necessarily correspond to the distribution of P n+1R . Specifically, in the DS
revocation scenarios of Figure 5.18, the percentage of nodes that are White Hat
nodes and have received a White Hat certificate remains consistently above 50%
of the node population for all variations of adversary node numbers. However,
the percentage of nodes with new public keys in Figure 5.12b is less than the
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Figure 5.19: Percentage of False Positives (White Hat Node with Black Certs)
for Multiplying Attack.
revocation certificate distribution. This due to the fact that receiving CR is
not the only method to receive the P n+1R . Nodes may receive P
n+1
R by one of
two methods, the first is direct contact from the revoking node, and the second
through the revocation certificate carried by other nodes.
When adversary nodes are introduced, new public key distributions decline,
particularly as the adversary population is increased. The legitimate White Hat
node that is requesting the revocation (NR) is the only node that is directly
distributing P n+1R . Concurrently there is a large percentage of Black Hat nodes
that have assumed and claim to be the revoking node, therefore providing the
opportunity to distribute spoofed revocation keys, even though GR may have
not been elevated to CR. An example of this scenario occurring is when a node
Ni has received a spoofed revocation key from the adversary directly, and added
this key to Di. At a later point in time, it receives CR - the revocation certificate
of the legitimate revoking node from a carrier. After trusting and accepting this
certificate, it determines that the old key to be revoked (P nR) is not in the key list,
and therefore the revocation process does not take place. It does however trust
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the certificate, to the extent of adding it to Ri, and thus carrying and distributing
CR to other nodes. This occurrence accounts for the disparity between the results
of key distribution and revocation certificate distribution in Figures 5.12b and
5.18 respectively.
The higher success rate of accepting the legitimate revocation certificate when
compared to the new public keys, may mean that the only method of distributing
P n+1R is through CR. However, this creates several issues. First, is the occurrence
when a node (Ni) has never met the revoking node (NR) prior to the revocation
event. Ni would have no instance of P
n
R and provide no confidence to determine
whether the P nR is to be revoked or not since the have no history prior. This
may be addressed through the signatories who have signed CR. The second
occurrence is in a system model unlike the one simulated. When dealing with
a large scalable open and dynamic network where nodes may join of leave at
any time, this methodology of distributing new public keys would disadvantage
nodes that have joined the network at a later time.
5.5.4 Revocation Certificate Trust Value
The final metric measured was the Revocation Certificate Trust Value. This
metric provides an indicator on trust transferral between P nR and P
n+1
R . The
measurement of this metric along with the White Hat Certificate Distribution
metric in Section 5.5.2.1 fulfils Security Property 5. The trust value attached to
the revocation certificate is inherited from GR, the list of signatories. Each node
that receives CR will compute and assign their own trust value and determine
whether to accept or reject the certificate. Table 5.4 shows the average trust
values that nodes assign upon receipt of CR for varying quantities of Black Hat
nodes. The results show as expected that as the number of Black Hat nodes
increases, the average trust value decreases. The average revocation certificate
trust values for the multiplying attack are also lower than the average trust values
for the single attack. The difference in average trust values between experiments
where there are no black hat nodes, and experiments with 30% black hat nodes,
is due to the trust value of the signatory nodes. In all experiments conducted,
CR was only signed by another node NA if T(R,A), exceeded T
D
A (Equations 5.2
and 5.3). Sufficient trust is required before NA will agree to sign CR. An added
safeguard to prevent a Black Hat node from signing CR to intentionally lower
the trust value, is the ability for NR to accept or reject the signature from NA.
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The signature from NA will only be accepted by NR if T(R,A), exceeds T
D
R . These
two threshold requirements during the signing process, prevents the intentional
lowering of trust associated with CR and subsequent P
n+1
R . The high trust values
in Table 5.4, even when there are large quantities of Black Hat nodes, provides
evidence of the signature approval scheme providing trust transferral.
Table 5.4: Average Trust Value of Revocation Certificate
Black Hat
Nodes
Average Trust of CR
Single Multiplying
0% 0.8088 0.8088
1 Node 0.8084 0.8084
1% 0.8074 0.8072
5% 0.7957 0.7953
10% 0.7867 0.7861
15% 0.7740 0.7723
20% 0.7561 0.7534
25% 0.7544 0.7392
30% 0.7277 0.7223
5.5.5 Comparison of Revocation Schemes
In this section, different related revocation schemes presented in Chapter 2 are
compared with the proposed DS revocation scheme. Table 5.5 summarises the
comparison between the revocation schemes. They are compared on key dis-
tribution mechanism, the communications overhead, storage overhead, and the
security of the various schemes. The first two are Raya et al. [117] and Lin et
al. [87]. Both these schemes rely on centralised infrastructure to perform and
manage the revocation. Hoeper and Gong [65] utilises an IBC based scheme.
Although distributed, it still relies on a KGC to bootstrap and initialise the
network. The DS revocation scheme is entirely distributed, decentralised, and
non-reliant on any party during key distribution much like the PGP model. Due
to either the centralised and distributed nature of the schemes compared, the
communications overheads differ. The centralised schemes of Raya et al. [117]
and Lin et al. [87] provide the minimal number of messages of N . Hoeper and
Gong [65] being distributed, in a worst case scenario is the order of edges be-
tween nodes. The DS revocation scheme at minimum also equals Hoeper and
Gong at the order of edges. However, with the inclusion of signatories, there is
an extra component which, in the worst case scenario, is the order of nodes. This
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is a worst case scenario, in reality, this parameter is significantly lower. The size
of the messages is also compared. Raya et al. [117] utilise the distribution of a
CRL, however provide a mechanism of compressing this using bloom filters. This
introduces false positives. Lin et al. [87] utilise the RSU infrastructure to filter
and distribute only the differences in the CRL for that particular node, thereby
only distributing a ∆CRL. The Harakiri message in Hoeper and Gong [65] is
essentially a ∆CRL. This is also the case in the DS revocation scheme where the
Revocation Certificate is a form of ∆CRL.
The storage requirements are consistent between all schemes. Although the
proposed DS revocation scheme has provision for the removal of old entries in the
CRL. The security metrics compare the infrastructure, revocation type, back-
ward secrecy, and general adversary model. Both Raya et al. [117] and Lin et al.
[87] are centralised schemes, while Hoeper and Gong [65] and the DS revocation
scheme are distributed. Raya et al. [117] and Lin et al. [87] concentrate on
a revocation process for node removal. However, due to the reliance on a cen-
tralised CA, there is also provision for key revocation and replacement. These
two centralised schemes also take the position that a malicious or misbehaving
node should be removed from operation. Hoeper and Gong [65] is only capable of
node revocation in the distributed scheme. The Harakiri message only supports
the removal of the node from service. As it is an IBC scheme, they are reliant
on a KGC to perform the key replacement process. The DS revocation scheme
is based on the PGP scheme and nodes are capable of generating their own key
pairs. As a result, it provides a mechanism for compromised keys to be revoked
and replaced without expelling the node from service. The proposed scheme also
assumes that a DTN may cover a large geographic area, with numerous nodes,
therefore making it difficult or infeasible to revoke a node from service. Instead
of removing a malicious node, it mitigates or limits the damage it can cause.
Backward secrecy of the key revoked is also considered. Both centralised
schemes support backward secrecy, as the compromised key is removed from ser-
vice. Hoeper and Gong [65] rely on the private key to be included in the Harakiri
message as a method of public key authentication. This creates a backward se-
crecy issue as the confidentiality of previous messages is compromised. The DS
revocation scheme relies on a revocation certificate that achieves both backward
secrecy and public key authentication for both old and new public keys. The
centralised schemes also assumes a weak adversary model. This is when the
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CA is considered to be completely trustworthy, the final authority of trust, and
provides public key authentication. It is considered to be either unhackable, or
outside the scope of attack. The decentralised schemes assume that nodes can
be compromised, and that they form the CAs of the network, the CA can be
compromised. Therefore, Hoeper and Gong [65] and the proposed DS revocation
scheme assume a strong adversary model, where all entities of the network can
be compromised.
In comparing revocation schemes, the proposed DS revocation scheme pro-
vides equal or better performance metrics in all categories except the number of
messages communicated. The distributed nature of the revocation scheme pro-
posed provides resilience to a stronger adversary model than centralised schemes.
Backward secrecy and public key authentication is also achieved. It is also as-
sumed that it may be infeasible to remove an adversary or misbehaving node
due to the scale of the network. As a result, a distributed key only revocation
mechanism that distributes a ∆CRL was presented.
Table 5.5: Comparison of Revocation Schemes
Scheme Raya et al. Lin et al. Hoeper and Gong DS
Key Distribution CA Based CA Based IBC LCF Based
Message Size CRL1 ∆CRL ∆CRL ∆CRL
No. of Messages N N O(Edges) O(Edges)
Storage CRL1 CRL CRL CRL
Security
Infrastructure Centralised Centralised Distributed Distributed
Revocation Type Node + Key Node + Key Node Key Only
Backward Secrecy Yes Yes No Yes
Adversary Model Weak Weak Strong Strong
1. CRL can be compressed using Bloom Filters
5.6 Discussion
This section discusses the implications and issues related with the proposed re-
vocation scheme, and results. The implementation of a trust and reputation
system to provide public key authentication, through public key confidence for
key revocation provides a few interesting issues.
1. There are delays in authentication. Public key authentication and revoca-
tion certificate authentication is subject to a trade-off in efficiency. Even
with the mobility model, which increases the exposure to neighbouring net-
work entities, there is additional delay in providing authentication in com-
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parison to no authentication. For some application scenarios, this trade-off
between security and efficiency might not be feasible or desirable.
2. The ability for the DS revocation scheme to provide some trust transfer-
ral between versions of keys has security implications. Although the DS
revocation scheme was developed to address unplanned revocation events,
the scheme can also be applied to planned events. In both cases, some
trust transferral can be achieved between key versions. As a result, key
usage durations may be affected. Currently, PGP users will generate keys
for long durations of use (sometimes indefinitely) due to difficulty in trust
transferral. However, to avoid private key compromise, the use of sub keys
are also generated for various security operations [27]. The provision of
authentication and trust transferral by the DS scheme may result in keys
being generated for shorter durations, as revocation and replacement would
provide some trust transferral. Thereby, improving security as keys do not
remain in operation indefinitely.
3. The DS key revocation scheme can not only be applied to autonomous
networks, but to human social networks. The concept of the DS key revo-
cation scheme can provide Multiple-Entity Factor Authentication, and can
be applied to the revocation of credentials (passwords) for user authenti-
cation. In particular, in 'forgot my password' schemes. It can be used as
a last resort measure, for users who have forgotten their credentials, and
exhausted all other challenge-response options. Users may request known
and trustworthy friends to attest their identity and the associated profile.
Variables such as length of service use, number of friends would contribute
to the number of friends needed to provide Multiple-Entity Factor Authen-
tication.
4. The proposed LCF trust establishment scheme and DS key revocation
scheme can be further applied to the CA model used for the Internet. With
over 600 CAs [36] performing certificate operations on the Internet, and a
few root CAs, there is no provision of revoking a trusted Root CA Certifi-
cate as it is self signed and has no trust mechanism for verifying a CRL.
Certificate revocation in this scenario would require a manual removal of
the Root CA certificate from browsers.
5. Trust and reputation systems are not perfect. The implementation of a
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trust and reputation system addresses the autonomous nature of the DTN
environment described. However, a condition may arise where a legitimate
node intends to revoke a key, however, is hindered by the DS scheme from
revoking their private and public key from service.
5.7 Conclusion
Key revocation and replacement is a critical and integral part of the key man-
agement lifecycle of any network. The ability to revoke keys due to limited
lifetimes, planned obsolescence, and more importantly private key compromise,
is an important aspect of providing security for the ongoing operations of a net-
work. This is even more critical in an autonomous DTN environment, where the
characteristics can translate to deployment in hostile environments. The provi-
sion of public key authentication is a foundational concept to the continuance of
confidentiality, data integrity, and message authentication, particularly in DTN
applications, given how data is routed. Public key authentication is particularly
important in the key revocation and replacement phase as it prevents an adver-
sary from falsely revoking a legitimate node, as well as assuming the identity of a
legitimate node. Past proposals to provide key revocation for DTNs have relied
on a centralised TTP such as a CA, or have focused on the planned revocation
event (key expiry, planned obsolescence) rather than an unplanned revocation
event (private key compromise).
This chapter designed, developed and evaluated a key revocation and re-
placement scheme that provides public key authentication for application in an
autonomous DTN. Along with Chapters 3 and 4, which presented and evalu-
ated a key distribution scheme, the addition of key revocation and replacement
completes the DTN key management lifecycle. The proposed scheme specifically
addresses the provision of public key authentication during an unplanned key
revocation event, and by extension can be applied to a planned revocation event.
By utilising a distributed signing feature to provide public key authentication
through public key confidence, autonomous nodes can be confident in the old
key being revoked, while also accepting the new public key. This feature also
provides trust transferral between the old key and the new key, thereby providing
one solution to the issue of decentralised unplanned key revocations. The main
contributions of this chapter are:
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• The investigation, development, and evaluation of a Distributed Signing
key revocation and replacement scheme. The scheme presented provides
public key authentication for both the old revoked key and new public key
during an unplanned revocation event without the requirement of a TTP.
Some sub-contributions include:
 The mitigation of effects an adversary or adversaries performing a
Sybil attack has on the DTN.
 The mitigation and prevention of an adversary or adversaries trigger-
ing a false revocation event.
• The provision of trust transferral between the old revoked public key and
the new public key during an unplanned key revocation event without the
dependence on a TTP.
The proposed key revocation and replacement scheme consistently outper-
formed the other schemes in new public key distribution for scenarios with ad-
versarial agents. In the single attack scenarios, the DS scheme provided a White
New Public Key distribution in the range of 52-77% of nodes, compared with RO
and RR, which achieved 30-44% and 45-68% of nodes respectively. In the multi-
plying attack, the strong adversary model resulted in more varied outcomes. The
DS revocation scheme still provided the best White New Public Key distribution
result when compared to RO and RR schemes.
The DS revocation scheme proposed also significantly mitigated the distri-
bution of Spoofed Revocation Keys when compared to the other scenarios. For
all scenarios in the single attack, the percentage of nodes holding a Spoofed Re-
vocation Key never exceeded 20% for the DS scheme, while the other schemes
resulted in 2 to 4 times the percentage of Spoofed Revocation Keys. More varied
results were obtained when the network was subjected to a multiplying adversary
attack. Even with Black Hat node populations at 1%, the RO and RR schemes
resulted in over 70% of nodes with a Spoofed Revocation Key. In comparison,
the DS revocation scheme provided significantly less Spoofed Revocation Keys
in situations with less than 20% adversarial node population.
Evidence of trust transferral of keys was obtained by the Revocation Certifi-
cate metric, in particular the White Hat Certificate Distribution. This metric
showed a high adoption of signed revocation certificates for the DS scheme when
compared to the RO and RR scenarios.
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These results signify the provision of public key authentication during key
revocation and replacement events in autonomous DTNs. In particular, during
unplanned revocation events, such as the compromise of a private key. Further
potential applications of the DS revocation scheme include Multiple-Entity Fac-
tor Authentication, where trusted friends are attest the identity of a locked out
user.
The limitations of this work is acknowledged in that area of data routing.
It is assumed that incomplete data transfers are dropped. The modelling of a
truly asymmetric data bundle exchange would affect the key revocation results.
A further restriction on how the new public key is distributed could be an area of
further work and experimentation. The future work, which aims to provide addi-
tional security are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, including the potential
performance ramifications of the future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Public key authentication, which is the ability for an entity to verify the identity-
public key binding of another entity, is critical to achieving many overarching
security properties such as confidentiality, data integrity, and message authen-
tication. Without it, an adversary is capable of performing Man In The Mid-
dle (MITM) and Sybil attacks, thereby allowing it to eavesdrop on sensitive data,
and compromise safety critical messages. Therefore, the ability to provide this
service in any network is an important area of research.
The issues of providing public key authentication during all stages of key man-
agement in an autonomous Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is further complicated
by the inherent characteristics that define a DTN. The frequent disconnected
state of the network means a reliable source to destination path is not always
available. This hinders public key distribution and public key revocation opera-
tions as nodes rely on store-carry-and-forward style exchanges. The decentralised
and distributed nature of DTNs means that traditional centralised Trusted Third
Party (TTP) topologies are unsuitable for providing public key authentication.
Autonomous DTNs also have no human intervention to provide trust and key
management duties. Many past proposals that attempted to address this critical
issue claimed to be distributed, but were hierarchic, as they depended on a TTP
prior to deployment or cluster structures. This thesis addresses the challenges
outlined by providing a fully decentralised and distributed solution. It provides
a number of related contributions described in the section following.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 summarises the
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contributions presented in this thesis. Section 6.2 outlines the limitations encoun-
tered and the potential future directions for this research. Section 6.3 presents
the concluding remarks.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
The challenges of providing public key authentication during all phases of public
key management in an autonomous DTN have been addressed. The contributions
to the research questions identified in Chapter 1 are summarised.
The first contribution of this research addressed Research Question 1: Can
a trust or reputation system be utilised to assist in DTN Key Distribution such
that Public Key Authentication can be achieved without a trusted third party, but
by automatically including mobility parameters, behaviour, and levels of collab-
oration into trust? The contribution has been the design of a trust system to
provide public key authentication during key distribution in a DTN. The trust
system utilised a common and effective linear computation engine that exploits
the social contacts to establish initial trust between two nodes meeting. The
proof-of-concept trust system called Leverage of Common Friends (LCF) was
modelled and evaluated in a controlled closed simulation consisting of a small
number of nodes. The LCF trust system was evaluated by introducing an adver-
sary performing a key spoof attack, attempting to exploit the identity-public key
binding. It was also compared to two other trust establishment methodologies.
The first, where trust establishment was randomly generated, and second, where
trust was absolute. The experimental data indicated that the LCF trust system
provided mitigation of adversary public keys and spoofed identity keys by 40%,
when compared to the other two methodologies. The design and implementa-
tion of the LCF trust system addresses the issue of public key authentication
between autonomous nodes during the key distribution phase. In particular, this
addressed a DTN deployment environment where there is no infrastructure. To
the best of our knowledge, this contribution is the first to combine an initial
trust establishment system with a key distribution model to provide public key
authentication for autonomous DTN nodes.
The second contribution of this research addressed Research Question 2: Is
it possible to apply a trust or reputation system for DTN Key Distribution for
a large scale realistic DTN application? The contribution has been to extend
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the deployment of the LCF trust system to a realistic large scale geographic
environment. The scalability of the LCF trust system was tested by modelling
and evaluating public key distribution using vehicular movement models from
San Francisco taxis over a 48 hour period. The movement model consisted of
nearly 500 vehicular nodes in a simulation space of 400 square kilometres. The
experimental data indicated that the LCF trust system was scalable at these
levels and provided mitigation of adversary public keys and spoofed identity
keys. However, scalability in larger orders of magnitude were not addressed,
due to limitation on realistic mobility models. This contribution simulates and
evaluates a combined initial trust establishment system and key distribution
model to provide public key authentication at a realistic scale.
The third contribution addressed Research Question 3: Is it possible to lever-
age location data to assist a trust or reputation system for DTN Key Distribu-
tion? This contribution utilised the realistic large scale geographic environment
of San Francisco taxis to leverage location to assist the LCF trust system in key
distribution. The proposed Location based Leverage of Common Friends (LLCF)
trust system was simulated and evaluated with the LCF trust system and abso-
lute trust system. The effectiveness of the LLCF trust system was determined
by introducing varying quantities of adversaries performing a key spoof attack.
Two variations of adversaries were introduced. The first was a dynamic mobility
adversary, and the second was a stationary adversary. The experimental results
indicated that the addition of co-localisation data in the LLCF trust system pro-
vided better public key authentication than the LCF trust system. Trust values
of legitimate keys were consistently higher in LLCF over LCF, while trust val-
ues of adversarial and spoofed keys were consistently lower in LLCF over LCF.
Spoofed ID Keys were also reduced by up to an additional 50% using the LLCF
trust system over LCF. However, scalability in larger orders of magnitude were
not addressed, due to limitation on realistic mobility models. This contribution
simulates and evaluates a combined initial trust establishment system with co-
localisation data, and key distribution model to provide public key authentication
at a realistic scale.
The fourth contribution designed a key revocation and replacement scheme
that provided public key authentication to prevent false and erroneous revo-
cation by an adversary. This addresses Research Question 4: Is it possible to
utilise a trust or reputation system to assist in DTN Key Revocation such that
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Public Key Authentication can be achieved without a trusted third party? The
proposed scheme utilised a distributed signing scheme by social contacts for a
node to self-revoke. The key revocation scheme is autonomous, decentralised,
and self-organising. It provides a timely removal of revoked keys by distributing
a delta Certificate Revocation List (CRL), while distributing replacement keys
to re-establish an end-to-end communications channel. The effectiveness of the
proposed revocation scheme was determined by introducing varying quantities
of adversarial nodes performing a Sybil attack. Two variations of adversaries
were introduced. The first was a singular adversary, and the second was a mul-
tiplying adversary. The experimental results indicated that the proposed key
revocation and replacement scheme provided a trade-off between preventing a
false and erroneous revocation by an adversary, and a delay in authentication.
This contribution is the first to propose a fully distributed key revocation and
replacement scheme where there is no TTP or human intervention.
The fifth contribution was the addressing of trust transferral between public
keys during an unplanned revocation event, which was the premise of Research
Question 5: Is it possible to provide trust transferral of an old compromised pub-
lic key to a newly generated public key without a trusted third party during an
unplanned key revocation event? Revocation of public keys may be planned,
due to a finite lifetime of keys, and/or organisational and environmental pol-
icy. Trust transferral between the old public key, and the new public key can
be transferred through various planned and organised methods (see Section 2.3
for details). However, in an unplanned scenario, public keys are revoked due to
private key compromise, and there is no trust transferral between old and new
keys. The distributed signing revocation scheme addresses the trust transferral
issue by leveraging the trust of signatories. The experimental results indicated a
high adoption of the signed revocation certificate and subsequent new public key
by legitimate nodes when compared with other revocation schemes with no or
complete trust transferral. However, trust systems are not perfect, resulting in
some specific node instances where trust transferral did not occur. This contribu-
tion proposed a distributed key revocation and replacement scheme where trust
transferral occurs between the old revoked key and the new public key during an
unplanned revocation event.
As a result of these contributions, an additional minor contribution has been
the design and development of a fully customisable DTN simulator in Python
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named Traffic Djam [30]. This simulator was designed in particular to address
the issue of simulating a trust and reputation system assisted public key ex-
change, as well as key revocation events. The simulator has the capability of
generating random movement models, as well as using pre-generated models.
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions
A number of limitations were identified during this research. These limitations
provide potential directions for future research and are presented in the following
sections.
6.2.1 Trust Weighting Variation
The selection criteria for trust weightings (tn, tc, and td) for both the LCF
and LLCF trust system were outlined in Section 3.4. The criteria for tn was
adopted from the cognitive limit of human stable social relationships and corre-
lated with additional research into online social relationships. This provided a
logical and sound starting assumption for the selection of tn. The criteria for tc
was adopted from initial experiments to satisfy the OpenPGP implementations
of GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 2.6. Although
these assumptions and criteria provide a logical starting place for the trust sys-
tem, additional experiments could be undertaken to determine how the variation
of these trust weightings affect the LCF and LLCF trust systems.
The trust weighting selections used reflect established PGP criteria. However,
these weighting selections can be adjusted to reflect the deployment of the au-
tonomous nodes for the environmental conditions, since the level of trust required
reflects the risk in the network. Long term deployment environments with a high
security requirement may adjust the trust weightings to reflect the necessity for
more trust to be established before trusting nodes and keys. The higher trust
reflects the increased risk for such a deployment. The increase in trust satisfies
the higher security requirement of the deployment environment at the cost of key
distribution performance as a greater number of instances of keys are required to
meet the increased trust. Conversely, in a low security requirement deployment,
a lower trust may be used to reflect the lower risk environment. Differing trust
weightings could also be applied to nodes with different roles in the network. A
long term deployment node could have a higher trust requirement, signifying an
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increased risk, and compromise in key distribution and time. In comparison, an
expendable node that is deployed for a short duration may have a lower trust
requirement, signifying a lower risk, whilst providing an improved key distribu-
tion and time. Since risk is dependant on the application of the network, future
work could include a risk factor into the trust system.
6.2.2 Movement Model Variation
The realistic movement model used to evaluate the trust systems proposed in
Chapter 4 is one of many different traffic movement models available. Inves-
tigating the use of a different movement model is a potential future research
direction. Vehicle movement models that include private cars, buses provide dif-
ferent movements compared to taxi cabs. Private cars would show specific source
to destination routes for vehicles that do not congregate around areas such as
airports and tourist areas, and buses would provide a periodic and set route of
vehicle movements. The inclusion of pedestrian movement as well as vehicu-
lar movement in the same model would provide an interesting overlap between
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) and Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs).
Additionally, varying the starting locations of Black Hat nodes is a potential
future research direction, as the limitation of the movement model restricts their
initial placement.
6.2.3 Inclusion of Time and Freshness of Data
Although the addition of co-localisation data to the LCF trust system to form
the LLCF trust system provided an improvement in key distribution and mitiga-
tion of spoofed ID keys, the inclusion of time and freshness of data may further
improve the initial trust establishment scheme. The addition of time and fresh-
ness of data may also provide a mechanism to discard and remove under utilised
public keys.
6.2.4 Incomplete Data Bundle Transfer
The experiments conducted in Chapters 4 and 5, all incomplete transfers of data
bundles were dumped. Modelling a purely asymmetric data bundle exchange
between nodes would significantly affect key distribution and subsequent key
revocation.
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6.2.5 Distribution of New Public Key via Revocation Cer-
tificate Only
In Chapter 5, the distribution of the new public key post revocation could be
further restricted to the revocation certificate. Theoretically, this would provide
additional security in preventing spoofed ID keys from being distributed. How-
ever, this may cause issues in open and dynamic networks where nodes can join
at any time. Newer nodes who have just joined the network may have difficulty
in distributing replacement public keys. The effects of this provide an interesting
future experiment.
6.2.6 LCF Trust and DS Revocation Schemes for CA Man-
agement
The LCF trust scheme proposed and evaluated in Chapter 3 has potential appli-
cation in Certificate Authority (CA) management. Trusting the large number of
Internet CAs is difficult, and the application of the LCF trust system to provide
trust and indicators on the performance and security of a CA has potential in
a distributed regulation of CAs. Combinations of CAs regulating other CAs,
end user regulation of CA, as well as a combination of both CA and end user
regulation could provide an effective method in regulating and mitigating the
issuance of false certificates by rogue or compromised CAs. Furthermore, the
Distributed Signing (DS) revocation scheme proposed and evaluated in Chap-
ter 5 can be applied to provide Root CA certificate revocation in the Internet
CA model. Currently the revoked Root CA certificate has to be manually re-
moved, while the DS revocation scheme has the potential to provide a more
automated revocation process.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
The provision of public key authentication for all phases of key management in a
decentralised, distributed autonomous DTN has resulted in the development and
evaluation of a combined trust system and key distribution scheme. In addition,
the development of a combined co-localisation trust system and key distribution
scheme evaluated on a realistic large geographic scale mobility model. The thesis
also addresses the problem of unplanned key revocation and replacement in an
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autonomous DTN without any centralised CA or TTP. Given how foundational
public key authentication is to the general security properties of a DTN, it is
important to provide confidence in the identity-public key binding during all
phases of key management. The contribution of this thesis has been to provide
public key authentication for a resource challenged network such as a DTN.
Further work that extends the contribution and evaluation of the work presented
in this thesis can be applied to more broad applications and varieties of DTNs.
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Figure A.1: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for Control Scenario.
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Figure A.2: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for Random Sce-
nario.
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Figure A.3: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for LCF Scenario.
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Appendix B
LCF Key Distribution Results
Table B.1: Experiment 1 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 42 42 42 42 42
with Black Hat Keys Approved 58 58 58 58 3
White Hat Nodes Direct 40 40 40 40 40
with Black Hat Keys Approved 50 51 54 50 53
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 30 16 25 29 2
Totals
Direct 82 82 82 82 82
Approved 138 125 137 137 58
All 220 207 219 219 140
Table B.2: Experiment 2 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 48 48 48 48 48
with Black Hat Keys Approved 52 52 52 52 0
White Hat Nodes Direct 44 44 44 44 44
with Black Hat Keys Approved 32 47 41 43 39
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 60 59 53 44 8
Totals
Direct 92 92 92 92 92
Approved 144 158 146 139 47
All 236 250 238 231 139
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Table B.3: Experiment 3 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 53 53 53 53 53
with Black Hat Keys Approved 47 47 47 47 4
White Hat Nodes Direct 50 50 50 50 50
with Black Hat Keys Approved 32 42 41 44 44
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 36 79 86 81 6
Totals
Direct 103 103 103 103 103
Approved 115 168 174 172 54
All 218 271 277 275 157
Table B.4: Experiment 4 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 50 50 50 50 50
with Black Hat Keys Approved 50 50 50 50 9
White Hat Nodes Direct 48 48 48 48 48
with Black Hat Keys Approved 50 48 49 46 49
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 126 82 77 78 9
Totals
Direct 98 98 98 98 98
Approved 226 180 176 174 67
All 324 278 274 272 165
Table B.5: Experiment 5 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 43 43 43 43 43
with Black Hat Keys Approved 57 57 57 57 4
White Hat Nodes Direct 41 41 41 41 41
with Black Hat Keys Approved 49 49 46 51 50
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 34 62 59 68 10
Totals
Direct 84 84 84 84 84
Approved 140 168 162 176 64
All 224 252 246 260 148
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Table B.6: Experiment 6 Results
Key List Control
Random
LCF
1 2 3
Black Hat Node Direct 42 42 42 42 42
with Black Hat Keys Approved 58 56 56 56 3
White Hat Nodes Direct 39 39 39 39 39
with Black Hat Keys Approved 51 53 52 53 54
Spoofed ID Keys Approved 18 25 16 19 1
Totals
Direct 81 81 81 81 81
Approved 127 134 124 128 58
All 208 215 205 209 139
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Appendix C
LLCF White/Black Key Results
Table C.1: Static Black Hat Node Raw Experiment Results
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
Direct Approved
White Black White Black
0
Control 21147 0 104603 0
LCF 21147 0 70363 0
LLCF 21147 0 71943 0
1%
Control 20688 783 101658 3919
LCF 20688 783 69432 837
LLCF 20688 783 70634 810
10%
Control 17009 9576 78323 24908
LCF 17009 9576 52715 9582
LLCF 17009 9576 53604 8454
20%
Control 13396 22043 59095 40407
LCF 13396 22043 37810 17122
LLCF 13396 22043 38675 15049
30%
Control 10458 39191 43345 52768
LCF 10458 39191 27110 22458
LLCF 10458 39191 27794 20134
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Table C.2: Dynamic Black Hat Node Raw Experiment Results
Black Hat
Nodes
Scenario
Direct Approved
White Black White Black
0
Control 21147 0 104603 0
LCF 21147 0 70363 0
LLCF 21147 0 71943 0
1%
Control 20760 379 102539 2392
LCF 20760 379 69688 668
LLCF 20760 379 70630 663
10%
Control 17159 4062 75107 29458
LCF 17159 4062 52949 9756
LLCF 17159 4062 52058 8517
20%
Control 13446 7651 52215 52409
LCF 13446 7651 38243 16829
LLCF 13446 7651 36673 14217
30%
Control 10468 10585 35272 69471
LCF 10468 10585 27603 21779
LLCF 10468 10585 26222 17644
Appendix D
LLCF Key Trust Distribution
Results
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Figure D.1: Key Trust Distribution for 0% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.2: Key Trust Distribution for 1% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.3: Key Trust Distribution for 1% Static Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.4: Key Trust Distribution for 10% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.5: Key Trust Distribution for 10% Static Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.6: Key Trust Distribution for 20% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.7: Key Trust Distribution for 20% Static Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.8: Key Trust Distribution for 30% Dynamic Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure D.9: Key Trust Distribution for 30% Static Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure E.1: Key Trust Five Number Summary.
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Figure F.1: Key Distribution over Time for no Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure F.2: Key Distribution over Time for 1% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure F.3: Key Distribution over Time for 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure F.4: Key Distribution over Time for 20% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure F.5: Key Distribution over Time for 30% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.1: Revoked Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes.
233
234 Appendix G. Revoked Key Results
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  10000  20000  30000  40000  50000
P
e
r c
e
n
t a
g
e
 o
f  
N
o
d
e
s
 w
i t
h
R
e
v
o
k
e
d
 K
e
y
s
 (
%
)
Time after revocation event (seconds)
RO and RR
DS
Request elevated to Certificate
Figure G.2: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 1 Black Hat Node.
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Figure G.3: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 1% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.4: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 5% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.5: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.6: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 15% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.7: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 20% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.8: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 25% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure G.9: Revoked Key Distribution over time with 30% Black Hat Nodes.
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New Public Key Results
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Figure H.1: New Public Key Distribution over time with no Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.2: New Public Key Distribution over time with 1 Black Hat Node.
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Figure H.3: New Public Key Distribution over time with 1% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.4: New Public Key Distribution over time with 5% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.5: New Public Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.6: New Public Key Distribution over time with 15% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.7: New Public Key Distribution over time with 20% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.8: New Public Key Distribution over time with 25% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure H.9: New Public Key Distribution over time with 30% Black Hat Nodes.
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Spoofed Revocation Key Results
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Figure I.2: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 1% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.3: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 5% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.4: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 10% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.5: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 15% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.6: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 20% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.7: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 25% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure I.8: Spoofed Revocation Key Distribution over time with 30% Black Hat
Nodes.
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Figure J.1: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with no Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.2: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 1 Black Hat Node.
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Figure J.3: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 1% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.4: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 5% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.5: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.6: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 15% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.7: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 20% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.8: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 25% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure J.9: Percentage of nodes with White Hat Revocation Certificates over
time with 30% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.1: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 1 Black Hat Node.
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Figure K.2: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 1% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.3: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 5% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.4: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 10% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.5: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 15% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.6: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 20% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.7: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 25% Black Hat Nodes.
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Figure K.8: Percentage of nodes with Spoofed Revocation Certificates over time
with 30% Black Hat Nodes.
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